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 The indigenous nation of the Lipan Apaches initiated diplomatic interaction with 
European powers beginning with colonial Spain in the early eighteenth century. In the 
nineteenth century, Lipan Apaches engaged the sovereign entities of the Republic of 
Texas, Mexico, and the United States. My thesis examines relations between the Lipan 
Apaches and external sovereigns from the advent of the Republic of Texas in 1836 to the 
1856 massacre of people in Mexico. During this period, the Lipan asserted their own 
internal polity through democratic organization as well as external diplomatic 
negotiations with other nations. The thesis focuses on how Lipan Apaches attempted to 
establish boundaries relative to the Republic of Texas, the United States, and Mexico in 
an assertion of indigenous sovereignty.  The thesis argues that sovereignty in the case of 
the Lipan Apaches consisted of community cohesion and diplomacy with other nations. 
 This historical study begins with a literature review and then focuses on Lipan 
Apache external social relations with the Republic of Texas. Next, the thesis discusses 
autonomous relations with the settler states of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas in 
northeastern Mexico. The final chapter discusses treaty relations between the United 
States and the Lipan Apaches. In this part, the thesis promotes the idea that this 
indigenous nation linked itself to the settler state. Later, however, the United States 
delinked from the Lipan Apache nation and then promulgated a number of massacres 
against Native peoples including the Apaches. In my conclusion, I analyze the impact of 
indigenous theoreticians of sovereignty in an effort to determine the significance of this 
legal concept in understanding intergovernmental relations between Native Americans 
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It is nighttime in March 1843. Sam Houston, known as “The Raven” by the 
Cherokee Indians, bends over his desk to pen a letter by the light of a candle. He 
composes a poem. He sits back in his chair, contemplating what he will say next. Then he 
leans forward into the light and writes the words “a dark cloud rests upon your nation.” 
Houston writes a letter to one of the leaders of the Lipan Apaches, the elder Flacco, upon 
the death of his son. Perhaps, at this moment, Houston reflects upon his words. Does the 
dark cloud follow the Lipan Apache Nation, or, instead, does Houston reverse what he 
really means to say? Does the dark cloud truly rest upon his own nation, that fledgling 
country known as the Republic of Texas? We do not know what whirs in the mind of the 
leader at this point in time. 
Sam Houston plays a large role in the composition of this thesis, as do the 
indigenous peoples of Texas. Indeed, my writing examines relations between the Lipan 
Apache, or Ndé, Nation and external sovereignties from the advent of the Republic of 
Texas to the beginning of the U.S. Civil War. During this period, the Lipan Apaches 
asserted their own internal polity through popular democracy and external diplomatic 
negotiations. In contemporary times, the Lipan Apaches organized into a political body in 
order to seek federal recognition. In 2009, the State of Texas granted recognition to the 
Ndé. In 2014, the Lipan Apaches continue to seek United States recognition of the tribe. 
As a result of these efforts, this thesis examines sovereign recognition of the Ndé from 
1836 to 1861. Three governing bodies granted diplomatic recognition to the Lipan 
Apaches at this time. The Republic of Texas, Mexico, and the United States each entered 
into agreements and treaties with this indigenous nation. This thesis argues that, because 
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of diplomatic recognition on the part of these settler states, the Lipan Apaches maintained 
external political relations with foreign bodies that recognized the sovereignty of this 
indigenous nation. 
I acknowledge that I make use of sources from the colonizer alone. My reliance 
on Indian agent and military reports precludes me from writing an indigenous or tribal 
history sensitive to the cultural, social, political, and economic beliefs of the Ndé. This, 
however, is not the point. In writing a thesis about colonial recognition of the colonized, I 
attempt to place the Ndé as central in the history of resistance to the colonization of 
Texas and northeastern Mexico. My primary focus is on the intergovernmental relations 
between the settler states and this indigenous nation. As such, I am not trying to write an 
oral-based history of an indigenous people not my own. That is the purview of an Ndé 
scholar. Instead, I am discussing intergovernmental relations between the Ndé and the 
colonizers as a case study. I seek to understand the significance and particularity of 
nineteenth century non-Indian discourse among settler states in colonial recognition of 
the sovereignty and autonomy of indigenous nations. The overarching narrative of 
domination, subjugation, and racism found in nineteenth-century written documents 
comprises the subject of this thesis. 
I have incorporated several questions for my research. What is indigenous 
sovereignty? How did it operate in the nineteenth century? How did the various 
presidential administration of the Republic of Texas promote positive or negative 
interaction with the Lipan Apaches and the Indians of Texas in general? How did Lipan 
self-government differ in Ndé relations with Mexico, the Texas Republic, and the United 
States? What effect did the U.S.-Mexican War have on sovereign recognition of the 
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Lipan Apaches in Mexico and the United States? How significant are treaties between the 
Ndé and various external governments? How did the United States finally resolve the 
“problem” of the Lipan Apaches? 
In the first chapter, the thesis provides an analysis of historical writing regarding 
the Native peoples of Texas from the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first centuries. 
This chapter places the Ndé as central in histories of the Texas Indians. Progressive 
histories of indigenous peoples promote positive interpretations of the lives and agency of 
Texas Indians in general and Lipan Apaches specifically. The purpose of this chapter’s 
literature review functions to understand some of the strands of historical writing that 
reflect perspectives on indigenous and subject peoples in an effort to examine changes in 
the writing of Ndé and indigenous Texan history over time. 
For the second chapter, the thesis discusses various racial and political 
constructions placed upon Lipan Apaches in interaction with the budding Republic of 
Texas. In this chapter, I argue that the Ndé asserted national popular sovereignty on their 
own terms in defiance of Texas settler state indigenous policies replete with gender and 
racial bias. Beginning with an analysis of the 1836 Constitution and its denial of 
citizenship to Native Americans, the chapter goes on the elucidate the policies of Sam 
Houston’s first administration and the presidency of Mirabeau Lamar. Sam Houston’s 
peace policy met with intransigence and rejection on the part of Texas legislature. 
Mirabeau Lamar actively cultivated Indian-hating in his administration. Regardless of 
these administrative difficulties, the Ndé succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Sam 
Houston administration. Further, under the aegis of Lamar, Lipan Apaches retained a 
measure of self-rule based on military service as scouts against other indigenous nations. 
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In the third chapter, the thesis discusses the later administrative policies of the 
republic that, while peaceful in nature, resulted in the destruction of positive diplomatic 
relations with this indigenous nation. Sam Houston’s naïve faith in his peace policy and 
reliance on Ndé military service did not reflect the hatred most of his fellow Anglo-
Texans felt for all indigenous peoples of Texas including the Lipan Apaches. As a result, 
Houston felt shame, as produced in a poem to Ndé leaders, at the death of one of the 
Lipan Apache chief’s son. This death marked the turning point in Ndé relations with the 
republic, finally resulting in the effective marginalization of the indigenous nation, 
Houston’s peace policy notwithstanding. The last president of the Republic, Anson Jones, 
continued Houston’s policies of pacification. More than anything, the appointment of 
Indian agent Robert Simpson Neighbors resulted in the recovery of positive diplomatic 
between the two nations, but only in part. Many Lipan Apaches fled beyond the line of 
Anglo settlement at this time, while a small remnant remained near San Antonio. 
The fourth chapter seeks to understand the machinations of Mexican 
governments, local and national, in their efforts to promote social and geopolitical control 
over the Ndé. In this and the following chapter, I define the term “autonomy” as a form 
of self-rule of a lesser degree than sovereignty, primarily in the absence of diplomatic 
recognition on the part of foreign bodies. Mexico sought to incorporate all Native people 
within its borders as citizens. Sovereign recognition remained outside the realm of 
Mexican political thought, at least with regard to the Lipan Apaches. At this time, local 
governments in northeastern Mexico including those of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and 
Tamaulipas desired to separate themselves from the centralist government of Mexico 
City. They founded a revolutionary movement that accorded no recognition to the Ndé. 
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The Lipan Apaches responded with massacres of Mexican settlers. Eventually, Coahuila 
recognized the error of ignoring the Ndé and concluded a treaty with one of their leaders. 
Lipan Apache autonomy remained a fact on the northeastern frontier. The U.S.-Mexican 
war changed all that. The U.S. military perpetrated a massacre of a band of Ndé men in 
Coahuila, thereby opening old wounds between the Mexican settlers and the Lipan 
Apaches. 
In the fifth chapter, treaties and massacres play a central role in the ultimate 
rejection of Lipan Apache political autonomy in northeastern Mexico. The Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase proved extremely detrimental to the 
situation of this indigenous nation. In particular, the invitation on the part of the Mexican 
government to resettle Ndé territory with settlers and refugee Indians produced severe 
problems for Lipan Apaches. Moreover, with the Liberal Revolution in Mexican politics, 
the militaristic caudillo Santiago Vidaurri came to the fore of power in the northeast. 
While originally supportive of the Ndé, eventually Vidaurri perpetrated one of the most 
violent attacks on Lipan Apache men, women, and children. His name went down in 
ignominy among the Ndé people. 
The sixth chapter switches to U.S. relations with the Ndé in an effort to analyze 
the several treaties promulgated between the two nations. The United States promulgated 
three treaties with the Lipan Apaches at this time. In each of these treaties, the settler 
state recognized the sovereignty of the Ndé people. Moreover, representatives of the 
Lipan Apaches visited then President of the United States, James K. Polk. The 
significance of these treaties remains to this day a stated fact. The U.S. government, in 
each negotiated accord, recognized the value and importance of Ndé national sovereignty 
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in these documents. By touching the pen, Lipan Apache leaders linked their own 
indigenous government in an alliance with the settler state. In particular, however, the 
Ndé people never made land cessions to the United States or any other sovereign entity. 
Further, the sixth chapter discusses “solutions” to the continuing problem of 
Lipan Apaches within the boundaries claimed by the state of Texas. In many ways, these 
methods devastated the situation of this indigenous nation on the frontier of the settler 
state. I focus on three policies, intended or otherwise, implemented to destroy the 
political structure inhering in the Ndé nation. These include starvation, massacre, and 
forced exile. While these “policies” may have been unintended, the end result is the 
same. The destruction of the Lipan Apache subsistence economy, along with the loss of 
life, resulted in their exile beyond the boundaries of the United States. Some Ndé chose 
to blend in with the tejano population in South Texas. Others chose to live beyond the 
confines of Texas in northeastern Mexico. 
The conclusion seeks to interpret various theories of indigenous sovereignty with 
particular regard to the Ndé. In this chapter, I will seek to analyze two contemporary 
theories of indigenous sovereignty. Those theories that rely on external diplomatic 
recognition from the United State alone, I find wanting. Instead, the best of indigenous 
theory regarding sovereignty comprises the notion of power on a micro-level and the 
recognition of popular sovereignty in the will of the people. Most of all, I question the 
value of rejecting the term “sovereignty” altogether. The Lipan Apache Nation at this 
time provides a test case for the reliability and validity of indigenous theory regarding 
sovereignty. 
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In sum, my thesis takes as its focus an analysis of sovereign diplomatic relations 
between the Ndé and Mexico, the United States, and the Republic of Texas in the mid-
nineteenth century. My primary intent is two-fold. First, I seek to provide a treaty 
analysis of various intergovernmental agreements between the Lipan Apaches and these 
foreign powers. Second, I seek to apply two theories of indigenous sovereignty to the 
Ndé as a case study of the performance of autonomy in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s. The 
thesis argues for a positive relation of external sovereignty in Lipan Apache diplomacy 
with these three settler states. I also use the term “popular sovereignty” to designate 
internal relations within this indigenous nation. Diplomatic relations point to a less intact 
notion of what constitutes a nation-state with regard to the indigenous nation of the Ndé. 
Internal Sovereignty and Anthropology 
 In the face of evidence regarding Lipan Apache socio-political organization, 
Morris E. Opler, anthropologist, asserted his own agenda in wishing to dispense with the 
notion of Ndé national sovereignty. Many scholars, including Nancy McGown Minor, 
Thomas A. Britten, and Sherry Robinson found that the Lipan Apache formed a nation 
with structural integrity. At certain points in Ndé history, the various bands and divisions 
amalgamated into different levels of alliance, although the status of the nation remained 
coherent even in the face of devastation wrought by colonial powers such as Spain, 
Mexico, and the United States. Contradicting the assertions of many scholars, Opler 
insisted that the Lipan Apaches did not form a complete tribal entity.1 Instead, he argued 
that the Lipan Apaches lacked an overarching national identification and that political 
status remained at the level of local family groups. Opler declared that the Ndé formed 
                                                
   1 Morris E. Opler, “Lipan Apache,” in Handbook of North American Indians XII, Part Two: Plains, ed. 
Raymond J. DeMallie (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 2001), 949. 
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into a collection of extended families termed “bands” only in order to perform the bison 
hunt.2 The Lipan Apache, according to this anthropologist, did not constitute a nation 
because primary political control remained at the local family group level.3 This 
analytical mistake, intended or otherwise, during the reports of the Indian Claims 
Commission in the 1970s, contributed to systematic erasure of the historical constitution 
of Ndé national government. Opler’s error allowed for the U.S. government in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries to deny the existence of the Ndé nation and 
government throughout the history of Ndé-white relations. 
Ndé internal leadership, composed primarily of women who were heads of 
families, used political tactics and strategies that proved decidedly resilient in the face of 
the onslaught of the Anglo hordes.  In order to understand how the Ndé maintained 
sovereign independence from the Republic of Texas, one must first delineate Lipan 
Apache socio-political structure.  This tribal nation promoted a polity with its basis in 
local family groups founded on matrilocal principles and matrilineal kinship formation.4  
Ndé women controlled the family unit as late as the early nineteenth century.  Ndé men 
resided with the families of their wives, and the Ndé family line traced itself from 
grandmother to mother to daughter.  The local family base expanded further to include 
the notion of a band, a collection of three to four extended families.5  While the term 
“band” has negative connotations because anthropologists defined this group formation 
as the primary political structure among the Lipan Apache, this chapter uses the term 
“band” only as a third tier in Lipan socio-political structure. 
                                                
   2 Morris E. Opler, “The Lipan and Mescalero Apaches in Texas,” in Apache Indians X (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1974), 216. 
   3 Opler, “Lipan Apache,” 949. 
   4 Morris E. Opler, “Lipan Apache,” 950. 
   5 Minor, Light Gray People, 87. 
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Larger than the bands, the divisions, the Upper Lipan, the Lower Lipan, and the 
Mexican Lipan, comprised the three basic political divisions of the Ndé nation based on 
geographical location.  In the historical record, Euro-Americans identified the Plains 
Lipan as the Upper Lipan.  They designated the Forest Lipan as the Lower Lipan.  The 
third division, the Mexican Lipan, arose primarily because of the bifurcation along the 
border between the United States and Mexico.6  This division resulted in a north-south 
formation as well as an east-west structure between the Mexican, Lower, and Upper 
Lipan.  Some of the names of bands that comprised subdivisions of each larger sphere 
included the Sun Otter Band and the High-Beaked Moccasin Band under the Lower 
Lipan division, the Fire/Camp Circle Band and the Pulverizing Band under the Upper 
Lipan division, and the Big Water Band and the Painted Wood Band under the Mexican 
Lipan division.7  The largest concentric sphere of Lipan Apache government comprised 
the nation as a whole. 
National integrity entailed language, cultural affiliation, and participation in a 
loose arrangement of trade both intertribal and intratribal. The loose structure at the 
national level allowed Ndé people to alter their group formation in order to resist the 
invaders.  Divisions could re-form with different bands.  Alternate family groups could 
join a different band if necessary, and bands could break up into extended family groups 
in the face of warfare or decimation from Spanish or Anglo attacks.  Within each sphere, 
these groups could form and re-form according to a resilient, flexible, and fluid notion of 
popular sovereignty.8 Ndé women formed the backbone of internal politics. 
 
                                                
   6 Opler, “Lipan Apache,” 951-952. 
   7 Minor, Light Gray People, 93-97. 
   8 Minor, Light Gray People, 88. 
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External Sovereignty: Lipan Leadership in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s 
In a subversion of women’s power, colonizing states in the mid-nineteenth 
century drastically altered the political roles of Ndé men and women in diplomatic 
negotiations.  According to my own primary source research, because of patriarchal 
expectations on the part of settler leadership, Ndé men began filling the roles Ndé women 
held in diplomatic relations.  From the beginning of the eighteenth century to the early 
part of the nineteenth, Ndé women not only led on the level of the family group but also 
engaged actively in diplomatic relations with the Spanish settler state.  Ndé men led war 
parties in early times, yet Ndé women usually brokered peace negotiations in relation to 
colonial Spanish attempts at social control.  In the 1830s, Ndé peace leadership began to 
change along the lines of gender.  The colonial powers forced Ndé men into peaceful 
leadership roles and shunted Ndé women aside. 
This gendered violence appeared with regard to the primary representatives of the 
Ndé in relations with Mexico, the Republic of Texas, and the United States.  Male peace 
representatives led their respective family groups originating in the bands of the Lower 
Lipan.  The Flacco family male leaders represented the High-Beaked Moccasin Band.  El 
Flacco (“thin one” in Spanish) led this band until 1843 when he died.  Anglo-Texans 
murdered his son before he could assume the mantle of leadership.  Leadership of this 
band passed into the hands of Flacco Chico (“thin boy”) also known as Juan, or John, 
Flacco.  He attained the position of chief in 1844.  Sun Otter Band representation during 
the years of the Texas republic fell on the Castro family.  Cuelgas de Castro led his 
people until 1842 when he passed away.  His sons Ramón and Juan Castro continued 
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holding the reins of leadership after occupation by the United States.9  The historical 
record remains silent on the roles of Ndé women in leadership positions at this time.  
Mexicans, Texans, and representatives of the United States, unlike the colonial Spanish, 
refused to negotiate peace settlements with women whom settlers considered to be vastly 
inferior to men.  The historical record also does not reveal the power dynamic between 
Ndé women and men at this time, although in recognizing only men as leaders the settler 
states contributed to the general chaos and tribulations of the Lipan in the 1830s, 1840s, 
and 1850s. 
A Note on Terminology 
As for terminology, the preferred term of art for more than one tribal people 
throughout the globe is “indigenous.” While this word is the term I use the most 
throughout the thesis, I also incorporate such terms as “Indian,” “American Indian,” 
“Native American,” and “Native peoples” in the course of my writing. I use these other 
terms consciously in an effort to avoid repetition in the thesis. Moreover, the semantics of 
each of these terms is essentially the same. While the term “Indian” is a misnomer, many 
tribal people still use this term in everyday parlance. As a result, I do not see fit to 
problematize use of this word. For the Lipan Apache, the preferred term of art is “Ndé” 
because that is what the people call themselves. I, however, have used the terms “Ndé,” 
“Lipan Apache,” “Lipanes,” and “Lipan” interchangeably throughout my writing. Again, 
I have done so in an effort to avoid repetition. I hope that by making this 
acknowledgment that I do not incur the anger of the Ndé who read this thesis. I have 
made use of several terms in reference to indigenous nations and the Ndé, specifically. 
These terms are significant in the historiography of the indigenous peoples of Texas. 
                                                
   9 Minor, Light Gray People, 106-107. 
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Chapter 1. National Homelands: 
Writing the History of the Indigenous Peoples of Texas with  
Special Reference to the Lipan Apaches 
Time and time again, the colonial administrations of Texas sought to destroy, 
absorb, or remove indigenous peoples from the geopolitical construction of the settler 
state. Native peoples as nations resisted the coercion these regimes implemented on a 
political and symbolic level. Out of this sense of indigeneity, Native Americans retained 
their concept of nationhood. Nationhood defines the political relations of indigenous 
peoples. Birth of adoption into the culture and society of an Indian nation defines 
nationhood. Each indigenous people in Texas constituted a nation. In each nation, 
territorial integrity demanded that this nation’s geopolitical formation comprise a 
homeland. Historically, these national homelands took precedence over and above the 
claimed boundaries of the Spanish province, the Anglo republic, and the state of Texas. 
This paper asserts the significance of historical literature relating to the indigenous 
peoples of Texas with emphasis placed on diplomatic and military engagements between 
settler states and the Ndé, or Lipan Apache. Progressive histories of indigenous peoples 
promote positive interpretation of the lives and agency of the Texas Indians and, in 
particular, the Lipan Apaches. The purpose of this literature review functions to 
understand some of the strands of historical writing that reflect perspectives on 
indigenous and subject peoples in an effort to examine changes in historiography over 
time. This paper advocates for the continued inclusion of indigenous-centered histories in 
historical writing relating to the geopolitical dominion of what is now Texas. 
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Histories of the Texas Indians changed from the progressive era historical writing 
of the 1910s and 1920s to cultural analyses in the 1930s and 1940s. As a result of the 
termination policies of the 1950s and early 1960s, historians of Native peoples modified 
their interpretation to reflect negative views. While the American Indian Movement of 
the late 1960s and 1970s had little effect on the historiography of Texas Indians, the 
Indian Claims Commission decision regarding the Lipan Apaches had an impact on 
historical writing about the Ndé. The 1980s and 1990s saw the rise of several tribal 
histories of Native peoples in Texas. At this time, only one historian saw fit to write 
about the Ndé. From 1999 to 2011, historians expanded their horizons to include 
syntheses of Texas Indian history. By 2007, tribal histories of the Ndé began to make 
their appearance. 
Two watershed events played primary roles in the political evolution of the Lipan 
Apache Nation and subsequent publications in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. By 1999, Daniel Castro Romero established the Lipan Apache governing body 
that remains at the forefront of the movement for federal recognition today. On March 18, 
2009, Texas granted recognition to the Lipan Apache as an indigenous nation forming its 
own governing body. State recognition of the Ndé coincided with the dissemination of 
Lipan Apache tribal histories. This chapter argues that much of the scholarship about the 
Ndé and the Native peoples of Texas in general developed as a result of political events. 
 The vast majority of histories involving the Texas Indians follow the trajectory of 
studies in eighteenth and nineteenth century Texas history. Indigenous histories follow 
this arc because Texas expelled the vast majority of Indians within its claimed boundaries 
by 1859. In the eighteenth century, the Ndé bounded their homeland in what is now south 
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Texas and northeastern Mexico. The Comanche lived to the northwest. The Caddo Nation 
settled in northeastern Texas and northwestern Louisiana. The nineteenth century saw 
turbulence and forced indigenous removal to the west of encroaching Anglo-Texas 
settlement. Texans forced several Lipan Apaches south into Mexico and further into West 
Texas. Eventually, Anglos expunged the Caddo, the Wichita, and the Tonkawa north to 
Indian Territory. The Comanche remained in northwest Texas until the 1870s when the 
U.S. government relocated the nation to Indian Territory. The Ndé journeyed into Mexico 
or blended with the tejano population during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 Histories of the indigenous peoples of Texas in the 1910s and 1920s, progressive 
in nature, reflected the professionalization of the historical discipline and claims to 
objectivity. Objectivity at this time meant thorough archival research with little or no 
interpretation or analysis.10 Two articles, both published in the Texas-based Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, illustrate this so-called objective approach. In Anna Muckleroy’s 
“The Indian Policy of the Republic of Texas,” the author delineates her subject matter 
from an extraordinary distance. She attempts to efface herself from the narrative 
altogether. The article, originally a Master’s thesis for the History Department at the 
University of Texas in Austin, reads in an objective manner at the expense of social 
historical perspectives. Muckleroy provides the facts of various presidential Indian 
policies with no analysis or interpretation. While she appears to favor the peace policies 
of the Sam Houston administrations with regard to the Native peoples of Texas, it 
remains unclear as to what stance Muckleroy takes on the issues involved. Her writing, 
                                                
   10 Two examples of “objective” historical writing at this time include William Edward Dunn, “Apache 
Relations in Texas, 1718-1750,” Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association 14 (January 1911), 
198-275; J. Fred Rippy, “The Indians of the Southwest in the Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 
1848-1853,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 2 (August 1919), 363-396. 
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along with the following article discussed, belongs properly to reporting in its quest to 
avoid argument in favor of or against administrative policies.11 
 Writing three years later, Lena Clara Koch’s “The Federal Indian Policy in Texas, 
1845-1860,” follows an approach similar to that of Muckelroy. Again, the author adapted 
her Master’s thesis from the University of Texas in Austin for publication in the same 
historical journal. Koch displays a paternalistic attitude in relation to the indigenous 
peoples of Texas, referring to them at one point in her article as “children.” Most of her 
writing, however, takes no particular stance on indigenous peoples or the destructive 
policies of the United States in the 1840s and 1850s. Along with Muckleroy, she includes 
specific mention of the Lipan Apaches, an advantage in its own right, yet her work 
chronicles historical events rather than providing thoughtful analysis of the significance 
of federal Indian policies on the Native peoples of Texas. In an effort to remain impartial 
to events portrayed, both historians provide simplistic lists of events. While each of the 
authors delineated their research in a meticulous and exacting examination of primary 
sources, both historians remain unconcerned on an intellectual level with the subject 
matter of their articles.12 
 In a manifest alteration from previous studies of indigenous peoples, 
anthropologists in the 1930s collected information on the Ndé among other Texas tribes 
and published their results in the 1940s and early 1950s. Indeed, at this time, histories and 
cultural studies of the Ndé, the Caddo, and the Comanche developed positive descriptions 
of indigenous peoples. By its very nature, anthropology requires rapport with Native 
                                                
   11 Anna Muckleroy, “The Indian Policy of the Republic of Texas,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 25 
(April 1922), 229-260; 26 (July 1922), 1-29; 26 (October 1922), 128-148; 26 (January 1923), 184-206. 
   12 Lena Clara Koch, “The Federal Indian Policy in Texas, 1845-1860,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 
28 (April 1925), 259-286; 29 (July 1925), 19-35; 29 (October 1925), 98-127. 
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Americans. As a result, anthropological studies emphasize indigenous peoples and their 
oral histories as sources in and of themselves. In the 1930s, the discipline of anthropology 
demanded co-authorship with Native peoples.13 At this time, the anthropologist Morris E. 
Opler produced one of the first book-length works taking as its subject the cultural study 
of the Ndé. In his Myths and Legends of the Lipan Apache Indians (1940), Opler set forth 
his research of the sacred stories, including the origin story, of the Ndé using Native 
American “informants.”14 The term “informant” presents a problem to the contemporary 
intellectual of indigenous studies. The connotation of the word in the 1930s and 1940s, 
however, lacked the demeaning sense ascribed to it today. 
 Historians of the 1940s and early 1950s began to develop positive views of the 
Native Americans of Texas. Grant Foreman, in his “Texas Comanche Treaty of 1846,” 
provides an excellent example of the glimmer of new historical writing about indigenous 
peoples of Texas. While resorting to an element of objectivity, Foreman’s respect for the 
Comanche and the Ndé among other Native peoples reveals much about his earnest 
perspective in support of the Indians in Texas.15 In Howard Lackman’s “The Howard-
Neighbors Controversy: A Cross-Section in West Texas Indian Affairs,” the author 
provides a supportive role to Native Americans in the interaction between two Indian 
agents in Texas.16 The writings of both of these authors produce narratives that would be 
                                                
   13 See, for example, John R. Swanton, Source Material on the History and Ethnology of the Caddo 
Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); Andrée F. Sjoberg, “Lipan Apache Culture in 
Historical Perspective,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 9 (Spring 1953), 76-98. 
   14 Morris Edward Opler, Myths and Legends of the Lipan Apache Indians (New York: American Folk-
Lore Society, 1940). 
   15 Grant Foreman, “The Texas Comanche Treaty of 1846,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 51 (April 
1948), 313-322. 
   16 Howard Lackman, “The Howard-Neighbors Controversy: A Cross-Section in West Texas Indian 
Affairs,” Panhandle-Plains Historical Review 25 (1952), 29-44. 
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later taken up by historians in the 1970s. The intervening period, however, remained 
pejorative to Native American issues. 
 Terminationist federal Indian policies began in earnest in the mid-1950s. As a 
result, historical scholarship remained problematic in relation to Texas Indians until the 
early 1970s. The method in which such racial bias revealed itself in historical scholarship 
included problematic references to indigenous peoples as “cannibals” and “savages.” 
These histories placed historical events in relation to Native Americans firmly in the 
distant past.17 At this time, scholarship elided references to contemporary conditions of 
indigenous peoples into an absence. This absence of the contemporary voice of the Texas 
Indians resulted in distant, so-called objective histories that patently ignored the reality of 
indigenous peoples during the fifties and sixties in favor of historical renderings of fact in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
W. W. Newcomb’s The Indians of Texas (1961) exemplifies this type of 
pejorative historical writing. In his book, the author asserts that by understanding Texas 
Indians, readers lessen their parochial beliefs in their own culture. The relation between 
historical study of the Texas Indians and today’s society raises awareness of difference in 
others outside of the mainstream. The author believes that although all people have the 
same innate capabilities, they evince diversity through culture. Natural environment can 
explain cultural differences only in part. A culture itself is an organization of materials, 
patterns of behavior, beliefs, epistemologies, and feelings that characterize a particular 
nation. Newcomb also asserts that culture constantly accumulates, changes, and moves. 
Newcomb’s primary interest revolves around Texas Indian cultures prior to their 
                                                
  17 See, for example, David M. Vigness, “Indian Raids on the Lower Rio Grande, 1836-1837,” 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 51 (April 1948), 313-322; W.W. Newcomb and Curtis Tunnell, A Lipan 
Apache Mission: San Lorenzo de la Santa Cruz, 1762-1771 (Austin: Texas Memorial Museum, 1969). 
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“corruption” by so-called “advanced” civilizations such as the Spanish, the French, and 
the United States.18 
 This book focuses on the historic tribes of Texas including the Coahuiltecans, the 
Karankawa, the Lipan Apache, the Tonkawa, the Comanche, the Kiowa, the Jumanos, the 
Wichita, the Attakapa, and the Caddo. Newcomb classifies the tribes according to region 
and cultural variation. Three primary classifications include the peoples of the western 
Gulf, the peoples who adapted the horse to their nomadic culture, and the agriculturalists. 
Newcomb delineates religious rituals of the Indians including the Sun Dance, the sacred 
story of Bright Shining Woman, and the vision quests of medicine people. Lipan Apache 
medicine people, for example, helped the Ndé to win wars because they could bring 
misfortune to enemies and predict their approach. 
In his work, Newcomb acknowledges that he provided no original research on the 
Texas Indians. He made use of no archives. Instead, he focuses on published primary 
sources including linguistic studies, ecological studies, ethnographies, explorers’ 
accounts, the archaeological record, correspondence, memoirs, government documents, 
drawing, maps, photographs, diaries, journals, captivity narratives, private papers, and 
documents of the Catholic Church. 
 Although Newcomb carefully phrases his definitions of “savage” and “barbarian,” 
he employs condescending terms with impunity. He believes that the onslaught of 
western civilization doomed Native Americans from the beginning. This belief denies 
agency to Native Americans, refuses to recognize the Native present, and presumes a 
problematic definition of progress. Newcomb frames so-called “pre-contact” Indian 
                                                
   18 W.W. Newcomb, The Indians of Texas: From Prehistoric to Modern Times (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1961). 
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nations as static and unchanging. In comparison to Native cultures he makes 
anachronistic references to modern Anglo-American culture. He covers no historical 
processes until the last chapter, and, even then, he laces his narrative with celebratory 
accounts of the Anglo-Texans at the expense of indigenous peoples. 
 Newcomb’s work broke ground for the time in which he wrote because he 
focused on Native American culture as an object of study. For the early 1960s, his work 
represented a sincere accomplishment. His evaluation of Native religion, although termed 
“supernaturalism,” provides a useful account of indigenous religious beliefs, actions, and 
material culture that remains a powerful explanation of Native ceremonies. While 
incorrectly asserting that most Native Texas tribes practiced cannibalism, Newcomb 
provides an enlightened analysis of subsistence activities on the part of indigenous 
peoples, including agriculture. The details provided allow for a deep understanding of 
Native cultures during European contact. His book, however, is exemplary of the 
oppressive era in which he worked. 
 In contrast to Newcomb’s work, the rise of the American Indian Movement in the 
1970s resulted in increased awareness of the rights of indigenous peoples. Texas Indians, 
however, remained neglected during this time period. Indeed, the most cogent analyses 
comprised testimony before the Indian Claims Commission.19 At this point in time, 
preliminary research in the histories of the indigenous peoples of Texas began to make an 
appearance, although this research, couched in somewhat pejorative terminology, 
                                                
   19 Publications resulting from this testimony include Kenneth F. Neighbours, Government, Land, and 
Indian Policies Relative to the Lipan, Mescalero, and Tigua Indians (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1974); Morris E. Opler, The Lipan and Mescalero Apaches in Texas (New York: Garland Publishing, 
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remained problematic.20 While various indigenous groups throughout the United States 
engaged in political uprisings, reflected in historical scholarship, the historiography of the 
Native peoples of Texas remained strangely reticent in connecting historical to 
contemporary events. 
With the 1980s, conservative backlash manifested itself, and historians wrote few 
works on the indigenous peoples of Texas. Some tribal histories written at this time, 
however, comprised exceptional works contributing to the historiography of the 
indigenous peoples of Texas. One history of the Caddo comprised the publication of 
Herbert Eugene Bolton’s research performed in the early part of the twentieth century. 
While his research was thorough, Bolton placed his research in the distant past without 
reference to contemporary indigenous peoples.21 In the late 1980s, two significant tribal 
histories made their appearance. Caddo tribal historiography received an added boost 
from a history, Hasinai: A Traditional History of the Caddo Confederacy by Vynola 
Beaver Newkumet and Howard L. Meredith (1988), that combined historical analysis 
with oral history.22 Moreover, the first Lipan Apache tribal history garnered academic 
recognition at this time. In the early 1980s, the borderlands scholar David J. Weber also 
produced a historical synthesis of nineteenth century Mexican history that included 
aspects relevant to indigenous history. 
Weber’s The Mexican Frontier (1982) a groundbreaking work in many respects, 
proposed an entirely new form of diplomatic, social, and cultural history in relation to the 
                                                
   20 See Kenneth F. Neighbours, Robert Simpson Neighbors and the Texas Frontier, 1836-1859 (Waco: 
Texian Press, 1975); Elizabeth A.H. John, Storms Brewed in Other Men’s Worlds: The Confrontation of 
Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540-1795 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 
1975). 
   21 Herbert Eugene Bolton, The Hasinais: Southern Caddoans as Seen by the Earliest Europeans 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987). 
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borderlands between the United States and Mexico. The author argues that the Mexican 
government viewed the northern frontier as remote and, consequently, did little to protect 
it from Indian “depredations” and economic imperialism on the part of the United States. 
The exception comprised the defense of Texas from 1835 to 1836, although this policy 
ultimately failed as well. By the end of the Mexican period, each of the provinces with 
the exception of northern Sonora viewed themselves more as economic allies of the 
United States than as governments loyal to the centralist power of Mexico City.23 
Weber breaks down his history into a discussion of the different regions of the far 
north of Mexico including Alta California, northern Sonora, New Mexico, and Texas. 
Alta California, a place of great wealth, continued its prosperity after the secularization of 
the missions in the 1830s. Northern Sonora remained sparsely settled as a result of 
Apache attacks in defense of their homelands on settlers. New Mexico changed during 
the Mexican period from a strong allegiance to Spain to the development of economic 
ties to the United States because of the incentive to trade with Anglos on the Santa Fe 
Trail. Texas, poorly defended, opened its borders to Anglo-American settlers.  Eventually 
Anglo settlers rebelled and overran Texas with a regime in which prominent tejanos took 
part, at first. 
The author makes extensive use of primary sources including private papers, 
correspondence, explorers’ accounts, journals, diaries, censuses, official reports, 
memoirs, autobiographies, compendiums of laws, constitutions, treaties, government 
documents, government reports, government instructions, documents of the Catholic 
Church, newspapers, expositions, speeches, addresses, land records, poetry, and 
                                                
   23 David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982). 
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architecture.  The author performed research in many archives in Mexico and the United 
States. 
 Weber hardly describes the impact Native American nations had on the 
development and demise of the Mexican colonies in the far north. Any exposition of the 
Mexican era in Texas and New Mexico must include a description of the impact of 
Native American nations on the economies of these colonies. Weber, however, pays scant 
attention to indigenous peoples. He ascribes recognition in his history to the impact of the 
California Indians on the development of the colony of Alta California, although Weber 
neglects to mention the abuse suffered by the California Mission Indians at the hands of 
the friars and, later, the secular californios. 
 This book is comprehensive and thoroughly researched. Weber’s use of Spanish 
language histories allows for a much broader concept of history and opens up a much-
needed dialogue between Mexican historians on the one hand and U.S. historians on the 
other. His analysis of cultural, political, and economic frontier institutions allows for an 
interpretive reading of the primary sources for his text. His understanding of the broad 
historical forces that led to the annexation of the territories in the far north of Mexico to 
the United States clarifies a much neglected portion of Mexican and U.S. history. 
Another narrative reflects a development in the writing of tribal histories as a 
result of the rise of intellectuals advocating for revised American Indian history in the 
1970s and 1980s. Thomas F. Schilz in Lipan Apaches in Texas (1987) argues that for 
much of the time during the nineteenth century, the Lipan Apaches struggled between 
two warring nations, the United States and the Comanche. The United States exploited 
Lipan Apaches through employment as scouts against the Comanche. Eventually the U.S. 
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and the Comanche, in warring with each other, drove the Lipan Apaches outside the 
boundaries of the United States and, later, onto a reservation in southern New Mexico.24 
The author divides Lipan Apache history into four periods. In turn, these periods 
each reflect a particular colonial power in its relation to the Lipanes. From 1542 to 1821, 
the era of Spanish colonization, Lipan Apaches controlled most of south Texas and what 
is now northeastern Mexico. From 1821 to 1846, the period of Mexican colonization and 
the Republic of Texas took effect. In this era the Apache, according to the author, acted 
as scouts and defenders of the Mexicans and Anglo-Americans against other Texas tribes. 
From 1846 to 1860 imperialist U.S. colonization was at the forefront of relations 
between the Lipan Apaches and empire. The Lipanes avoided the most stringent controls 
of the United States.  In fact, the nation divided into two groups, a southern group in what 
is now Mexico and a northern group in south Texas that treated with the United States. 
From 1860 to the 1880s the U.S. military imposed an aggressive policy against Lipan 
Apaches. By 1865, the northern and southern groups had reunited in northern Mexico 
only to be defeated in the 1870s. In the 1880s the United States forcibly removed the 
tribal nation from northern Mexico to the Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation in New 
Mexico. 
Schilz makes some use of primary sources including narratives of conquest 
expeditions, published historical documents, correspondence, official documents of the 
Spanish colonies, journals of Anglo-American explorers, official documents of the Texas 
empresario Stephen Austin, official documents of the Mexican government, historical 
documents relating to the Texas Revolution of 1835, memoirs, published reports relating 
to the Texas Indians, United States government documents, and diaries.  Schilz 
                                                
   24 Thomas F. Schilz, Lipan Apaches in Texas (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 1987). 
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performed research in the following archives: the Archivo General y Publico de la 
Nación, the Bexar Archives at the University of Texas at Austin, and the National 
Archives in Washington, D.C. 
 The author’s narrative suffers from lack of interpretation. Schilz fails to provide 
strong historical analysis of the events given in the text. At times, the narrative reads like 
a chronicle. Schilz discusses facts and events without much analysis. The author pieces 
together historical events including migrations, wars, conflicts, and changes in tribal 
leadership. Schilz’s periodization also explores different colonial powers that affected 
Lipan Apaches over time. He engrosses himself in the political economy of the nation 
without a close study of culture. This first foray into the tribal history of the Lipan 
Apaches exemplifies many initial attempts to write indigenous histories. 
 In the 1990s, historians wrote several tribal histories, although the Ndé remained 
excluded from serious historical scholarship. Non-Indian historians wrote about the 
Comanche, Caddo, Wichita, Karankawa, and Jumano peoples of Texas.25 Each of these 
historians centered one or two indigenous peoples in academic scholarship. An 
indigenous historian, Cecile Elkins Carter, also wrote a tribal history of the Caddo titled 
Caddo Indians: Where We Come From (1995).26 This indigenous-centered history 
comprised one of the few tribal histories written by an indigenous historian during the 
1990s. 
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 Beginning in 1999, several professional historians began to write syntheses of 
historical events relating to the Texas Indians as a whole along with the standard tribal 
histories. At the same time, tribal histories proliferated as well. The tribal histories 
differed from previous works in the sense of the incorporation of social theory into the 
texts.27 Syntheses of Texas indigenous history also incorporated cultural philosophies at 
this time.28 Non-Indian historian Gary Clayton Anderson has played a significant role in 
the adaptation of theory into historical writing since 1999. 
 In his attempt to incorporate Native Americans into mainstream history, Gary 
Clayton Anderson in The Indian Southwest (1999) seeks to develop new concepts in 
describing events in colonial Spanish and Mexican Texas. The author argues that the 
Jumanos along the Rio Grande comprised the earliest Native group to establish 
hegemony as a result of interaction with the Spanish in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. After the Spanish virtually destroyed Jumano culture, the Apaches 
asserted dominance throughout colonial Texas in the seventeenth century. As a result of 
Spanish machinations to defeat the Apaches, the norteños (comprised of the Wichita, the 
Caddo, and the Comanche nations among others) asserted hegemony on the southern 
Plains in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.29 
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The author further defines ethnogenesis as a process whereby a tribe or nation 
incorporates people from other indigenous polities or European powers. As a result of 
tribal incorporation, many tribes contributed to the formation of a new people. Spanish 
colonial policy fragmented the Jumanos early on. They formed into a new tribal grouping 
at the ranchería grande and later developed into the Tonkawa people, at least in part. The 
Apaches also engaged in ethnogenesis by incorporating apostate mission Indians into 
their cultural and national group. The Comanche adapted themselves along the lines of 
ethnogenesis in capturing Native people from other nations, Spaniards, Mexicans, and 
Anglos. 
 Anderson makes extensive use of primary sources including government and 
colonial reports, exploration accounts, memorials, testimonies of missionaries, journals, 
diaries, letters, laws, quantitative studies, government petitions, drawings, and 
anthropological accounts.  He performed research in many Spanish and French archives. 
Anderson’s narrative contains a great deal of technical language and use of 
theoretical terminology defined only lightly. The author, in a move ascribed to 
anthropological writing, elides difference and historical change within tribal societies 
except in blocks of time. He uses periodization to discuss this change without focusing on 
the micro-level of historical difference within and among Native communities. On a 
positive note, Anderson employs Marxist theory to great advantage in describing Native 
peoples during the Spanish colonial era. Too often, Marxist historians relegate indigenous 
peoples to the level of “simple, primitive” economies. Anderson revises this theory to 
include the notion of a legitimate political economy among Native Americans. In 
introducing the concept of ethnogenesis to the history of Native peoples in Texas, 
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Anderson expands understandings of Native societies as fluid and transitional instead of 
static and unchanging. The author develops theoretical complexity in writing about 
historical events pertaining to Native Americans. The historiography of Native 
Americans in Texas only increased in sophistication after the publication of this book. 
 Kelly F. Himmel’s The Conquest of the Karankawas and Tonkawas (1999) 
epitomizes the theory-based approach to historical writing in the late 1990s. In his book, 
the author argues that originally the Spanish viewed the coastal Karankawa in Texas as a 
barrier to French, British, and U.S. intrusion into New Spain. Similarly, during Mexican 
occupation and the establishment of the Republic of Texas, Mexicans and Anglo-
Americans found that the Tonkawa acted as a buffer between their settlements and the 
Wichita and Comanche peoples. For these reasons, the colonizers of Texas established 
trade and treaty negotiations with the Karankawa and Tonkawa. In the case of the 
Karankawa, Anglo-American settlement in Stephen Austin’s colony entailed the end of 
peaceful diplomacy between the Karankawa and officials of the province of Coahuila y 
Texas in the Mexican republic. The extension of the frontier with the annexation of Texas 
in 1845 resulted in a break in diplomatic relations between the settler state and the 
Tonkawa. Because of the extension of the frontier beyond these buffer zones, Anglo-
Texans and Anglo-Americans later brushed aside recognition of the Tonkawa and 
Karankawa as independent nations. As a result, the United States and its settlers 
annihilated the Karankawa as a cultural group and forcibly removed the Tonkawa to 
Indian Territory. Himmel’s analysis is particularly useful in his delineation of the general 
Indian policies of the United States and the Republic of Texas.30 
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 Himmel makes use of primary sources including correspondence, accounts by 
explorers, journals, memoirs, diaries, government reports, personal papers, 
autobiographies, laws, newspapers, and collections of primary source documents relating 
to Indian affairs. Himmel performed research in the Bexar Archives and the Center for 
American History at the University of Texas at Austin. 
 In historical sociology’s effort to grasp larger social processes through the lens of 
theory, the discipline neglects the singularity and particularity of the historical events 
portrayed. Himmel’s work typifies this approach. The author provides insufficient 
information on Mexican policy toward the Karankawa and Tonkawa and focuses almost 
exclusively on the Spanish, the Anglo-Texan, and the Anglo-American periods. Himmel 
engages historical texts peripherally because he seeks primarily to prove sociological 
theories. Because he takes this perspective, however, Himmel provides some fresh 
insights about the history of the Indians of Texas and their conquest. His use of 
theoretical models from sociology describes macrohistorical processes. The author’s 
focus on memoirs of Anglo-Texans during the Mexican period and the regime of the 
Republic of Texas allows for a nuanced understanding of the intimate relations between 
Anglos and the Karankawa and Tonkawa. Still, his analysis proves too limited in scope. 
The histories of both Himmel and Anderson apply Marxist and sociological theories to 
the situation of Native Americans, giving rise to deeper modes of analysis. 
 In contrast to Himmel and Anderson, David La Vere in The Texas Indians (2004) 
rewrites a survey of the Texas Indians in direct response to Newcomb’s The Indians of 
Texas. La Vere argues that Spanish colonialism made many tribes of Texas dependent, to 
a certain extent, on Spanish trade goods. The French supplied guns to the tribes north and 
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east of Texas. Missionization in the Rio Grande area of Texas resulted in the 
Hispanization of the Indian populace and the virtual disappearance of the Jumano and the 
Coahuiltecans. Anglo contact with the tribes of Texas resulted in policies of removal and 
extermination. In his book, La Vere recognizes that the original tribes at about the year 
1500 C.E. included the Caddo of East Texas, the Karankawa and the Atakapa on the Gulf 
Coast, the Jumano along the Rio Grande, the Coahuiltecan in South Texas, and the 
Wichita in the Texas Panhandle. According to the author, the Lipan Apache immigrated 
to Texas in the sixteenth century. The Comanche immigrated to Texas in the seventeenth 
century. Various eastern tribes, as a result of the Indian Removal policies of Andrew 
Jackson, including the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, Kickapoo, 
Shawnee, Delaware, found refuge in Texas in the early nineteenth century. Spanish 
contact resulted in the establishment of missions along the Rio Grande and the founding 
of San Antonio.31 
The wars over Texas in the early to mid-nineteenth century resulted in the 
decimation of many Native populations through disease and depredations. Texas and the 
U.S. removed the Wichita, Caddo, and the Peneteka Comanche to reservations on the 
Upper Brazos River in 1854. By 1859, Anglo-Texans coveted these reservation lands and 
drove these tribes into Indian Territory. The author argues that three primary groups of 
Texas Indians survived the wars of extermination and removal: the Tiguas of El Paso, the 
Mexican Kickapoo on the Rio Grande, and the Alabama-Coushatta near the city of 
Houston. La Vere neglects to mention Texas state recognition of the Lipan Apache. 
La Vere uses some primary sources including archaeological information, the 
writings of anthropologists, the reports of conquistadors, letters between various Spanish 
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government agents, journals of French explorers, diaries of French and Spanish visitors to 
Texas, and the Texas Indian Papers. 
La Vere’s material lacks cogent analysis of Texas Indian history. The book, a 
survey, remains unfocused in scope. La Vere’s book, however, provides a wealth of 
information on the Texas tribes from first European contact to the present. Although the 
text lacks clarity at times, the book provides a careful analysis of certain historical 
moments. In a significant difference from Newcomb, the author portrays macro-processes 
of change over time among the Indians of Texas. Most survey histories lack nuance in 
discussing historical processes and social change. Instead, La Vere writes a dynamic 
survey history of the Texas Indians. 
 In another survey history of the Texas Indians in the nineteenth century, Gary 
Clayton Anderson in The Conquest of Texas (2005) provides a more in-depth analysis of 
the dynamics of Texas history focused solely on the nineteenth century. The author, in 
defining the annihilation and removal of Texas Indians as ethnic cleansing, asserts that 
the difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide is one of degree and geopolitical 
placement. Genocide is the outright extermination of a people or peoples. Instead, ethnic 
cleansing involves the forced displacement of peoples and the creation of a refugee status 
for them. In this case, Anglo-Texans in the nineteenth century sought to remove from a 
certain geopolitical area all ethnicities that did not coincide with their own. Ethnic 
cleansing provides a useful category of analysis for indigenous history.32 
From 1836 to 1845, with the establishment of the Republic of Texas, the author 
argues that the Anglo populace began to ethnically cleanse its geopolitical area by 
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legislating the removal of Indians from east Texas to west Texas. From 1845 to 1859, 
when Texas became a state, the government pushed Indians further west and settled some 
of them on two small reservations. From 1859 to 1875, Texas pushed the vast majority of 
Native Americans from its borders, according to the author. Texas Rangers, vigilante 
militia groups, attacked Native Americans wherever they found them. Some Rangers 
disguised themselves as Native Americans to incite media and government support in 
favor of ethnic cleansing. 
Anderson used many primary sources including newspapers, letters, diaries, 
papers, correspondence, governmental records, statistical reports, correspondence, 
sketches, photographs, and journals. He performed research in archives in Mexico and 
the United States. 
 Particularly in the early part of the book, during his discussion of the Mexican era 
of Texas, Anderson’s narrative suffers from a muddling effect. He refers to a number of 
different historical events and personages in a jumbled manner. The narrative in other 
parts is also not clear and concise. Anderson, however, performed extensive archival 
research. His theoretical model of ethnic cleansing, in replacement of genocide, provides 
a divergent formulation in the classification of wars of extermination in Texas. As with 
individual tribal histories, later surveys of the conditions of indigenous peoples in Texas 
such as that of Anderson employ complex theoretical models. 
 In contrast to Anderson’s heavy use of theory, F. Todd Smith’s survey of Texas 
Indian history in From Dominance to Disappearance (2005) ascribes the disappearance 
of the Indians from Texas in part to demographics. While the author denotes warfare and 
disease as contributing factors, he promotes the idea that Anglos simply overwhelmed the 
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Indians of Texas by sheer numbers of immigrants from the United States. Smith finds 
that colonial Spain initiated a peace policy with the Comanches, Wichitas, and Caddos at 
the expense of positive relations with the Lipan Apaches and Karankawas. The peace 
itself, however, was always tenuous at best because the Comanche in particular based a 
part of their culture on raiding horse and cattle herds in Texas, Nuevo León, and 
Coahuila. The “liberal” policy of Mexico upon its founding included populating the far 
reaches of the northern province of Texas with Anglo-Americans who converted to 
Roman Catholicism and purportedly become Mexican citizens. Ultimately, this plan 
backfired when Anglo settlement came to dominate the province of Texas to the 
detriment not only of Mexicans but also Indians who lived in Texas long before the 
Spanish “discovered” the province.33 
From 1836 to 1845, during the regime of the Republic of Texas, two types of 
Indian policy appeared. One promoted peace between Anglo settlers and the tribes of 
Texas.  The other promoted wars of extermination and forced removal from the 
boundaries of the Republic. Eventually, the second type of Indian policy prevailed. 
During the 1850s, once Texas reached statehood, the United States established two 
reservations in Texas. The author argues that the reservation policy resulted in failure for 
two reasons. First, the northern Comanche continued raiding Anglo settlements 
surrounding the reserves. Second, Anglo settlers blamed reservation Indians for the 
depredations of the northern Comanche and, as a result, organized militias to massacre 
and expel Texas Indians in 1859. 
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Smith makes extensive use of primary sources including United States 
government documents, letters and correspondence, colonial Spanish government 
documents, Mexican government documents, the Texas Indian Papers, population 
studies, diaries, depositions, reports, lists of goods distributed to Indians, petitions, census 
rolls, and Indian treaties. Smith performed research in archives in Spain and the United 
States. 
 Smith’s work appears to provide only facts without interpretive context.  The 
historical events and material with which Smith works comprise considerable 
possibilities for further analysis. The book ends abruptly without a synthesis of the 
arguments provided throughout the work. Smith does not use enough historical, social, 
and cultural theory to demonstrate credible historical arguments for his thesis. 
 By contrast, in Hämäläinen’s The Comanche Empire (2008), the author asserts 
that this indigenous nation had an adaptive culture that allowed them to assimilate horses, 
buffalo hunting, and captives into their political economy. These adaptations created the 
conditions for “empire.” Hämäläinen argues that the Comanche comprised the center of a 
geopolitical nexus that allowed them to play off one colonial power against another. The 
author defines empire as including conquest, tributary client states, slave markets, an 
extraction economy, the incorporation of foreign peoples, and cultural influence on 
subject states. The Comanche “empire” fulfilled each of these requirements.  Turning 
dependency theory on its head, la comanchería was at the core of empire, and the 
Comanche subjugated each of the settlements of the colonial powers surrounding their 
lands.34 
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 The author makes extensive use of primary sources including newspapers, 
explorers’ accounts, government documents, letters, diaries, archaeological studies, 
anthropological studies, environmental studies, interviews with Comanches, reports, 
testimonies, council proceedings, accounts, statements, depositions, itineraries, 
demographic reports, autobiographies, proposals, treaties, military reports, maps, 
territorial papers, dictionaries, private papers, petitions, court records, proclamations, 
military documents, expositions, and captivity narratives. 
 The work suffers from an overabundance of technical jargon and theory. While 
this fact makes the book more readable for academics, the author’s history remains 
inaccessible to the general reader. In his effort to describe the Comanche empire, the 
author neglects an accurate analysis of state formation among other Native American 
peoples such as the Apaches, the Pueblos, and the Osages. On the other hand, the author 
carefully ascribes power and ability to Native peoples. The author’s use of endnotes and 
sources engages the academic reader and reflects a concern to be authoritative and 
exhaustive of the literature on the Comanche. The author’s use of the Comanche 
language comprises an added element to his analysis. His tracing of events from the 
sixteenth century to the late nineteenth century is comprehensive in its analysis of the rise 
and fall of the Comanche empire. 
The author reverses Immanuel Wallerstein’s economic theory of dependency. He 
ascribes agency to the Comanche and recognition of their accomplishments. His analysis 
of Comanche culture and the dynamics of cultural change in the era of empire allows for 
a historical rendering that far surpasses anthropological and ethnohistorical renditions of 
the societies of Native peoples as static and unchanging. Tribal history reaches new 
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heights with this work because the author interweaves Comanche history with the 
histories of other peoples on the edge of empire including the Ndé. 
 Beginning in 1999, the Ndé began to assert tribal sovereignty in relation to 
external governments. Early in the 1990s, Daniel Castro Romero and Bernard F. Barcena 
developed a constitution for the Lipan Apache Band of Texas and began enrolling tribal 
citizens. They presented their petition for federal recognition to the U.S. government in 
1999. In the interceding years to the present, Castro Romero developed a tribal historical 
narrative to provide justification for continued existence of the Lipan Apache. Schism 
developed in 2007. As a result of imposition from external sources, in particular the 
Bexar County District Court, a separate governing body formed from the Lipan Apache 
Band of Texas. This new governing body, led by Barcena, called itself the Lipan Apache 
Tribe of Texas. In the spring of 2009, Texas moved to recognize the Lipan Apache as a 
sovereign nation separate from the state. The Texas legislature also moved to form an 
official government-to-government relation with the tribe. As a result of these recent 
historical events, tribal histories of the Ndé proliferated in their dissemination of 
knowledge with the purpose of providing a scholarly basis for federal recognition. 
 In the continuation of co-authorship between an indigenous person and a non-
Indian tribal historian, William Chebahtah and Nancy McGown Minor published 
Chevato: The story of the Apache Who Captured Herman Lehmann (2007). In this work, 
the history and biography of Chevato, a Lipan Apache, plays a primary role. Chebahtah, a 
direct descendant of Chevato, provides an excellent rendition of oral history in relation to 
his ancestor. Minor provides a thorough analysis of historical events relating to this Ndé 
man who significantly brought the peyote ceremony to the Comanche in Oklahoma. The 
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authors argue that Chevato ought to take his place in the annals of history as a Lipan 
Apache who distinguished himself through his capacity for survival during the 
reservation era and his dissemination of knowledge about peyote religion to the 
Mescalero Apache in New Mexico and the Comanche in Indian Territory.35 
 As for sources, perhaps the most significant derivation is the oral history that 
William Chebahtah introduces. Oral history played a role in the development of 
indigenous histories of Texas since 1988 with the publication of Hasinai: A Traditional 
History of the Caddo Confederacy. One cannot stress more the importance that oral 
history provides, particularly in histories that involve the recent past and historical events 
of the twentieth century. Other sources came from archives such as the Center for 
American History at the University of Texas at Austin and the National Archives. 
Genealogical societies and censuses also play a significant role in the development of 
Chebahtah and Minor’s work. 
 One problem with the book is that at times the facts portrayed in Minor’s straight 
narrative history do not correspond to Chebahtah’s reminiscences. The narrative can be 
somewhat confusing in the sense that Minor often skips significant events only to return 
to them later. As a result, the chronology appears scattered and repetitive. Overall, this 
text provides groundbreaking work on the Ndé. The combination of oral narrative with 
diachronic analysis of related historical events provides a necessary contribution to the 
development of Lipan Apache histories. Indeed, histories of the Ndé following the 
publication of this work remained at the level of renditions of historical events based on 
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written primary sources. As a result, Chevato remains unparalleled in its focus on the 
combination of Chebahtah’s narrative with Minor’s historical research. 
 Minor’s books provide effective means for understanding the history of the Lipan 
Apache. She was tribal historian for the Lipan Apache Tribe of Texas, one of two 
governing bodies. While factions resulted in a split between the Ndé, Minor effected a 
description of the Lipan Apaches that included both sides of their story. In The Light 
Gray People: An Ethno-History of the Lipan Apaches of Texas and Northern Mexico 
(2009), the author gave an excellent cultural and social explanation of the Ndé as a whole 
indigenous nation. She asserts that the Lipanes performed several cultural ceremonies. 
She also discusses their political organization. Minor argues that, with careful 
interpretation of oral histories and written historical documents, she recovers the history 
of the Ndé through analysis of their economic, cultural, and political status.36 
 Minor’s book focuses on ethnological approaches to Ndé history. She includes 
such topics as political organization, religion, styles of warfare and raiding, economics, 
and social structure. The author carefully delineates each of the bands and band leaders 
within the Lipan Apache nation. Minor includes an extensive discussion of Ndé relations, 
both spiritual and economic, to the bison. One weakness of the book comprises 
placement of Lipan culture in an ethnographic present. As a result, changes within Ndé 
culture become subsumed to an eternal, unchanging time frame. Diachronic analysis 
suffers. In this book, Minor also implied that the Lipan diaspora at the end of the 
nineteenth century resulted in the end of Ndé cohesiveness and political formation. Her 
later work serves to repudiate this notion. 
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 In her third book, Minor writes the history of events relating to the Lipan Apaches 
in Texas and Mexico. In Turning Adversity to Advantage: A History of the Lipan Apaches 
of Texas and Northern Mexico, 1700-1900 (2009), the author provides a privileged 
analysis based, as stated above, on her role as tribal historian for the Lipan Apache Tribe 
of Texas. In this book, Minor produces a historical narrative of events relating to the Ndé 
from the time of their first recognition to contemporary issues affecting the tribe. She 
asserts that the Lipan Apache had a direct influence on the development of cowboy 
culture in Mexico and Texas, particularly in the realm of environmental interaction with 
horses. She finds that the record of events provides a rich source for discussion of Ndé 
history. She seeks to include the reasons that Lipan Apaches performed their actions both 
with relation to each other as individuals, as groups, and to the governments of outside 
powers. She argues that the indigenous nation turned a variety of barriers to development 
to their advantage over two centuries.37 
 In this work, Minor brings the history of the Ndé up to the present day. As a 
result, this narrative, more diachronic in nature than her previous book, contributes much 
to understandings of Lipan Apache history from the eighteenth century to 2009. Over half 
the book deals with historical events in the 1700s. Minor provides new research based on 
Spanish-language primary source documents found in archives in Texas. In contrast to 
her extensive narrative regarding the eighteenth century, Minor’s analysis of the Ndé in 
the nineteenth century lacks clear organization. At these points in her narrative, she skips 
from one time period to another only to return in discussion to a previous era. The 
                                                
   37 Nancy McGown Minor, Turning Adversity to Advantage: A History of the Lipan Apaches of Texas and 
Northern Mexico, 1700-1900 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009). 
 42 
author’s work, published by an obscure publishing house with problematic bibliography 
and footnotes, remains the most insightful analysis of Lipan historical events to 2013. 
 In The Lipan Apaches: People of Wind and Lightning (2009), Thomas A. Britten 
seeks to provide an academic approach different from Minor’s histories of the Ndé. The 
author argues that the Lipan Apache provide a test case of Native American groups that 
experienced enormous stress in relation to interaction with external sovereign forces. In 
this case, those powers that induced Ndé internal strife included the governments of 
Spain, Mexico, the Republic of Texas, and the United States. Britten seeks to give voice 
to the Lipan Apache, particularly through the writing of oral narratives passed down over 
the generations at the beginning of each chapter. He also attempts to recognize and write 
about agency among the Ndé, although he acknowledges that the sources lean toward the 
white view of Lipan Apaches. Britten argues that the Ndé maintained cohesiveness in the 
face of the intended destruction of their people.38 
 Britten’s work comprises an analysis that is the most academic of current Lipan 
Apache histories. At times, his terminology remains difficult and requires advanced 
knowledge of social theory. In this sense, Britten’s work provides legitimation to 
scholarly understandings of Ndé social and political history. His narrative suffers from 
insufficient interpretation of certain historical events relating to the Lipan Apaches. For 
example, his analysis of relations between the Ndé and the Texas Rangers lacks a certain 
richness of detail found in Minor’s books. Britten’s book, while useful, provides only a 
small amount of research in comparison to Sherry Robinson’s book. 
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 Robinson’s work I Fought A Good Fight: A History of the Lipan Apaches (2013) 
provides an excellent narrative of historical events relating to the Ndé. She asserts that 
Lipan Apaches maintained autonomy in relation to the various foreign states that 
attempted to control and subjugate them. In a negative sense, Robinson denies that the 
Ndé built an empire or remained victims of circumstances beyond their control. She 
asserts that the Lipanes initiated violence while, at the same time, other states committed 
depredations against this indigenous nation. She argues that the history of the Ndé carries 
a moral tone in uplifting a subject people from the dustbin of history.39 
 Robinson’s work is extensively researched and provides excellent footnotes and 
bibliography. Her perspective remains decidedly in support of the Ndé, both historically 
and in the present. She distinguishes her work from previous authors by stating that those 
histories produced too much academic jargon. In this assertion, Robinson is unfair in her 
assessment. Academic histories provide useful legitimating structures of analysis. 
Robinson, trained as a journalist, provides a unique perspective on Lipan Apaches. She 
need not attack other historians without recognizing the benefits they provide as well. 
Significantly, Robinson references Ndé scholars in her work. 
 This analysis of historical writing would be incomplete without discussion of 
indigenous scholars and their contributions to the historical discussion. Three scholars 
with Native American backgrounds have focused on the history of the Ndé. They include 
Daniel Castro Romero and Margo Tamez. Both of these historians are Ndé themselves. A 
third scholar who writes about Lipan Apaches is Enrique Gilbert-Michael Maestas of 
Jumano descent. Unfortunately, none of these scholars have published books about Ndé 
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history. Tamez received her doctorate from Washington State University in 2010. In 
2014, she teaches indigenous studies at the University of British Columbia. Castro 
Romero is studying for his doctorate at the University of Texas at El Paso. Maestas 
received his doctorate from the University of Texas at Austin in 2008. While each of 
these indigenous historians have penetrating analyses of the historical situation of the 
Ndé, the reader awaits their book-length publications. One must watch for these 
indigenous scholars to develop their work into book form.40 
 As for my research, its purpose is to examine historical bases for U.S. recognition 
of Lipan Apaches today. The United States has so far refused federal recognition of the 
Ndé. My research focuses on historical treaties and social relations between settler states 
and the Ndé in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The lack of academic scholarship 
influences my interest in this indigenous people during this time period. My focus on 
relations between Lipan Apaches and the Republic of Texas serve to provide 
international diplomatic precursors to U.S. involvement with the Ndé. In analyzing events 
during this time period between Mexico and the Lipan Apaches, my narrative seeks to 
provide the grounding for Mexican recognition of Ndé sovereignty today. Most 
significantly, Ndé interaction with the United States before the Civil War produces a 
basis for understanding U.S. historical recognition of the Lipan Apache. This historical 
recognition, then, should encourage the United States to renew diplomatic and political 
ties with this indigenous nation in the contemporary realm. Although my thesis provides 
no privileged information through oral narratives, I carefully position myself as an 
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external agent examining perceptions between colonial regimes and Native peoples. My 
research adds to previous scholarship in assessing the latest theories of indigenous 
sovereignty as they apply to the situation of the Ndé in the mid-nineteenth century. 
 In sum, this overview of historical writing about the Native peoples of Texas 
covers a wide range of types of history. The most significant histories combine traditional 
stories with straightforward narrative composition. Indeed, the oral traditions of 
indigenous peoples contain privileged knowledge, thereby constituting a value-laden 
ethos. The union of narrative with stories passes down over generations provides a unique 
perspective on the ordering of events. These indigenous-centered histories comprise the 














Chapter 2. Citizenship, Sovereignty, Land: The Lipan Apaches and the Republic of 
Texas, 1836-1841 
 In the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas, the government recognized 
only free white persons as legitimate for the purposes of citizenship. Not surprisingly, 
Lipan Apaches could not gain access as citizens. Along with free people of color and 
slaves, the constitution specifically prohibited Native Americans from its citizenry. 
Consummate with this cold fact, the Ndé remained the original arbiters of the land on 
which Anglo-Texans stood. In terms of sovereignty and nationhood, Lipan Apaches from 
1836 to 1841 continued their political, social, and cultural exercise of power in relation to 
themselves, other indigenous nations, and, astonishingly, the Republic of Texas itself. 
Texas asserted incomplete jurisdiction over the population within its claimed 
borders. Sovereignty is the ability to exercise political power in favor of individuals 
within a national group and relations with foreign nations.41 The settler state of Texas 
enshrined its governing structure within a written document, its constitution. This form of 
government entailed the writing, passage, and execution of laws promulgated in written 
form. Proof of the scope and intent of a law required an adversarial relationship between 
two opposing parties in a court of law. The Ndé polity comprised popular sovereignty in 
its most radical form. Popular sovereignty is political power that rests within the people 
of a nation and not in the hands of a sovereign. In Ndé society, the people had no need for 
a constitution because they lived in a strong, resilient community. Oral traditions instead 
of writing characterized Ndé “laws.” Ndé justice took the form of obligations to each 
other within a community, reciprocity between individuals, and respect between groups. 
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Individual acceptance of Ndé legal strictures embodied a system of belief in which each 
person, particularly each woman head of a family, made decisions in concert with each 
other to formulate policy.42 
Lipanes, along with other indigenous nations, held their own views on national 
integrity based in part on external leadership in relations with Texas and internal 
leadership centered on Ndé women’s power. External leadership, composed of extended 
families with a man and his wife at the head of a socio-political group, included the 
Flacco family and the Castro family during this time period. Lipan Apaches also 
formulated internal maintenance of territory in the face of Anglo settlement through the 
exercise of family and community decisions on the part of Ndé women’s leadership.43 
Lipan Apache political progress comprised fluid concepts that transcended traditional 
European-American definitions of sovereignty. The Ndé rose to the challenge in the face 
of the territorial, legal, and political invasion from the Republic of Texas. This chapter 
argues that Lipan Apaches asserted national popular sovereignty on their own terms in 
defiance of Texas settler state Indian policies replete with racial and gender bias.   
The 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas 
 Texas’s first constitution entailed juridical violence against all non-white persons, 
particularly Native Americans and people of African descent. In its constitution and with 
relation to those of supposed inferior races, the Republic of Texas reserved rights to those 
individuals categorized as “white” that purportedly limited the sovereignty of the various 
indigenous nations within the boundaries claimed. The constitution, adopted in 1836, 
enshrined particular elements of racial bias against Native Americans and African 
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Americans.44 Two specific sections, found in the general provisions, provided a basis for 
the exclusion and destruction of indigenous and African peoples and cultures. First, the 
constitution named “all free white persons” as entitled to the privileges of citizenship.45 
The nomenclature of race found in this section promoted the concept of republican civic 
virtue for whites alone. In Section Ten of the general provisions, consideration of persons 
for citizenship specifically denied Native peoples along with persons of African descent, 
free or enslaved.46 The only allowance for this egregious racial bias comprised the 
possibility for recognition of indigenous peoples as separate nations. 
The Republic lumped African American slaves and free persons of color with 
Native Americans. The Texas Constitution denied each of these groups their rights to 
citizenship within the settler state. Moreover, Texas sought to erase indigenous and free 
African populations from the boundaries of its territory. The white republic remained in 
the minds of its Anglo citizens as an effort not only to clear the land for planting but also 
to clear the territory of peoples of so-called impure blood. Texans of Mexican descent 
maintained a precarious relation to the new polity based primarily on Anglo demands that 
they, as tejanos, acknowledge their own “white” racial status in continued dominance of 
indigenous and African peoples. In the erasure of ethnic differences and the expulsion of 
those who made such assertions, the constitution of the Texas Republic planted the seeds 
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of violence in thought, speech, discourse, and action against African Americans and 
Native Americans. During 1836, the Republic elected a president, Sam Houston, who 
sought, however, to accord indigenous nations the respect they deserved. 
Houston’s First Administration 
Political interaction evinced positive relations with indigenous peoples at the 
beginning of the republican era even if the Ndé gained little from this duplicitous 
discourse. Houston’s first administration put in place the mechanisms of Indian policy 
similar to the legal and political decisions of the United States. Beginning with his 
inaugural address in October 1836 Houston clarified his intent to dispense justice in 
relation to the Native American tribes that bordered the small republic.47 He embedded 
his peace policy in a larger discourse on diplomatic relations with other countries. While 
Houston made no provisions for the establishment of indigenous legal title to land, his 
inaugural address clarified three main policy aims: to refrain from aggression, establish 
commerce, and supply the tribes with goods. These policies reduced conflict on the 
frontier. The absence of recognition of Indian ownership of land, however, resulted in a 
juridical erasure of indigenous rights. Over time, this problem for the settler state 
remained in place because the Republic, in treating with the Ndé specifically, never 
extinguished Native American title to lands that Texas claimed. 
In his address, Houston also referred to the power of making treaties with Indian 
nations. Treaty making supplied a discourse of external diplomatic sovereignty in 
relations between Texas and the tribes. Congress made it clear, however, that it opposed 
                                                
   47 Houston’s Inaugural Address, Columbia, October 26, 1836, in The Writings of Sam Houston, eds. 
Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, vol. 1, 1813-1863 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1938), 
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granting land titles and extending diplomatic relations to indigenous nations.48 
Regardless, in November 1836, the Texas Senate approved the appointment of Indian 
commissioners upon the recommendation of the President. Houston, the primary force 
behind the implementation of favorable Indian policies, developed governmental 
structures for recognizing indigenous nations as sovereign entities.49 
Enacted laws of the Republic affected various indigenous peoples. During 
Houston’s first administration, the Congress passed an act for protection of the frontier.50 
The main import of this law was to establish a military corps in order to protect the lives 
and property of white settlers on the edge of the so-called civilized part of Texas. This 
military corps, later referred to as the Texas Rangers, evolved with the rise of the 
vigilante police state. The act further mentioned Native Americans as the source of 
depredations against European-Americans. This discourse of “depredations” and “acts of 
hostility” elided the truth of violence between Native peoples and the settler state. Native 
Americans sought through warfare to defeat the aims of Texas and defend their 
homelands. The settlers promoted the notion that indigenous national defense comprised 
so-called depredations. 
The Republic, however, also sought to promote treaties of peace and friendship 
with the tribes. Diplomatic negotiations with indigenous nations explicitly recognized the 
sovereignty of these peoples. Legal structures for the implementation of either warfare or 
diplomacy resulted from the political apparatus of the Republic. The impetus for 
Congressional conduct in establishing treaty relations with indigenous nations resulted 
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from Sam Houston’s peace policy with regard to Native peoples within the claimed 
boundaries of Texas. As a result, pro-active indigenous policies produced honorable 
relations between the Ndé, in particular, and the republican government. 
In an attempt to align with the Indian policy of the United States, Texas promoted 
interaction with Native peoples that recognized their sovereign status and ability to treat 
with the Republic on a nation-to-nation basis. The act for protection of the frontier further 
provided for the establishment of trading houses and forts along the boundary between 
indigenous nations and the settler state.51 Trading houses implied the notion of 
international commerce between Texas and the Indian nations. These commercial 
enterprises also represented economic sites in the cultural reinforcement of dependency. 
One result of the establishment of these houses comprised the destruction of indigenous 
traditional economies in favor of dependence on Euro-American trade goods. Further, 
forts established national borders. These forts evolved into the militarization of the border 
long before disputes developed between the settler states of Mexico and the United 
States. In effect, the republic promulgated a number of legal concepts that implied 
recognition of indigenous sovereignty. With regard to the Ndé, initial republican 
understandings of this indigenous nation, however, resulted in rejection of its very 
existence within the boundaries of the Republic. 
The Texas expansionist impulse, alive and well in 1837, resulted in juridical and 
discursive violence with particular regard to the Ndé. In a move detrimental to external 
recognition of Ndé people, the republican Senate Standing Committee on Indian Affairs 
submitted a report to the president outlining the various situations of indigenous 
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nations.52 The Committee chose to place many Native Americans within the boundaries 
of Texas without necessarily recognizing or honoring Indian sovereignty. This alteration 
in discourse reflected Congress’s negative attitude toward indigenous peoples at variance 
with that of the president. The report comprised information gathered about the tribes 
with some policy recommendations. 
The Committee found that the Lipan Apaches, along with the Karankawas and 
Tonkawas, ought to be considered a part of the Mexican nation, thereby embedding Ndé 
external peacemaking within the fold of the Mexican sovereign, a “legitimate” nation in 
the eyes of Texas. The Senate refused to treat these indigenous peoples as political 
entities separate from the government of Mexico.53 This policy recommendation began a 
long practice among Anglos of falsely labeling Lipanes as Mexicans. In the interest of 
reducing fiscal expenditures, the Committee excused itself from its responsibilities to the 
Ndé. The result, although only in the short term, continued the discourse of absence. 
Because the governing body of the Republic refused to recognize Lipan Apaches within 
its borders, Texas effected an erasure of Ndé nationhood. 
The report also granted Native peoples use of the land under the so-called right of 
occupancy. In this purported recognition of Indian land title, the Texas government 
inscribed indigenous peoples in juridical practice as squatters on homelands the tribes 
claimed for thousands of years. The document made express reference that “no fee simple 
right of soil be acknowledged by this [government] in favor of these Indians.”54 The 
arbitrary and malicious supposed demotion of Indian land title entailed Texas’ discursive 
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excuse to expel indigenous peoples from their homelands. These assertions contradicted 
Houston’s peace policy. As a result, Houston overrode the suggestions of the Senate 
report in an effort to promote recognition of the viability of Indian nations through treaty 
making.55 
Eventually the Republic politically recognized the Ndé. Indigenous 
intergovernmental agreements often comprised sites of social and cultural destruction 
cloaked in the recognition of tribal sovereignty. Even if Congress resisted, Houston’s first 
administration made a point of promoting accords with the tribes. In November 1837, the 
president made his second annual message to Congress. He asserted that the Texas 
legislature should regulate the interaction between settlers and Native peoples on the 
frontier between the settler state and the indigenous nations. Houston neglected to 
mention the possibility of treaty making in his second annual message as a result of 
congressional resistance to the notion of treating Indian tribes as sovereign nations.56 The 
President, in a clever sleight of hand, promoted his own treaty policy while not explicitly 
acknowledging his program before the Texas Congress. Soon after, Houston made 
preparations for sovereign diplomatic relations with the Ndé. Indeed, he commissioned 
James Power to treat with the Lipan Apache nation. 
Land cessions, arising in concert with the land law of 1836 and the subsequent 
opening of the General Land Office of the Republic of Texas, contradicted recognition of 
indigenous sovereignty.57 Settlers who invaded Indian-held territories, including those of 
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the Ndé, flooded the office with land claims and requests for surveying parties in order to 
depose the indigenous people of their so-called right of occupancy. The act of opening 
lands claimed by Texas to Anglo settlement denied recognition that people already lived 
on these lands and had done so for millennia. The categorical erasure of indigenous space 
on the prairies, plains, forests, and rivers resulted in the evaporation of indigenous land 
stewardship in favor of large plantation cotton economies. 
In making treaties with representatives of the Lipan Apache Nation, the Republic 
of Texas promoted the concept of indigenous sovereignty and recognized Ndé power to 
the south and west of the early line of Anglo settlement. Lipan leader Cuelgas de Castro 
signed the Live Oak Point Treaty in January 1838.58 He negotiated this treaty with James 
Power on the Gulf Coast above the mouth of the Nueces River at Aransas Bay.59 The 
diplomatic and peacemaking roles of Ndé women appeared to vanish in the face of 
Anglo-Texan patriarchal notions of women’s status. The violence of the dominant 
discourse resulted in reduction of Ndé women’s power. The colonial Spanish, however 
grudgingly, at least recognized the diplomatic capabilities of indigenous women.60 The 
Texans refused to do so. From Anglo domination of the geopolitical region beginning in 
a direct manner in 1836, Ndé women disappear from the written record as diplomats or 
political leaders. In essence, the Lipan accommodated themselves to Anglo-Texan power, 
although Ndé women most likely remained in internal political councils. The Anglo-
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Texan written record, however, ascribes no recognition of Lipan Apache women’s roles 
in politics. 
The Lipanes made no land cessions at this time. The primary purpose of the treaty 
asserted peace and friendship between the two nations in keeping with Houston’s Indian 
policy. Article Three of the treaty provided for trading houses to be established in Lipan 
Apache settlements.61 The Republic did not fulfill this stipulation. The lack of 
enforcement of this provision constituted a boost to the maintenance of traditional Ndé 
economies, however, because the Ndé had embroiled themselves in dependency on Euro-
American trade goods at the end of the Spanish colonial era in the early nineteenth 
century. Another stipulation, Article Five, also lacked teeth in its enforcement. Castro 
agreed to turn over any Lipanes who committed depredations against Anglo-Texan 
settlers. Clearly, he later refused to do so in the case of Ndé “crimes” against Euro-
American settlers in San Antonio during the Lamar administration. According to Article 
Five, the Republic also promised to prosecute all settlers who committed crimes against 
the Lipanes.62  Law enforcement, comprised of the Texas Rangers, refused to enforce this 
stipulation. Article Five rendered criminal jurisdiction as problematic. In particular, the 
underlying rationale for the seizure of rights to police indigenous crimes came about 
because a purportedly inferior race could not exercise the administration of justice over 
the “superior” white bodies of the “master-race.” On paper, Texas accorded rights to the 
Ndé in criminal jurisdiction that the Republic later refused to enforce. Actions on the part 
of the Republic differed from paper promises. 
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Scholar of the Ndé Nancy McGown Minor associates the fact of making one band 
chief representative of the Lipan Apache Nation with disaster in Ndé-Texan relations. 
Castro, head of the Sun Otter Band, lacked authority to assert power over the various 
Lipan Apache groups in west Texas and south of the Rio Grande.63 The republic refused 
to recognize its own folly in upholding the representational synecdoche of the Sun Otter 
Band as constitutive of the entire Ndé nation.64 Minor is correct in her assessment that 
one local group of Ndé lacked the ability to represent, let alone enforce, the stipulations 
of a treaty made with another sovereign entity. Ndé government comprised a loose 
federation of different family groups, bands, and divisions.65 As a result, consensus 
among the nation as a whole became necessary for treaty stipulations to be honored. 
Minor correctly asserts that Castro lacked sufficient power in his person to represent the 
entirety of the Lipan nation.66 Regardless, the treaty affirmed Lipan Apache sovereignty 
as separate from the Republic of Texas. After the signing of the treaty, the republican 
government invited Castro to the city of Houston, an invitation to which Castro 
responded favorably. 
 Ndé leaders, when faced with the naked power of the Anglo-Texan settler state, 
appeared to manifest two primary responses: hegemonic co-optation and subversion. 
Hegemony, as defined here, is structural power exercised over subordinate groups in 
daily life in which the dominated group takes part in its own oppression, usually by 
idolizing or “selling out” to the dominant polity.67 In this sense, then, Ndé leader Cuelgas 
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de Castro, in his visit to the Texas capital in the city of Houston, found himself co-opted 
in a hegemonic social structure. Castro also engaged in subversion of the aspirations of 
the settler state. He maintained his own integrity as a leader by means of subtle resistance 
through charm and diplomacy. 
 When Castro came to Houston to solidify treaty negotiations in March 1838, 
representatives of the government of Texas accorded him honors reserved for foreign 
diplomats. The Lipan Apache leader made a distinct impression among the social elites of 
the capital. Upon his arrival in Houston on March 3, Castro, wearing “American” clothes, 
attended a society ball in which he made a distinct and captivating impression on the 
elites of the Texas oligarchy. His chronicler, John Hunter Herndon, declared that Castro 
was “fine looking,” “intelligent,” and “very warlike.”68 
Mirabeau Lamar’s relation to indigenous peoples often contained an element of 
duplicity. All the same, Lamar had certain affections for Lipan Apaches as individuals 
and as a people. Castro, styled as a “General,” met with Vice President Lamar in Houston 
on March 6. Lamar, in his speech, recognized the sovereign status of the Lipan Apaches 
Apache Nation by his declaration of “General de Castro as the enlightened chief of a 
powerful nation.” He asserted the intention of the Republic of Texas to “maintain 
amicable and pacific relations with all nations and tribes.”69 In his statements, Lamar 
recognized the sovereign status of the Ndé. In granting symbolic power to Ndé 
leadership, the Vice President, however, overstepped his political boundaries. 
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Afterwards, one of his advisers during his presidential campaign proposed that Lamar 
retract publicly his statements made to Cuelgas de Castro.70 
President Houston, in contrast to his Vice President, had faith in the mechanism 
of U.S. Indian policy that he sought to apply to the situation of indigenous peoples in 
Texas. This earnest faith in U.S. administrative policy ultimately thwarted Houston’s 
desire to respect the rights of Native peoples. In the intervening period between Lamar’s 
speech in March and his receipt of the letter from his adviser in June, President Houston 
vetoed a bill sending ranger companies to attack so-called “hostile” Indians. Houston 
provided a message along with this bill reaffirming the importance of making treaty 
negotiations with Native peoples. He reasoned that “the executive has never yet known a 
treaty made with an Indian tribe first infracted or violated by them.”71 Unfortunately, in 
the election of 1838, Lamar replaced Houston as President of the Republic. Lamar’s 
administration tolerated no treaty making, in part because of pressure from Congress to 
take a hard line against indigenous nations bordering on or intersecting with Texas. 
Lamar’s Administration 
 Lamar’s Indian policy, in marked contrast to Houston’s peaceful initiatives, 
promoted the use of physical violence against indigenous peoples through the discursive 
destruction of his own political cant. In his inaugural address in December the President 
declared a de facto war against the indigenous peoples on the Texas frontier. His desire 
for conflict tolerated no compromise. Lamar wished to enact total devastation. He 
proposed to exterminate or remove all “hostile” Indians from the claimed boundaries of 
the republic. Lamar tempered his inflammatory rhetoric through the statement that the lex 
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talionis, or law of retaliation, would not rule the war. Still, he attacked Native peoples as 
worthy only of extinction or expulsion, incorrectly calling them “sanguinary savages” 
and “wild cannibals.”72 
Lamar also made an arbitrary distinction between those Natives he considered 
“hostile” and those he posited as “friendly.” In creating this distinction, Lamar effectively 
discouraged indigenous nations from intertribal negotiations to defeat the settler state. 
Lamar demanded the atomization of each “friendly” Indian’s family to separate plots of 
land, a prescient and disturbing precursor to the policy of allotment the United States 
deployed in the late nineteenth century. Further, so-called friendly Natives remained 
subject to the laws of the Republic of Texas and the control of Indian agents.73 Lamar, in 
designating a part of the Lipan nation as “friendly,” divided the tribe. He demanded 
submission to the will of the settler state and active intolerance of other indigenous 
nations, particularly the Comanches. 
Lamar used soft power, or subtle discursive violence, to enforce dominant modes 
of Indian hating in designating the Ndé as “friendly” yet subjected to the “superior” 
control of the Anglo settler state. During Lamar’s administration the Texas Congress, in 
keeping with the President’s Indian policy, subsumed the Lipan among other tribes into 
the category of “friendly Indians.” While the legislation that the President approved in 
January 1839 did not specifically name the Lipan Apaches, the act implied their 
inclusion.74 This implication resulted only from Lamar’s actions toward Lipan Apaches 
afterwards. The law provided for the employment of “friendly Indians” in the military 
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service of the republic. Lamar’s policy pointed to the Lipan as “friendly” because Texas 
proceeded to employ the Apaches as scouts in military actions against both the 
Comanche and refugee indigenous nations. This legislation, however, limited Indian 
sovereignty through the arbitrary designation of “friendly” nations such as the Lipan 
Apache and Tonkawa to supposedly hostile ones including the Comanche. The law also 
promoted a vision of relations with indigenous people not as nations but as individuals 
subject to employment by the Republic. As a result, arbitrary divisions between and 
within indigenous nations precluded international agreements among tribes in order to 
defeat the order of the settler state. 
In a series of campaigns against so-called enemy nations, President Lamar 
deployed the so-called “friendly” Lipan Apaches against the Comanche, Mexican 
banditti, and the Texas Cherokee. The settler state employed the Lipans as scouts 
alongside Anglo Rangers. The Republic attacked indigenous and Mexican men, women, 
and children in their settlements.75 These attacks also included incursions on Comanche 
land in what is now Northwest Texas.76 The Texas Rangers advanced the border between 
the indigenous nations to the west and north of the Republic for the purposes of Anglo-
Texan settlement. Texas co-opted the allegiances and activities of Ndé leaders and 
warriors. Indeed, the Lipanes gained very little for their service. The indigenous nation 
received no official recognition of its sovereignty during the Lamar administration. 
 Still, the Ndé were not simply pawns in the hands of Lamar. An understanding of 
the actions of the Lipan Apaches results from their peculiar situation in relation to Texas. 
Indeed, Euro-Americans continued to immigrate to the republic and lay claim to the lands 
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of the Ndé. The Lipan Apaches sought to maintain positive relations with Texas and 
interact with Anglo-Texans in the face of a widespread assault on Ndé territorial 
integrity. This attempt at diplomatic negotiations ultimately failed. 
Lamar and his administration used hegemonic social control against both the 
Apaches and Comanches. Indeed, hegemony was central to the Texas Republic’s 
dominance over “friendly” Indians including the Tonkawa and the Ndé. Ever seeking to 
accommodate the encroaching white settlers of the republic, Lipan Apaches submitted in 
part to the control of the settler state. Ndé men did so because they wished to remain 
warriors in the face of the overwhelming deluge of white settlers onto their traditional 
homelands. The choice of the Ndé was to attack so-called “hostile” nations such as the 
Comanche in order to maintain Lipan Apache status as a warrior society. Ultimately, 
their agreement with Texas resulted in loss of land and destruction of their original way 
of life. 
A closer look at historical events during the Lamar administration reveals 
complicit relationships between the Ndé and the larger Texas colonizing entity. One 
month into the new administration, Colonel John H. Moore organized a group of Anglo-
Texans into a military unit. This unit co-opted the Lipan Apaches as scouts under the 
direction of Cuelgas de Castro. Young Flacco along with Juan Castro and Juan Seis 
comprised three members of this unit.77 The Apaches, who knew the terrain because it 
was their homeland, traced signs of Comanche habitation to the San Saba River valley 
several miles northwest of the white settlements.78 The combined Native and Anglo-
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Texan military unit succeeded in taking the enemy camp and cruelly massacred men, 
women, and children as they were sleeping in February 1839. The Comanche responded 
quickly, and the outcome of the battle evolved into a stalemate. The Lipan Apaches 
acquired a number of Comanche horses, and the Comanche absconded with the mounts 
of the Anglo-Texans.79 
Ndé women, although excoriated by the leaders of the Republic of Texas, 
remained the primary matriarchs within internal relations of the indigenous nation. In the 
eighteenth century, Lipan Apaches often used matriarchs for diplomatic relations with 
Spain, although the historical record tends to obscure their leadership roles.80 The Ndé 
responded viscerally to their own captives among foreign nations, particularly Lipan 
women, because women held such commendable status within Ndé society. The end of 
the San Saba battle occurred when the Comanche sent a Lipan captive woman to 
negotiate a peace settlement.81 In the eighteenth century, both the Comanches and the 
Lipan Apaches often employed women as cultural brokers between warring nations.82 
Indeed, Ndé women evinced diplomatic leadership. The Comanches knew that the 
Apaches would respond favorably to the use of a captive Ndé woman as diplomat. At this 
time, Anglo-Texans refused to understand this concept of women as diplomats during 
wartime. 
Lamar also employed Lipan Apache scouts to drive the last vestiges of the 
Cherokee from Texas. This indigenous nation consisted of refugees from the Indian 
removal policies of President Andrew Jackson. Under Sam Houston, a long-time friend 
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of this displaced people, the Texas Cherokee sought legitimacy to their land claims.83 
Upon failing in this measure, they sought solace and protection under the Lamar 
administration. Lamar would have none of it. During the summer of 1839, the rangers 
defeated and removed most of these refugees.84 By December of the same year, only a 
small part of the Cherokee Nation remained in the central part of the Republic. Indeed, 
this tribal remnant sought to receive asylum within Mexico.85 Ndé scouts led a 
reconnaissance party to discover the village and assess its strength in December. On 
Christmas Day, the Texas Rangers, under Colonel Edward Burleson attacked the small 
indigenous village on the Colorado River northwest of the town of Austin.86 The 
Christmas Day Cherokee massacre resulted in the death of two tribal leaders, including 
John Bowls. With the contributions of Lipan Apaches, the Rangers captured five women 
and nineteen children. The combined force marched these defenseless prisoners in the 
dead of winter to Austin. Ranger guards “protected” the prisoners in their removal to the 
city.87 The hegemony of the Anglo-Texans produced “success” in subordinating the Ndé 
to the whims of the settler state. The Lipan Apaches found themselves free from 
persecution under Lamar’s administration only as long as they practiced coercion and 
violence against other indigenous peoples, no matter how peaceful, within the claimed 
boundaries of Texas. 
 The year 1840 saw only increased complicity of the Lipan Apaches in the violent 
actions of the Republic. The Ndé gained very little from this sacrifice of their integrity as 
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a people apart from the Anglo-Texans. For the vast majority of the year, Lipan Apaches, 
along with the Texas Rangers, promoted armed conflict with the Comanche nation. In 
March 1840, Comanche leaders found themselves in the midst of a massacre in San 
Antonio. The chiefs arrived in the village in order to negotiate a treaty. While Anglo-
Texans referred to the following events as the Council House Fight, these same Anglos 
perpetrated a massacre against the Comanche.88 Apparently, the Texans led the chiefs 
into a trap. Instead of a prisoner exchange, the Rangers sought to hold the Comanche 
leaders hostage until the release of more prisoners than anticipated.89 The Comanche 
could not abide captivity and sought to escape. Every Comanche man along with many 
women and children died at the hands of the Anglo-Texans in San Antonio.90 Reprisal for 
wrongs committed during this massacre inevitably developed later in the year. 
 It took most of the summer for the Comanche to decide on an act of retribution for 
the killing of some of their most significant leaders. In August 1840, the Comanche 
provided a military response to the destruction of their people by invading the towns of 
Victoria and Linnville.91 Indeed, Linnville sat on the coastline of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Comanche attacks in this vicinity were unusual given the fact that the Comanche 
homeland consisted of territory far from the coast in the vicinity of Central and 
Northwest Texas. Anger at the destruction of traditional lifeways and revenge for the 
deaths of some of their most prominent chiefs convinced the Comanche to make war as 
far into Anglo-Texan settlements as they could. Parties of men from this indigenous 
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nation proceeded to immolate Linnville in a fiery inferno on the shoreline.92 Key to the 
Republic’s response, the Ndé formed a part of the countering movement of the Texas 
Rangers in reasserting dominance and control over the settlements of coastal and Central 
Texas. 
 The Lipan Apaches, forced to employ physical violence against other indigenous 
nations, had no choice with regard to their exercise of sovereignty. The Ndé, in their 
relations with Lamar’s administration and the Texas Rangers, held no sovereign status 
separate from the Republic at this time. Lamar’s policy, specifically, provided for no 
recognition of intergovernmental agreements with the tribes. The Ndé, in an effort at self-
preservation given the proximity of some of their rancherías to Anglo settlements, found 
that they had little choice but to accommodate themselves to the control of the police 
state. In policing Native peoples, Texas sought to incorporate the Ndé into their society. 
In other words, Texas wanted to ignore the “otherness” of Lipan Apaches in order to 
integrate individual leaders of this indigenous nation into Anglo-Texan settlements. As a 
result, in October 1840, Ndé scouts along with Colonel John H. Moore’s regiment of 
Texas Rangers sought out and killed Comanche men, women, and children.93 Although 
called a battle, this military action constituted no armed conflict. Instead, Texas 
promulgated mass extermination of the Comanches. The Comanches, after this battle in 
their own territory, never again attacked the coast settlements of the Republic. 
 In dispensing with their desire to maintain territorial and structural integrity, the 
Ndé accompanied the Rangers in the hopes of a reward to their people. In this, the 
Lipanes found friends within the Texas legislature. In fact, some of these politicians 
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deigned to provide the Ndé with a small plot of land reserved from the entirety of la 
lipanería. The ten-mile square reservation proposal west of the Colorado River, for all 
intents and purposes, constituted a chimera on the part of those politicians desirous of 
recognizing the Lipan Apaches. The media at the time deemed this reservation offer as an 
“experiment.”94 Apparently, the measure fell through as the historical record provides no 
evidence of the establishment of reserved lands in accordance with the “right of 
occupancy” in 1840. Lamar, without engaging in clear inconsistencies, could not allow it. 
In 1841, the themes of accommodation, integration, and the awards system came 
to a head in San Antonio. Anglo-Texans often did not understand the intricacy and 
subtlety of Ndé socio-political interaction. They understood much, however, about 
methods of destroying Lipan Apache culture. Alcohol, for example, fueled the fire of the 
destruction of Ndé traditional lifeways. Whiskey peddlers in San Antonio, as elsewhere 
throughout Indian country, sought to anaesthetize Ndé agency in a form of structural 
violence imposed on Lipan politics, society, and culture. The situation of the Ndé in 
Béxar (San Antonio) indicated the extent of the problem of Lipan Apache relationships to 
Anglo-Texan society. In July 1841, the mayor of Béxar, C. H. Guilbeau, wrote President 
Lamar about the problems of Ndé social and political relations with settlers in the city. 
The mayor insisted that Lipan Apaches committed theft, destroyed crops and livestock, 
and desecrated the missions. Ndé people, according to Guilbeau, performed these actions 
while under the influence of alcohol. The mayor punished the “delinquent” Lipan 
Apaches with imprisonment. He also appealed to Cuelgas de Castro to chastise and 
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control Ndé men committing these actions.95 What Guilbeau could not understand, 
however, was that Ndé political structure at the time refused to allow Castro, as leader, to 
impose his power through force. Ndé leaders, in accordance with popular sovereignty, 
relied on gentle admonition instead of coercion.96 
Guilbeau sought to place blame on the Ndé and their leaders in a psychology of 
ethnic chauvinism. The mayor lacked the ability to comprehend the actions of Lipan 
Apaches and, more significantly, their motivations. Béxar constituted a cultural 
crossroads for centuries. The placement of the city coincided directly with the homelands 
of the Ndé.97 Indeed, it appears that Lipan Apaches committed these acts out of anger at 
continued Anglo-Texan encroachment on their lands. Without sovereign recognition from 
Texas, the Ndé fell back on subversive actions against Anglos who refused to respect the 
integrity of the Lipan Apache nation. A change was absolutely necessary in Ndé-Texan 
relations. This change, with unforeseen negative consequences, came about with the 
reelection of Sam Houston in 1841. 
Conclusion 
 During the first five years of the newly established Republic of Texas, the Ndé 
maintained positive relations with the government. Indeed, the Republic accorded status 
to the Ndé under the Sam Houston administration as a sovereign entity separate from the 
juridical nature of Texas. This sovereign recognition appeared markedly different from 
the experience of Lipanes to the south in Mexico. Indeed, that government sought to 
incorporate the Ndé as citizens of its polity. The Constitution of the Republic and the 
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Lamar administration provide a nadir in comparison to either Mexican or Houstonian 
indigenous policies. Lamar’s administration demonized Native peoples and subscribed to 
the dictum: “divide and conquer.” In distinguishing “friendly” from “hostile” Native 
Americans, the Republic sought to accord the Ndé status as a people residing in limbo. 
Neither citizen nor separate nation, Lipan Apaches adapted to their situation in multiple, 
ultimately negative, ways. The Lipan Apache people either surrendered to the soft power 
of the Republic in becoming scouts for the settler state or adopted negative behaviors 
such as alcoholism. Neither result contributed much to Ndé sovereignty. By 1841, Lipan 
Apache political status remained subject to the political whims of the Lamar 




























Chapter 3. Grass Shall Not Grow in the Path Between Us: Sam Houston, Anson 
Jones, and the Lipan Apaches, 1841-1846 
In 1843 Sam Houston, President of the Republic of Texas, in writing his poem to 
the elder Flacco, Lipan Apache commandant, discussed in the introduction, pleaded with 
the Ndé that “grass shall not grow in the path between us.”98 Houston made this effort in 
order to allay the fear that Anglo-Texans had murdered Flacco’s son in an ethnically 
motivated attack. Although Flacco’s personal response to the poem remains hidden from 
the written historical record, the Lipanes withdrew from official relations with the young 
republic shortly afterwards. Did grass grow in the path between the Ndé and the Republic 
of Texas in the years following young Flacco’s death? The simple answer is affirmative, 
although a careful delineation of events reflects Lipan Apache desires to maintain good 
relations with the settlers and the settler state. Yet, Anglo-Texans refused to accord 
positive recognition to the value of Lipan Apaches in relation to Texas politics and 
society. Houston’s poetry, while poignant, also reflected denial on the part of the republic 
to recognize its own fault in the destruction of amenable relations between the settlers 
and the Ndé. 
This chapter seeks to clarify sovereign and diplomatic relations between the 
Republic of Texas and Lipan Apaches in the latter half of the era of independent Texas. 
From 1841 to 1846, the Republic sought to consolidate its territorial claims vis-à-vis the 
claims of Mexico and the United States. While demanding recognition from Mexico in a 
belligerent manner led to war with that nation-state in 1842, Anglo-Texans found 
common cause with the Anglo citizens of the U.S. settler state. Eventually, this rapport 
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led to the annexation of Texas as a state in 1845 and the establishment of a state 
government in February 1846. The indigenous policies of the Republic at this time 
reflected Sam Houston’s desire to perform justice in relation to Native Americans. 
Following Houston’s administration, President Anson Jones continued the peace policies 
of the previous leader of the Republic. Ironically, this period found the Ndé to be 
marginalized and bereft of political sovereign rights. This chapter argues that Lipan 
Apaches, contrary to the historical trends of marginalization and rejection, maintained 
internal structural coherence and partial recognition from the Republic of sovereign rights 
to maintain the coherence of the Ndé polity. 
Houston’s Second Administration 
 President Houston sought to perform the role of savior to indigenous people, but 
his naïveté in actuality resulted in the exploitation of divisions between tribal nations. 
Houston, in his second term, purportedly continued his indigenous peace policy. The 
President clarified his position in his first message before Congress in December 1841.99 
He declared Lamar’s war of attrition a failure. The president reinstated a policy of treaty-
making with the various tribes considered to be within the boundaries of Texas. The 
Lipan Apaches remained staunch allies of the republic. The impetus for diplomatic 
relations ultimately resulted in a treaty with the Ndé.100 Determining Lamar’s war against 
“hostile” indigenous peoples as a failure, Houston carefully ascribed fault with the 
administration of his predecessor. It seemed as if a new Indian policy would soon 
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develop as a result. Unfortunately for the Lipan Apaches, Houston’s efforts to accord 
diplomatic recognition of the Comanche and other tribes actually increased negative 
relations between the Ndé and the Republic. Moreover, Houston maintained the 
distinction between “hostile” and “friendly” Indians as a discourse begun under the aegis 
of Lamar. This discourse, in a clear continuance of Lamar’s divide-and-conquer strategy, 
resulted in the destruction of positive international relations between indigenous peoples 
in Texas. 
The President cleverly maintained Lipan Apaches as friends to the people of the 
Republic of Texas. Whether the Anglo-Texans of the Republic returned this offer of 
friendship remained a different matter altogether. Houston wryly clarified his position in 
relation to the Lipan Apaches in a letter written in February 1842.101 In this letter, 
Houston described the Ndé as “friendly” Indians similar to the assertions of Mirabeau 
Lamar. In his letter, Houston retained the arbitrary division of Native peoples as either 
“friendly” or “hostile.” The designation of “friendly” constituted the political relation 
between the Ndé and Anglo-Texans, at least in the President’s eyes. This dualism 
resulted in Houston’s admonition to the Lipan Apache as a group not to associate with 
those the administration viewed as a threat. The President requested of the Lipan Apaches 
that they guard against and watch for Indians who “murder and steal.”102 
At this point in his letter, Houston elucidated the fault in his perspective that 
ultimately led to the downfall of the Ndé. If no Lipan Apaches murdered or engaged in 
thievery, the President made primary reference to other indigenous nations and citizens of 
these nations as “other.” Houston not only divided the nations from each other in his 
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request, he also accused those “other” Indians as morally distinct from the Ndé and, 
somehow, in the wrong. The President further asked that Lipan Apaches act as spies for 
the Republic against other Indian tribes. In this final twist to the divisive discourse of the 
letter, Houston promoted not only the difference of the Ndé from other tribes but also the 
active complicity of Lipan Apaches in the destruction and surveillance of those “other” 
Indians. Houston may not have realized the purport of his demands, yet his orders prove 
that his peace policy could not be truly conciliatory to the Comanche and other 
indigenous nations pejoratively labeled as “hostile.” 
 Because of the hegemonic relations of power between the Anglo settler state and 
the Lipan Apache Nation, the Ndé acted in what they perceived as their own best interest. 
Because the Lipanes trusted Anglo-Texans as their friends on the basis of previous 
experience, this indigenous nation provided service to the Texas settler state against the 
Mexican military. Texans manipulated the fealty of the Ndé for their own ends. Almost 
directly after the swearing in of Houston as President of the Republic, war with Mexico 
brewed on the horizon. Hostilities between the two “legitimized” polities, unlike 
“delegitimized” indigenous nations, broke out in 1842.103 Lipan Apaches formed an 
invaluable role in the Republic’s war with Mexico by acting as scouts for the Texas 
militia. The Ndé, having lived in south Texas for several centuries, could distinguish the 
different topographical markers of the terrain that remained invisible to Anglo-Texan 
settlers of the 1840s.104 
                                                
   103 For a thoroughly researched historical rendition of the Texas-Mexican War, see Joseph M. Nance, 
Attack and Counter-Attack: The Texas Mexican Frontier, 1842 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964). 
   104 Nancy McGown Minor, Turning Adversity to Advantage: A History of the Lipan Apaches of Texas and 
Northern Mexico, 1700-1900 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009), 131-132. 
 73 
In effect, the Ndé approach to the 1842 war formed a triangulation that broke the 
false dichotomy of Anglo versus Mexican. During the war, each of the three polities 
exercised their interests. While Lipan Apaches allied with the Anglo-Texans, certain 
tejanos also fought on the side of the Republic.105 The Ndé played a direct role in the 
prosecution of the war. Unfortunately, the year 1842 comprised the beginning of the end 
of peaceful relations between the Ndé and the Anglo-Texans. Indeed, after 1842, Anglo 
settlers made clear and distinct group formations on the basis of perceived “racial” 
attributes that determined the previously elevated position of Lipan Apaches to 
subjugation. 
From Texan independence to 1842, the nation-state of Mexico denied recognition 
of the Republic. As a result of this refusal, Mexico planned to realign Texas as its own 
province during the ensuing years after the Texas Revolution of 1836. In 1841, General 
Mariano Arista amassed an army on the border with Texas. In January 1842, the Mexican 
General issued a proclamation from his military seat in Tamaulipas in which he 
threatened the invasion of the “Department of Texas.”106 In early March, Mexican troops 
under General Rafael Vasquez marched on San Antonio, although they abandoned the 
old capital of the Province of Texas only four days later.107 With regard to the Mexican 
military, their leaders, as so often before, refused to recognize the significance or status 
of the indigenous nations on the so-called border between Texas and Mexico. 
The Ndé, however, retained a position of importance to relations between the 
militaries of the Texas Republic and Mexico. The Mexican army under Captain Miguel 
Aznar engaged this indigenous nation at the Mission del Refugio near San Antonio. On 
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March 5, an invading party of Mexicans attacked a Lipan settlement near Refugio. In this 
battle, the Mexican soldiers killed Lipan Apache leader Cuelgas de Castro’s son-in-law 
and nephew. Moreover, the Ndé, having acquired goods from south of the Rio Grande, 
lost forty-two horses in the Mexican attack. Captain Aznar killed each Ndé person who 
demonstrated resistance against his military force. The Mexicans murdered two of the 
Lipanes who ventured to escape.108 In this instance, the Ndé evinced a clearly negative 
relation to the Mexican military, and, while the Lipanes often traded with the tejano 
population, animosity between this indigenous nation and the military elite of Mexico 
remained a constant of anger and misunderstanding.109 
Indeed, the Ndé refused to suffer the atrocities of the Mexicans under Captain 
Aznar for any length of time. Retribution came swift and just. The Apaches, enraged with 
the Mexican military over the loss of family members of a hereditary chief, gathered a 
war party to attack the Mexicans as they withdrew from the Anglo-Texans settlements 
south to the Rio Grande. The Texas rangers supplied the Lipan Apaches with guns and 
ammunition, and the Ndé captured a number of horses during this skirmish. The Lipan 
war party met with the Mexican regiment just south of the Nueces River five days after 
the death of the nephew of Cuelgas de Castro. The Ndé managed to reacquire some of 
their horses and wounded fifteen soldiers.110 Lipanes and Mexican military elites failed to 
engage in acts of friendship. Soon, the Anglo-Texans would join the Mexican elites as 
enemies in the eyes of the Ndé. 
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While some of the Lipanes resided in Mexico at this time, other Ndé people 
inhabited the claimed lands of Texas. Because of divisions between Texas and the 
Mexican nation-state, at points in time the Ndé could not maintain proper communication 
lines across the Rio Grande. Lipanes at this time fought the Mexicans in Mexico and the 
Mexicans invading Texas. As for the continuance of war, President Houston organized a 
general call to arms on March 10. A volunteer army under Brigadier General Alexander 
Somervell formed only to disband in late April.111 The Ndé, along with their friend 
among the Texas Rangers, Captain John Hays, formed a small defense party with 
headquarters at San Antonio by the end of May.112 Although Lipan Apaches quickly 
found themselves in the position of the enemy at the same time in the following year, in 
the spring of 1842 the people of this indigenous nation remained on good terms with the 
Republic and the Texas Rangers. 
 During the summer of 1842, the President remained solicitous of Lipan Apache 
leadership and collective rights as a direct result of the need for the Republic to employ 
the Ndé as scouts in protection of the environs of San Antonio during the Texas-Mexican 
War. Houston reiterated his peace policy with specific regard to the Lipan Apaches in a 
letter dated March 25, 1842.113 In this letter, the President of the Republic requested that 
Major Thomas J. Smith, commander of the Texas rangers, stop Anglos from attacking the 
Ndé. Clearly, Houston was anxious to retain the allegiance of the Apaches given the 
attacks on the Republic from Mexico. In April, Houston requested a trading house to be 
placed on the Brazos River. He also demanded that Anglo-Texans not make enemies of 
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the Lipan and, in particular, to keep the Lipanes from purchasing whiskey and other 
spirits.114 Houston, in his good-natured way, evinced a policy of social control of the Ndé 
that, all the same, denied their agency. Moreover, his repeated requests that Anglo-
Texans refrain from violent speech and behavior toward Lipan Apaches belie the changes 
occurring in the perspectives of Anglos toward Native Americans, tejanos, and Mexicans. 
Ndé women continued to retain high status.  In late May, traveler Francis Latham 
encountered the Lipan Apaches on the San Marcos River in between Austin and San 
Antonio.115 Latham described the customs and habits of Lipan Apaches at this time. He 
praised the beauty and dignity of Ndé women. Latham recognized the high status 
accorded women in the nation, including the demand that a husband live with his wife’s 
family. Indeed, while the erosion of women’s power with regard to the polity continued, 
their exalted status within the domestic affairs of the nation remained in force. 
Ndé leaders and people in general suffered from increasing alienation from the 
dominant society. As Anglo populations increased as a result of immigration, the 
previous favored status of the Lipan Apache Nation continued to deteriorate. In the early 
summer of 1842, President Houston granted a passport to Cuelgas de Castro for safe 
passage from Houston to Austin.116 The grant of a passport reflected the problem of 
Anglo-Texan settler demonization of indigenous peoples encountered on the roads of the 
republic. Moreover, the irony of granting a passport to an indigenous person within his 
own homeland remained a glaring reminder of the impositions of settler colonialism. 
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The Texas Rangers continued to exploit the military prowess of the Ndé in a 
series of attacks on the Mexican military in the latter part of 1842. In recognition of the 
fact that the Mexicans could invade at any time, young Flacco and Colonel Juan Castro, a 
son of Cuelgas de Castro, remained in the fields west of San Antonio with Texas ranger 
Colonel Hays.117 In early July, a Mexican force under Colonel Antonio Canales, a former 
Texas ally in the federalist uprisings against the government in Mexico City in 1840, 
attacked a small party of Anglo-Texans at Lipantitlán. After his initial success, the 
Colonel quickly withdrew south of the Rio Grande.118 In September, the Mexican 
military under Brigadier General Adrián Woll captured San Antonio once again only to 
abandon the town before the end of the month.119 The historical record remains silent on 
whether the Lipan fought in these engagements, but, considering that their fellow 
comrade-in-arms Colonel Hays fought against Woll in September near San Antonio, the 
Ndé certainly had an interest in the unfolding of events. 
In the exercise of hegemony, the oppressed individual takes part in his or her own 
oppression. Another term for this behavior is to sell out. While Flacco, the son of one 
hereditary chief of the Lipan Apache Nation, was no sell-out, he partook of his own 
oppression in acting as a scout for the Anglo-Texans in their war with Mexico. In 
November 1842, Brigadier General Somervell ordered his expedition into disputed 
territory south of the Nueces River in order to pillage the town of Laredo on the north 
bank of the Rio Grande. He wished to punish the Mexican army for attempting to reassert 
control over San Antonio and other towns in the Republic in September.120 Young Flacco 
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joined Captain Hays as a scout. In early December, young Flacco and one deaf mute 
Lipan with an acute sense of sight traveled with Hays to the Nueces River. Flacco rode 
further south to the town of Laredo on the Mexican frontier in order to gather 
information.121 He returned four days later to the Somervell outfit to inform them of the 
position of his scouts and the situation just north of the Rio Grande.122 On December 9, 
the Somervell expedition took Laredo. After capturing a second Rio Grande town, 
Guerrero, General Somervell disbanded the expedition on December 19, 1842.123 Flacco, 
an intriguing warrior in his own right, reinforced the notion of the Ndé as complicit in the 
oppression of other Native Americans and Mexicans. Justifications exist in explanation of 
his behavior. The fact remains, however, that Flacco acted in the interests of Anglo-
Texans during the Somervell Expedition. 
On January 1, 1843, General Somervell offered a reward to Flacco if he returned 
to the Nueces River from San Antonio in order to recover some horses.124 Flacco left with 
his friend and recovered the animals. Two Anglo-Texans accompanied them. In late 
January, James O. Rice found the murdered bodies of the two indigenous warriors. The 
Anglo-Texans murdered young Flacco while he was sleeping and stole away with the 
horses to sell in the town of Seguin. Settlers spotted one of the killers, Tom Thernon, in 
town.125 Lamar, in his personal papers, noted that James B. Ravis was the second 
perpetrator.126 
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Noah Smithwick, friend to the Ndé, told old Flacco of his son’s death. When the 
leader heard the news “tears rained down the old man’s face while sobs fairly shook his 
frame.”127 Houston sent the mournful leader a letter in which he asserted that Mexicans 
killed his son. The president, while penning this letter, had just received a note from old 
Flacco that he was distraught and in poor health over the death of young Flacco. He 
changed his name to Yawney in his sorrow because he longer wanted to hear the name 
Flacco. Soon after discovering the truth that Anglos had killed his son, Yawney removed 
himself and his band to the Rio Grande.128  Diplomatic relations between the Lipan 
Apaches and the settlers of Texas ended at this time. 
The Republic never brought the men to justice, even if some Anglos such as 
Lamar, as mentioned above, knew their identities. In the summer of 1843, Lipan Apaches 
raided Anglo-Texans in San Antonio, although Colonel Jack Hays blamed the 
depredations on the Comanche.129 Bitterness and the seeds of discord sown between the 
two nations resulted in chaos during the U.S. era after 1846. What was justice, then, 
according to Anglo-Texans in the 1840s? At the time, justice could only provide 
retribution for white citizens of the republic as embedded in the Constitution of 1836.130 
The Ndé remained outside of the mechanism of the juridical administration of the law. 
The actions of the settler state entailed a test of its ability to ascribe fairness to juridical 
proceedings. In this instance, the Republic failed to accord respectful recognition of the 
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legal rights of the Ndé as found in the Live Oak Point Treaty of 1838.131 To compound 
the matter, President Houston used the administration of Indian affairs found in U.S. 
structures of government as a blueprint for the implementation of his own prerogatives in 
relation to the Lipan among other indigenous nations. 
 Houston inscribed the shortcomings of U.S. Indian policy in establishing the 
Republic’s own Bureau of Indian Affairs. This department of government exemplified a 
microcosm of policies that failed to accord equal status to indigenous nations within the 
confines of the United States.132 Congress enacted the most comprehensive law dealing 
with Native Americans during Houston’s second administration in January 1843.133 The 
act’s stated goal provided for peace and the regulation of trade with indigenous peoples. 
The legislation established a Bureau of Indian Affairs attached to the Department of War, 
synonymous with the structure of federal government over Natives in the United States. 
The President of the Republic requested a yearly congressional report, interpreters, 
agents, and a superintendent. The Indian agents reported directly to the President. The 
law provided for trading posts along the line between white settlements and indigenous 
nations. The Republic required licenses of its traders. The legislation specifically 
prohibited trade in horses between white settlers and Native people. This stipulation 
directly affected Ndé economic initiatives focused on the appropriation of Mexican 
horses for trade to Texas settlers. The act also prohibited the sale of alcohol to Indians.134 
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 In a reflection on the limitations of indigenous sovereignty, several provisions of 
the Act attenuated the rights of Native nations. Under the control of Texas, all Indians 
who stole European-American property had to restore the goods to the settlers. Further, 
the law prohibited Native movement across the border of white settlement. The very 
notion of a reduction and survey of indigenous territory implied encroachment upon tribal 
sovereignty. Texas forced Lipan Apaches, whose settlements at the time fell below the 
dividing line, to remove beyond the limits of the white settler state. In relation to crimes, 
the Republic asserted control over prosecution regardless of the ethnicity of the 
perpetrator.135 This provision comprised an outright assault on Indian sovereignty 
because it refused to recognize the right of the tribes to prosecute non-Indian crimes. 
Clearly, this legislation brought the tribes under control of the settler state even while 
purporting to promote peaceful relations with indigenous nations. 
The Republic’s lumping of diverse Indian nations within the Treaty of Tehuacana 
Creek resulted in a further misrecognition of indigenous peoples. Texas sought to impose 
the concept of one single purported “Indian race” according to physiological and cultural 
difference. This action implicated the failure of the settler state to accord sovereign status 
to each nation as a distinct collective. On October 9, 1844, the Lipan Apache and 
Comanche along with other indigenous nations “agreed” to this treaty with Texas.136 
Signed in council south of present-day Waco, this accord also presented a renewed 
recognition of the sovereign status of the Ndé. In keeping with President Houston’s 
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policy, the treaty’s title referenced peace and friendship.137 The Lipanes were not the only 
signatories to the treaty. Other tribal leaders that signed included the purported heads of 
the Keechi, the Waco, the Caddo, the Anadarko, the Ioni, the Delaware, the Shawnee, 
and the Tawakoni tribes. Lipan Apache signatories to the Treaty of Tehuacana Creek 
included Ramon Castro, son of the deceased Cuelgas de Castro, and Captain Chico who 
renamed himself after the death of his brother young Flacco.138 The liberal stipulations of 
the treaty provided a basis for the recognition of sovereignty with regard to each nation 
even if the agreement “lumped” the interests of every polity into one “Indian” 
conglomerate. 
The gist of the treaty provided mostly negative consequences for the Ndé, 
although the accord allowed for some positive developments in relation to indigenous 
sovereignty in general. Article Two of the treaty proposed a borderline between the 
colonial settlements and the indigenous nations to the south, west, and north of the settler 
state. In a strong concession to Native peoples, Article Five of the treaty allowed Natives 
to punish their own thieves committing depredations against non-Indians.139 The ability 
to punish crimes against Anglo-Texans allowed for recognition of tribal power in 
criminal law. Article Thirteen demanded that no settlers sell whiskey to Native peoples. 
In an ironic turn, Article Fifteen sought to teach Native peoples the arts of agriculture in 
raising corn.140 Lipan Apaches planted corn long before the arrival of the Europeans and 
needed no instruction on this point. In keeping with the Republic’s prior stance on the 
Native right of occupancy, the accord provided for no land cessions. 
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This treaty comprised Houston’s final accomplishment with indigenous nations 
before statehood. Sam Houston stepped down from the presidency in early December, 
giving a valedictory address that recognized a newfound peace with the tribes.141 His 
peace policy, absent the death of Flacco, had been such a success with other indigenous 
nations that Houston’s successor, Anson Jones, continued diplomatic relations with 
Native peoples almost uninterrupted. This last President of the Republic, however, 
created more problems for the Ndé than solutions. While he appointed effective Indian 
agents to negotiate with the Lipan Apache Nation, his superintendent posed difficulties 
with relation to other indigenous nations. 
The Jones Administration 
The settler state of Texas inaugurated Jones as President of the Republic on 
December 9, 1844.142 The administration of Indian Affairs with regard to the Ndé 
commenced almost immediately after his inauguration. In a report to the Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs made in mid-December, Cambridge Green, Agent to the Lipans and 
Tonkawas, found that Ndé people committed depredations on a daily basis against the 
settlers of Seguin. Prior to the Council at Tehuacana Creek, Green unsuccessfully coerced 
the Ndé to avoid intergovernmental agreements with either “Mexicans or Indians.” 
According to the Agent, Lipan Apaches engaged in diplomatic relations with the 
Comanche to garner a peace.143 Clearly, Ndé anger at the loss of Flacco demonstrated 
itself in raids on Anglo-Texan settlements and peace-making with the powerful and 
independent Comanche. In proof of the fact that matters of diplomacy hinge on positive 
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interpersonal relationships, the personalities of the Texas Bureau of Indian Affairs 
reflected differing perspectives on the treatment of the Ndé with respect to national 
sovereignty or its absence. 
Relations with the Lipan Apaches would change, however, with the appointment 
of Robert Simpson Neighbors as Indian Agent to the Ndé.144 Neighbors sympathized with 
Native Americans, a quality few other Indian Agents possessed in the nineteenth century. 
As evinced by one of his reports in January 1844, Neighbors found Lipan Apaches to be 
“perfectly willing to be governed by the instructions of the government in every 
respect.”145 Given the nature of hegemony, Ndé acceptance of settler colonialism at this 
point reflects either a blind obedience or a clever subterfuge in “accepting” the “graces” 
of the Anglo-Texan Republic while maintaining national autonomy. In counterpoint to 
this sly move, the Ndé embraced the notion of joining a number of indigenous nations in 
council with the settler state the following September. 
Texas Indian Superintendent Thomas G. Western, on the other hand, had little 
patience for the situation of the Lipan Apache Nation. In fact, in attempting to enforce a 
provision of the Tehuacana Creek Treaty, Western sought to remove the nation beyond 
the line of white settlement in March.146 In May, Western desired Neighbors to inform 
the Ndé that, should their services be required, the Republic demanded that Lipan 
Apaches act as scouts for further incursions on the frontier.147 The Superintendent 
engaged in a form of Janus diplomacy with the Ndé. He required the removal of this 
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nation beyond the boundary of white settlement but also asserted his need of the services 
of this people in “protecting” the frontier. In the summer of 1845, Western made 
numerous requests that Lipan Apaches keep out of Anglo settlements.148 In the final 
analysis, the President’s policy toward the Ndé constituted removal as evinced by the 
letters of Superintendent Western. While paying lip service to the continuance of 
Houston’s peace policy, in point of fact the Ndé suffered a worsening situation since the 
death of Flacco at the beginning of 1843. 
 While the historical record appears bereft of the speech-acts of Ndé leaders, an 
important exception reveals the power inherent in the discourse of Ndé peace leadership 
then devolving upon men. Lipan Apache leaders’ articulation of their independence 
contributed to their diplomatic recognition as ambassadors of a separate nation. Cuelgas 
de Castro’s son, Ramón, representative of the Lipan Apache Nation at a second council 
held at Tehuacana Creek in September 1845, gave a fine speech at the council quoted in 
full here: 
I am happy to learn that all is peace.  I wish to say to the President and the  
commissioners that I bring my people here to continue our friendship, and that I want  
to give my hand in peace to all the tribes present.  I do not come here with a forked  
tongue.  I come to make peace with all, and I know that my young men will keep it  
and not molest the property of anyone.  The old chiefs present must tell their young  
men not to break the treaty but to assist one another in maintaining it.  I saw some at  
the last council that pretended to be at peace that are not here now.  I fear they do not  
intend to keep the treaty.  I do not see any now but what, I believe, will do as they  
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promise.  I have only to assure the commissioners and the different tribes present that  
I have faithfully kept the treaty and will continue to do so, and I call upon the Great  
Spirit to witness that what I say is true.  And I want the other tribes to talk the truth so  
that we may all understand one another and live in peace.149 
This eloquent address to the various tribes represented at the council testified to the 
speaking capabilities and diplomatic skills of the leaders of the Ndé nation. In contrast to 
the lumping of tribes according to so-called “race,” Castro accorded sovereign respect to 
each indigenous nation present. His control of the warriors among his band reflected his 
status as a leader. Castro recognized that not all leaders from other nations came in good 
faith to the diplomatic table. He admonished the leaders of other nations to control their 
warriors as well.  Castro’s metaphor of the “forked tongue” revealed the significance of 
the snake to Lipan culture and his assertion that falsehoods would not be tolerated.150 His 
reference to the Great Spirit implied an ability to translate complex indigenous concepts 
of religion and spirituality into a simplified form recognizable by the representative of the 
settler state. Ndé rhetoric, evinced in this masterpiece of oratory, comprised a significant 
part of the oral cultures of indigenous peoples. In speaking truth to other sovereign 
entities, the Ndé revealed their own power reflected in the spoken word. 
Resettlement, or forced exile, deterred Lower Lipan Apache resolve to maintain 
structural integrity in the lands they considered to be their homes. Surprisingly, 
Neighbors first suggested the removal of this indigenous people. Directly after the 
council at Tehuacana Creek, Neighbors declared that, given Lipan Apache rapport with 
the Mexican population among Anglo settlements, the Ndé “must be kept out of the reach 
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of Mexican settlements.”151 Indeed, Neighbors hoped that the Superintendent would 
decree the removal of this indigenous nation from their homelands. The Comanche 
sought to punish the Ndé for their earlier complicity with the settler state in exiling the 
Lower Lipan bands to lands claimed by the Comanche as their own. In a clever move, the 
Ndé simply ignored the discursive violence contained within Texas’s proclamations and 
returned to familiar sites within the boundaries that they recognized as their own land. 
Each attempt to resettle the Ndé above the border line of white settlement ultimately 
failed to impact Lipan territorial integrity. Comanche leaders in November 1845 
demanded that the Ndé remove from the vicinity of Anglo settlements and camp in 
Comanche territory above the line.152 As a result of this pressure, the Lipan Apaches 
removed for a couple of months from the San Antonio River to the San Gabriel beyond 
the reach of Anglo settlement.153 
Settler colonialism, as practiced by the Republic of Texas, demanded the removal 
of the Ndé from Anglo settlements, yet these same settlements continued to grow with 
immigration from the United States and stretch further west over time. The Ndé, in an 
effort to subvert the aims of the settler state, agreed to remove west into the Comanchería 
only to return to their previous long-term homelands to the northeast of San Antonio. 
Indeed, by February 1846, Indian Agent Neighbors reported that Lipan Apaches returned 
to their old town on Cibolo Creek near San Antonio and planted corn. All attempts on the 
part of the settler state to destroy the territorial integrity of this indigenous nation came to 
nought. The Ndé simply refused to relocate from their ancient place of living for 
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prolonged periods of time. Indian Agent Neighbors, in sympathy and knowledge of the 
difficult position of the Lipan Apache Nation, advised the Superintendent to allow the 
nation to remain at its ancient settlement because of their “entire devotion … and their 
willingness at all times to serve [the Republic] to the best of their ability in every 
respect.”154 Neighbors found it only just to allow the Ndé to remain in their homeland. 
His opinion, however, was that of a minority among Anglos. 
U.S. policy as exercised in Texas would continue the Janus perspective of treating 
with the tribes yet effecting their removal or destruction. The United States officially 
recognized the state government of Texas on February 19, 1846 after annexation the 
previous year.155 Relations between the Lipan Apaches and the Republic came to an 
ignominious end. Over time, the Republic treated the Ndé alternatively as a sovereign 
nation, as exploited peoples, as hegemonized soldiers for the uses of the state, and as 
enemies to the interests of Texas. 
Conclusion 
Did the Lipan Apache Nation maintain sovereignty in the face of the onslaught of 
the Anglo-Texan settlers and the settler state? If sovereignty is defined as a nation-state 
with proper borders and relations with foreign nations, then, by definition, Lipan Apaches 
lost their sovereignty under the creeping auspices of the Republic of Texas. Yet, this 
definition does not constitute the sovereignty of indigenous peoples. Instead, indigenous 
sovereignty resides in the people and the maintenance of community integrity even in the 
face of colonization and attempts at erasure. In this sense, then, Lipan Apache 
                                                
   154 R. S. Neighbors to T. G. Western, Austin, February 4, 1846, in The Indian Papers of Texas and the 
Southwest, 1825-1916, eds. Dorman H. Winfrey and James M. Day, vol. 3, 1846-1859 (Austin: Texas State 
Historical Association, 1995), 13-14. 
   155 Joel H. Silbey, Storm Over Texas: The Annexation Controversy and the Road to Civil War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 92. 
 89 
sovereignty remained intact.156 The bands in different divisions continued to interact with 
each other both across the disputed border between Texas and Mexico and beyond the 
line of settlement in west Texas. Indeed, the erosion of sovereignty perpetrated by the 
Republic of Texas impacted only the Sun Otter and High-Beaked Moccasin bands.157 
Ndé sovereignty, defined as community integrity, remained strong. It allowed Ndé people 
to maintain internal social relations and external interaction with Texas. 
Ndé sovereignty remained undiminished in the face of the onslaught of Anglo 
settlers and the settler state of the Republic of Texas. The Ndé maintained sovereignty 
because the structure of their government was neither rigid nor hierarchical. Ndé politics, 
characterized by a loose federation of three divisions comprised of bands and local family 
groups, contained enough fluidity to withstand repeated attacks in the mid-nineteenth 
century.158 Each of the four administrations of the Texas republic attempted to impose its 
own view on the constitution of Lipan Apache sovereignty, and each administration’s 
policy failed in its goal of assimilation, annihilation, or removal of the Ndé people. The 
settler state promulgated definitions of sovereignty that retained a nation-to-nation 
relation with the Ndé. The Ndé retained internal sovereignty by means of careful 
organization of their related divisions and external sovereignty through diplomatic 
relations with the Republic of Texas. Ndé relations with Mexico, the subject of the next 
chapter, proved in actuality to be a great deal more contentious even than relations with 
the Texas Republic. 
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Chapter 4. Shadows in Northeastern Mexico: Federalism, Mexican Treaty Relations 
with the Lipan Apaches, and the U.S.-Mexican War, 1836-1848 
Shadows are odd things. They appear to occupy space, yet they have no 
substance. They are the negation of light. Moreover, they follow us wherever we walk. 
What, then, are the shadows of northeastern Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century? This 
chapter argues that the shadows of Mexican settlers and elites had form. From 1836 to 
1848, the Ndé shadowed Mexican politics and social interaction. The Lipanes formed a 
shadow polity and economy at this time in eluding direct recognition from the Mexican 
national state. While this indigenous nation concluded one treaty with local Mexican 
governmental authority in 1845, their overwhelming place in the historical events of the 
era comprised clever moves to avoid direct incorporation in the polity including raiding 
for economic trade goods and lightning-quick military strikes. As such, the sovereign 
status of the Ndé reflected their own internal order rather than full-blown diplomatic 
relations with the Mexican settler state. 
Sovereignty consists of formal external relations with a foreign power and 
governmental structural integrity. The Ndé in Mexico maintained their own internal 
forms of government, yet their external relations with Mexico were anything but 
sovereign.159 Elements of what defines concepts of sovereignty existed in treaties and the 
negotiation for land title in establicimientos de paz recognized by the state of Coahuila. 
Mexican officials in Mexico City and local governments in the northeast refused to 
accord the Ndé sovereign status. Instead, they looked upon the nation as either indios 
bárbaros or Mexican citizens without rights to land and culture prior to European 
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colonization. Regardless, the Ndé maintained political integrity and autonomy in Mexico 
because the Mexican government lacked resources to implement its strategies to dissolve 
the Lipan nation. 
Many individual Mexicans found common cause with the Lipanes in politico-
economic relations such as the shadow economy but not in the fight for federalism 
against centralism. The founding of the “Republic of the Rio Grande,” as the Texas 
newspapers termed this separatist movement among the northeastern states of Mexico, 
resulted in the direct subordination of Ndé goals for political self-rule. Because poor 
relations developed between northeastern elites and the Lipanes, massacres against either 
the Ndé or Mexicans occurred all too often. The Ndé negotiated one treaty with 
representatives of local Mexican government at this time, although the U.S.-Mexican 
War eventually took precedence in the minds of Mexican politicians. This chapter argues 
that the Ndé exercised autonomy in relation to Mexico even if, in the end, the United 
States imposed its military might not only against the nation-state but also this indigenous 
nation. 
Ndé Appropriation of Settler Property 
The Ndé “shadow” economy, built in time over the eighteenth century, comprised 
the enterprise of raiding for Mexican cattle, horses, and firearms south of the Rio Grande 
to trade with tribes in southeastern Texas such as the Bidais and Akokisas.160 This 
economy relied on shadowing the formal economy of the Mexican and Anglo-Texan 
population. Because Spanish colonization depleted bison populations earlier in the 
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eighteenth century, conditions forced the Ndé to rely on shadowing the Mexican and 
Anglo-Texan economies through raiding settlements for goods and trading them with 
willing partners on the other side of the Rio Grande.161 In this way, the Ndé exploited the 
political differences between Mexicans and Anglos. The Ndé raided in Texas and traded 
in Mexico or raided in Mexico and traded in Texas. From 1836 to 1845, the Ndé 
continued their shadow economy of raiding and trading with Mexican settlements in 
defiance of Mexican attempts at control of the indigenous population. As a result, Ndé 
efforts at autonomy during this period remained powerful in the face of Mexican attempts 
at social control of the Ndé population south of the Nueces River, the de facto boundary 
between the Republic of Texas and Mexico. 
The numbers of the bison thinned beginning in the mid-eighteenth century.  As a 
result, the Ndé turned increasingly from their traditional bison economy to the shadow 
economy of acquiring horses, cattle, and sheep from Mexicans for sale across the border 
into the Republic of Texas.162 This acquisition by means of appropriation of animals on 
what the Ndé considered to be their own territory primarily affected the elites of societies 
in the northeast of Mexico. Peones, comprised mostly of tribal remnants of various 
indigenous nations along and south of the Río Bravo/Grande, also suffered inordinately. 
Indeed, the peons, comprised of sheep-herders among other lowly economic positions 
relative to the Spanish elites in Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas, often risked 
death in their efforts to incorporate themselves into the cash economy of the northeast.163 
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Lipan Apache leaders engaged in horse and livestock rustling for trade across the Rio 
Grande and the Nueces River (the disputed boundary between Mexico and the Republic 
of Texas) in favor of Anglo-Texans and indigenous nations to the east of Anglo 
settlements in Texas. Because the newly established Republic of Texas engaged in the 
shadow economy of the Lipanes, the Ndé made raids in the vicinity of the Río 
Bravo/Grande resulting in severe destabilization in the Mexican polity of the northeast 
and the continued strength of the Ndé in maintaining political autonomy. 
 Reports of newspapers in Tamaulipas reflected Ndé political self-rule and 
economic autonomy by means of the shadow economy. In 1836, a Matamoros newspaper 
reported that the Lipanes raided as far south as the Arroyo Colorado in Tamaulipas.164 
Reynosa, a town situated on the south side of the Río Bravo, suffered. The Lipanes 
reportedly raided south of the Rio Grande because the Texans “no longer [had] anything 
of value to them.”165 The idea, implicit in this statement, demonstrated the intent of the 
Ndé to appropriate livestock and horses south of the Rio Grande not because the Anglo-
Texans had nothing to offer the Ndé in terms of livestock and horses. Instead, the Anglos 
of the Republic of Texas provided sufficient military and vigilante force to halt Indian 
raiding north of the Nueces River. Anglo-Texans also had enough economic acumen to 
deal with the Lipanes as economic partners in the shadow economy. 
 The Ndé exercised their autonomy in their ability to effect population change 
among the pobladores/settlers of the Nueces Strip. The Nueces River to the north and the 
Río Bravo/Grande to the south formed the borders of the Nueces Strip. During the 1830s, 
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both the Republic of Texas and Tamaulipas claimed this piece of land as their own.166 
Most of the non-Indian residents of the Strip, however, were Mexicans. Mexicans 
holding title to lands north of the Rio Grande began a steady immigration south of the 
river as a result of Indian depredations, including those of the Ndé and the Comanche, in 
1837.167 Mexico’s claims to the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande thereby 
weakened.  In this sense, then, the Ndé asserted territorial rights to the Nueces Strip. 
 Moreover, the Ndé asserted rights to lands in Coahuila and Tamaulipas at this 
time, particularly in the towns of Santa Rosa and Laredo. In 1838, Ndé leader Datíl 
resided in Santa Rosa in Coahuila. Mexican leaders in Laredo speculated that a division 
existed between Datíl and Cuelgas de Castro to the north of Tamaulipas in the Republic 
of Texas. Datíl had an agreement with the town of Laredo to afford his people protection 
when they resided in this villa del norte just north of the Río Bravo/Grande. Cuelgas de 
Castro, however, had no such agreement, although he decided to move his band to 
Laredo. Indeed, Capitán Manuel Lafuente wrote that the Lipanes who chose to settle near 
the town spied on the people of this village for the purposes of making raids on behalf of 
Cuelgas de Castro. Lafuente speculated further that Lipan Apache spies could not help 
but find the military garrison of the town weak and depleted.168 Ndé leadership evinced 
itself in this case of the assertion of territorial rights in Coahuila and Tamaulipas. 
Mexican national Indian policy at this time sought to accord Mexican citizenship 
to all indigenous peoples within its boundaries.169 The Ndé, in keeping with their 
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autonomous stance, refused to become part of Mexico. Moreover, Mexican settlers in the 
northeast viewed the Ndé as indios bárbaros unworthy of Mexican citizenship because 
the Ndé committed “depredations” against their settlements. Indeed, the northeastern 
pobladores refused to accord citizen rights to the Ndé because they hated and feared 
difference and Lipan Apache national autonomy.170 Because the centralist government in 
Mexico City would not protect settlers on the Río Bravo/Grande, the settlers of the 
northeastern states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and Coahuila protested against the 
centralist regime in its lack of ability to quell Lipan Apache and Comanche “hostilities” 
and eventually rebelled beginning in 1838 and resulting in the short-lived “Republic of 
the Rio Grande” in 1840. The impetus for the uprising included Lipan Apache attacks on 
Mexican settlements.171 To the northeastern Mexican elites, however, the fact that the 
Ndé sought reprisal in defense of their homeland remained a moot point. The 
establishment of the provisional state boded ill for the Ndé because the states of 
northeastern Mexico in asserting their separatist sovereignty refused to recognized the 
autonomy of the Ndé nation. Indeed, the northeastern states sought to negate Ndé 
sovereignty and autonomy through rejection of the Mexican national Indian policy. 
 In the events leading up to the federalist uprisings, the central Mexican 
government sought to subsume Ndé rights to territorial integrity and political self-rule.  In 
1835 the centralist party of Mexico returned to power.  In doing so, the new regime 
promulgated the Siete Leyes as a replacement for the federalist Constitution of 1824.172  
This new constitution converted Mexican states into departments that had no political or 
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fiscal autonomy.  Juntas replaced provincial assemblies.  The centralist government based 
out of Mexico City appointed governors of each of the departments instead of holding 
elections.  This quelling of local power along with the centralist refusal to aid the 
departments of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas in their efforts to annihilate the 
Ndé and the Comanche resulted in the federalist uprisings in northeastern Mexico from 
1838 to 1840.173  Even more significant, the centralist Mexican government continued to 
recognize all inhabitants of Mexico as Mexican citizens including all Native Americans 
residing within the borders of the state.  As a result, the government recognized the Ndé 
as citizens of Mexico not as a separate Indian nation.  In other words, the assimilation 
program directed from Mexico City viewed the Lipanes among other peoples as already 
assimilated into the mainstream of Mexican society.174  The Mexican authorities refused 
to recognize that such was not the case. 
 With the stirrings of a federalist push for local government, the Mexican state of 
Tamaulipas embodied concerns over the assimilationist Indian policy of the central 
government. Indeed, the most significant revolutionary in these uprisings, José Antonio 
Canales Rosillo, was well-versed in attacking the Ndé in their own homeland. Canales, 
prior to his rise to power, engaged in fighting the Lipan Apache and other tribes through 
the local militia in the Mexican northeast.175 The federalist movement began in October 
1838 with an uprising in the port city of Tampico in Tamaulipas. The movement then 
spread to Nuevo León and Coahuila.176 On November 3, 1838, Canales promulgated a 
pronunciamiento from Guererro in northern Tamaulipas against the centralist government 
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in Mexico City in favor of federalism.177 The subtext of the uprising remained clear. The 
federalists sought local power in order to implement a policy of extermination against the 
Ndé. 
 Rejecting Ndé needs and rights, the federalists engaged the centralists and 
succeeded in battles against Mexican forces. By early 1839, the federalists of the 
northeast appeared poised to topple the centralist government in Coahuila, Nuevo León, 
and Tamaulipas. Their military forces took control of the capital cities of Saltillo and 
Monterrey. The federalists also controlled foreign trade through the ports of Tampico and 
Matamoros in Tamaulipas.178 All too soon, the centralist forces began to agitate and 
regain control of each of these towns. For the better part of 1839 and 1840, Canales and 
other officials of the federalist uprisings crossed the Río Bravo/Grande into the Nueces 
Strip and the Republic of Texas. From summer 1839 to the following January, Canales 
and his followers defeated centralist forces at Guererro and Mier along or south of the 
Río Bravo/Grande.179 In this “revolution,” both sides all but ignored the Ndé. 
 In defiance of any kind of recognition of Ndé self-rule, the federalists in 1840 
sought to establish a new jurisdiction in the Mexican northeast. This new republic elided 
all mention of indigenous political and social rights. In January 1840, Canales called a 
convention to meet in Guererro. The convention elected officials from Tamaulipas, 
Nuevo León, and Coahuila including Jesús Cárdenas, President, Francisco Vidaurri y 
Villaseñor, Vice President, Antonio Canales as commander-in-chief of the army, and one 
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representative each from Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas.180 These elected 
officials then formed a political entity separate from the government of Mexico. The 
name of this provisional government was the Frontera del norte. The Texas press 
mistakenly labeled the fledgling state the “Republic of the Rio Grande.”181 No self-
respecting Mexican at the time referred to the Río Bravo as the Rio Grande. As a result, 
the likelihood of referring to their new regime with the misnomer “Rio Grande” was 
extremely low.182 The import of this action, however, resulted in complete denial of the 
land title and political standing of the indigenous people of the lower Río Bravo. The Ndé 
remained side-lined in the political and military wrangling between federalists and 
centralists. 
 Involved in the discourse of war between the federalists and the centralists, both 
sides employed the Ndé as political pawns in a battle of words. Indeed both ideological 
groups accused each other of inciting the Ndé to attack the opposing force, yet the Ndé 
remained aloof from the political and military machinations of a war that affected the 
Indian nation only peripherally.183 In the end, the uprising lasted until November 1840 
when the leader of the federalist forces, General Canales, capitulated and joined the 
Mexican military.184 Such a move on the part of Canales suggested that he was not 
entirely sincere in his “revolution” against the central government of Mexico. In sum, 
when faced with Native American opposition, both federalists and centralists saw 
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common cause in defeating the Ndé and other indigenous peoples of northeastern 
Mexico. 
 Increasingly angered with the imposition of military occupation, the Ndé began to 
fight in earnest for their homeland. Their lives, freedom, and autonomy were at stake in 
the escalating violence between centralist and federalist armies crossing the region. 
Clearly the Lipanes perceived a change in the colonial situation. As a result, the Ndé 
altered their own military tactics to reflect the new reality of internecine violence within 
the boundaries of their homeland. In 1840 the Ndé attacked the town of Agualeguas in 
Nuevo León. In a reflection of their rage, the Lipanes killed sixty settlers, wounded 
another sixty, and took twenty-eight Mexicans as captives.185 The Ndé response to the 
chaos of the temporary provisional government entailed an alteration from raiding for 
commodities to execution of settlers. The indigenous nation realized that the various 
colonial factions engaged in war fought over what was essentially not Mexican land. 
Mexicans fought over rights to Ndé land without acknowledging Ndé title. As a result, 
the Ndé demonstrated their anger for Mexicans who refused to acknowledge the 
existence of the Ndé let alone their rights to their own territories and self-rule. 
Further Attacks in the Northeast and Datíl’s Treaty 
With the demise of the so-called Republic of the Rio Grande, the Mexican settlers 
of the northeast devoted themselves whole-heartedly to attacks on Ndé national 
autonomy, although they couched their discourse of domination in terms of defense, 
portraying themselves as innocent in violent interaction with the Lipanes. Deteriorating 
relations with the Republic of Texas exacerbated the war of attrition between 
northeastern pobladores and indigenous peoples. The war between the Ndé and the 
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settlers remained in effect until 1845. At this point in time, the Ndé residing in Mexico 
under the aegis of Datíl made a treaty of peace with Coahuila.186 Lipan Apache relations 
with the Mexicans of the northeast entered a period of détente until the Anglo-American 
hordes invaded Mexico in the war of the following year during la intervención 
norteamericana, or the U.S.-Mexican War.187 Prior to the intervention, Ndé autonomy 
remained structurally intact and garnered recognition from the state of Coahuila in the 
continued saga of Ndé attempts to maintain political and territorial strength in the face of 
Mexican attempts to deny recognition of Ndé sovereignty. 
 Mexican military leaders in the northeast employed discursive tropes that 
portrayed the Ndé as “savages” who attacked the pobladores without compunction. 
Captain Lafuente, in particular, denied any recognition of Ndé aboriginal title or rights to 
political integrity. In the minds of Mexican military elites, the Ndé associated with 
Anglo-Texans in raiding Mexican settlements. On June 18, 1841, Manuel Lafuente wrote 
from Monterrey that the Commanding General in Lampazos, Nuevo León discovered that 
fifty Lipanes along with Anglo-Texans sought to raid the frontier. Lafuente argued that 
the Mexican settlers of Lampazos believed that the Anglo-Texans would do nothing 
against Mexicans without the instigation of the Lipan Apaches.188 In other words, 
Lafuente ascribed fault with the Lipanes in encouraging Anglo-Texans to rob and steal 
from the Mexicans with impunity. Lafuente used the trope of blaming the “foreign,” non-
European element as a foil to explain the outrageous behavior of Anglo-Texans. The 
capitán failed to mention, purposefully, that the Ndé sought only to protect their 
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homeland and appropriate commodities such as livestock as tribute. The Lipanes, instead, 
asserted rights to all goods within the boundaries of their own territory. 
 Given the Mexican military’s propensity for demonization of the Ndé, relations 
between Mexico and the indigenous nation became increasingly polarized. As a result, in 
an attack in Tamaulipas and Nuevo León in 1844, the Ndé evinced a style of warfare 
similar to the attack on the village of Agualeguas in 1840. Angered with the continuing 
occupation and Euro-American development of their territories, the Lipanes attempted to 
send a message to northeastern Mexico that refused any compromise. In October 1844, 
over 400 Lipan Apache warriors led by a chief referred to as Indio Viejo attacked four 
towns in the northeast: Mier on the Río Bravo/Grande and the villages of La Palmita, La 
Laja, and La China in Nuevo León. In La Palmita, the Lipanes killed eighty-three 
Mexicans and took approximately fifty women and children captive. The Ndé 
appropriated horses but this was more than a raid. The attack was an act of retribution. 
After the assault on La China in Nuevo León, the Mexican military returned fire against 
the Lipanes and routed the Natives, recovering most of the women and children taken 
captive.189 As a result, Ndé anger and desire for retribution remained a significant fact in 
relations on the northeastern frontier or, rather, the indigenous territories of the Lipan. 
 Mexican military elites of the villas del norte continued to employ the rhetoric of 
“innocence” in the face of Ndé incursions resulting in further misunderstandings and an 
increase in violence between the Lipanes and the Mexican pobladores. In February 1845, 
the Mexican military in Laredo, led by Calisto Bravo, decided to end the peace with 
Lipanes along with all other “barbarian” tribes because it believed that Texas provided 
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arms to the Lipanes to raid into Mexico.190 The Ndé, portrayed as salvajes/savages once 
again rose up against the people of the villas del norte. In March, approximately 1500 
Ndé, massed at the headwaters of the Colorado River in central Texas, sought to attack 
Laredo in particular.191 Most likely, Bravo exaggerated the numbers in order to incite fear 
in the settlers. In a discourse of terror, Mexican elites sought to polarize relations between 
the Ndé and the Anglo-Texans on the one hand and the Mexican pobladores on the other. 
 In a move indicative of final recognition of Ndé sovereignty, Mexicans subscribed 
to the policies of the United States in engaging with the Ndé on a sovereign-to-sovereign 
basis, that is treaty making. Under duress from increasingly violent incursions on the part 
of the Ndé, officials of the Mexican government decided that recognition of the Lipanes 
as an entity separate from the rest of Mexico resulted in more positive relations between 
the two nations. Unfortunately, this recognition of Ndé sovereignty functioned only at the 
local level. In May 1845 Chief Datíl engaged in treaty making with local officials of 
Santa Rosa, Coahuila.192 The resulting agreement meant that the Mexican Lipanes 
observed a peace with the settlers until the violence of the U.S.-Mexican War the 
following year. Because municipal officials recognized this fact that the central 
government in Mexico City did not, peace between the two governments became a 
distinct possibility. In the end, the Ndé gained the highest respect from the Mexican 
pobladores in the figure of a treaty. 
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 As a result of this détente in sovereign relations between the Ndé and the 
municipality of Santa Rosa, officials from throughout Coahuila and Tamaulipas sought 
the aid of the indigenous nation. In July 1845 the prefect of Monclova in Coahuila made 
the suggestion that because the pobladores abandoned the vast majority of the northern 
part of Coahuila, perhaps the Lipanes could receive Mexican title to their own indigenous 
territories.193 On September 30, 1845, Calisto Bravo voiced concerns over the Texas 
Lipanes. His primary fear comprised that of Anglo-Texan hostilities from San Antonio 
towards Laredo, Tamaulipas. The Mexican military authorities specifically sought the 
help of Mexican Lipanes in assuaging fears over a Texas Lipan incursion against the 
villa.194 In a direct about-face only one year away from the devastating massacres against 
the Mexican settlers of the northeast, the Ndé in 1845 provided much needed help with 
regard to Mexican military affairs in Tamaulipas. This new approach of recognition of 
the value of the indigenous nation appeared auspicious to Ndé-Mexican relations. La 
intervención norteamericana dashed all Mexican hopes for a final peace, however, in the 
following year. 
The U.S.-Mexican War 
 Clearly, the imperialist war of aggression on the part of the United States against 
Mexico from 1846 to 1848 comprised a land grab that resulted in the loss of over half of 
Mexico’s territory. The U.S. government fully intended to provoke Mexico into the 
losing proposition of a war when it annexed Texas beginning in 1845. Indeed, by 
February 1846, the designs of U.S. President James K. Polk for the acquisition of 
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California and New Mexico manifested themselves in a perspicuous push for more and 
more land. Almost immediately upon the annexation of Texas, U.S. troops began to 
amass in Corpus Christi south of the disputed boundary line of the Nueces River.195 
“American” blood was not shed on “American” soil when the Mexican army attacked 
and killed the imperialist aggressor just north of the Río Bravo/Grande regardless of 
whatever rhetorical tropes President Polk employed in order to galvanize the U.S. war 
machine. The occupation of Mexico City in 1847 supplied the coup de grâce to a war 
with no just moral basis.196 
 More significant to the matter at hand, the U.S. occupation of the villas del norte 
and the Mexican northeast beginning in 1846 posed a serious problem for the Ndé. The 
beginning of a war that ultimately divided Lipan Apache traditional territories in two 
resulted in the unparalleled destruction of Ndé structural integrity and autonomy. The 
Lipanes could not ignore the war and its effects on their homelands. Historical sources, 
however, sorely lack substantiation in terms of the Ndé response to this unbelievable 
attack on their lifeworld. The world of the Lipan Apaches became severely attenuated 
beginning in 1846 and resulted in desperate situations for the Ndé by the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
 That Mexico supposedly lost half of her territory begs the question of whose lands 
were lost. At this point, indigenous and Mexican national perspectives diverge. A careful 
reading of the history of this region reveals that indigenous people retained strong rights 
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to the territories of New Mexico, California, and south Texas.197 The Lipanes certainly 
felt threatened enough by the Republic of Mexico to flee military conscription into the 
Mexican army. At first, the U.S. occupation of the Nueces Strip and northeastern Mexico 
appeared to alleviate some of the most egregious complaints the Ndé held against the 
pobladores. If anything, however, massacres promulgated on the part of the United States 
against the Ndé revealed more of what was to come. The peculiar attitudes of Anglo-
Americans with regard to race, nation, violence, class, patriarchy, and even scientific 
racism entailed the rejection of Lipan Apaches as equals in the race for control of the 
U.S.-Mexican borderlands at the flashpoint of the Río Bravo/Grande. The Ndé learned 
quickly that Anglo control of Lipan Apache territories could only result in a fate far 
worse than anything the Mexicans had ever imposed in the form of social control and 
policies of assimilation and annihilation. 
The Ndé felt threatened as much by the Mexicans as by the Anglo-Americans 
during la intervención norteamericana.  Indeed, according to Sherry Robinson in I 
Fought a Good Fight: A History of the Lipan Apaches, 2,500 Apache families fled 
northeastern Mexico to join their fellows on the Edwards Plateau.  The Lipanes brought 
herds of cattle raided from Mexican settlements.198  In May 1846, because the Mexican 
military sought to conscript Lipan men into their army in defense of the northeast against 
the Anglo-American invaders, many Mexican Lipanes fled north of the Río 
Bravo/Grande to escape military conscription during the U.S.-Mexican war.  A Houston 
newspaper, the Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, reported that the Mexican 
Lipanes “fled from the oppressions of Mexico, because their young men were forced into 
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the army without their consent.”199  Although the United States comprised the instigator 
in the U.S.-Mexican War, Mexico herself also committed crimes against the Ndé during 
the war.  Clearly, because the Mexican military forced Ndé men and boys to fight for a 
nation that they never considered their own, the Lipanes sought to exploit the divisions 
between the United States and Mexico in an effort to maintain political and structural 
integrity in the face of enormous devastation. 
 If the Ndé contemplated protection from Mexican elites and settlers alike in 
turning to Anglo-Americans for help, events that soon followed combined to disabuse the 
indigenous nation of such a notion. Anglo-American armies crossed Ndé territorial 
homelands beginning in 1846.200  In 1847 Anglo colonization of Lipan-claimed land 
began in earnest. General Zachary Taylor’s armies of occupation settled in Tamaulipas, 
Nuevo León, and Coahuila. Moreover, Colonel Alexander Doniphan’s regiment 
descended from El Paso del Norte into Chihuahua and set its sights on Coahuila, the 
central southern part of the Lipanería. Soon after, Doniphan dispatched Captain John 
Reid to reconnoiter the area around the village of Parras. In May Captain Reid 
contributed to the massacre of several Lipanes.201 This monstrous event was only one of 
many that Anglo-Americans would perpetrate in the following years. Blind to their own 
failings and race hatred, the Anglos consistently portrayed themselves as heroes in their 
delusional melodrama of “evil” Indians versus “good” whites. The truth was always more 
complex than Anglo-American thinking on the matter of the Ndé. 
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On May 13, 1847, in the midst of la intervención norteamericana, a small force 
of Anglo soldiers led by Captain Reid joined with a number of Mexican cavalry headed 
by the hacendero Don Manuel de Ibarra at the Hacienda San José del Pozo. The 
plantation was near the town of Parras in southern Coahuila. The small combined force 
had gathered to attack approximately sixty-five Lipan Apaches. The armed party of 
Mexicans and Anglos killed many Lipanes including their medicine man.202 The 
European-Americans identified the war leader as a medicine man by means of his 
headdress of feathers and horns. Upon his death, the physician accompanying Reid’s 
force, Adolph Wislizenus, severed the head of the Apache leader, boiled it in water to 
remove the flesh, and transported the skull for the purposes of craniological study.203 The 
Mexican force rescued more than one dozen women and children along with five hundred 
horses and mules. After the so-called Battle of El Pozo, Don Manuel fêted the U.S. 
cavalry at his hacienda that evening. The following day, the citizens of the town of Parras 
honored Captain Reid with a letter of thanks for rescuing Christians from what they 
called “the cruelty of the most inhuman of savages.”204 
 Anglo-Americans in relating their contributions in the Battle of El Pozo cast 
themselves as heroes in the defeat of the so-called “savage” Lipan Apache.205 Anglos also 
believed that Mexican people succeeded in vanquishing the Apache only because of the 
U.S. military’s presence.206 The Anglos-Americans viewed the land itself, a desert, 
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primarily as a wilderness in need of taming. Such views of the land extended to the 
original inhabitants. Anglo men viewed violence against the Apache as a necessary 
element to the establishment of United States sovereignty in the borderlands.207 The 
Indian as other, then, represented a relic of the past, a fossil that required extermination. 
The norteamericanos held the Apache as other responsible for the violence at El Pozo 
without contextualizing relations between Mexicans, Indians, and Anglos within the 
borderlands. Indeed, US attitudes towards both Mexicans and Indians explicitly produced 
a discourse in which it viewed the other as lacking in human value.208 
 Scientific racism, in a corollary to general racist attitudes, manifested an empirical 
justification for the annihilation of Native peoples in the nineteenth century. In the case 
of the El Pozo incident, craniology as a purported “science” came to the fore. Craniology, 
in the mid-nineteenth century, included the study of skull capacity to determine racial 
difference and the intelligence of a given human being.209 Dr. Wislizenus, an 
acquaintance of and familiar with the work of Samuel Morton, idolized the renowned 
craniologist in Philadelphia. Dr. Morton wrote extensively on the superiority of the 
European “race” through comparison of the size of skulls of the supposedly different 
“races” of the globe.210 Dr. Wislizenus believed that he could gain fame and notoriety as 
a cranial scientist by contributing to Morton’s collection of skulls, the largest scientific 
holding in the entire world. What the event demonstrates is that European and European-
American scientists viewed Apache bodies as the source of scientific experiments. They 
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used indigenous skulls to argue for racial difference among the various populations in the 
world. Anglo scientists viewed Native bodies as not fully human.211 Instead, Lipan 
Apache corpses were instrumental to the “scientific” proof of various theories regarding 
the purported inferiority of certain supposed “races” to others. 
The norteamericanos often viewed Mexicans as subordinate to themselves in 
terms of class.212 The battle of El Pozo composed a significant exception. In this case, 
Anglo volunteers, drawn from the upper classes in the United States, recognized 
distinctions in class in Mexico. The volunteers identified the hacenderos as similar in 
class relations with the peons and Lipanes to upper class Anglos in the United States in 
exploiting workers, regular soldiers in the U.S. Army, and, most significantly, Native 
Americans in the 1840s.213 In other words, recognition of class-consciousness and 
solidarity transcended the war between Mexico and the United States in the event of the 
Battle of El Pozo.214 As a result, Anglos allied with Mexican hacenderos along the lines 
of class over and above issues of war and national identity. They did so through the 
willing acquiescence to attack the Lipanes on behalf and with the plantation-owners of 
Parras and its environs. 
 In an issue related to the exploitation of supposed inferiors along the lines of 
class, Anglos perceived male hacendero relations with their wives and children as similar 
to upper class United States male approaches to their wives and children. The upper 
classes of both nations embodied patriarchy defined here as the relations of power 
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between the hacenderos and Anglo volunteers on the one hand and women, children, and 
Native Americans on the other.215 While relations between the different groups cannot be 
reduced to a simple dualism, the end result was an alliance between Anglo volunteers and 
hacenderos to control women and children as property in accordance with the patria 
potestas.216 This “power of the father” dictated that the men who controlled the relations 
of production on the haciendas would have final say in the control over their wives and 
children. The Anglo volunteers served only to reinforce upper class control of women 
and children in Mexico.  
 Both sovereigns, however, recognized the border between them as peripheral to 
the main political centers in each country. Lipanes viewed the border as a disruption that 
drew distinctions directly in contradiction to their territory, the Lipanería. This problem 
of a border, a line in the sand drawn between two competing visions of social control, 
became an all-encompassing and devastating problem for the Ndé because two foreign 
powers suddenly divided the unified whole of their homeland. The boundary of the Río 
Bravo/Grande was the new source for an arbitrary and malicious division between 
different groups of Lipanes. The inane pride of the United States and Mexico demanded 
that these lands were theirs when, in fact, the US and Mexico were only foreign powers 
occupying the aboriginal homeland of the Ndé. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, during the years leading up to and during the U.S.-Mexican War, the 
Lipan Apache Nation exercised political autonomy in relations with the settler states of 
the Mexico and the United States. Autonomy is a lesser form of sovereignty that implies 
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a lack of external recognition and the uses of diplomacy. The Ndé engaged in national 
self-determination through the exercise of military might against the settlers at this time 
to the extent of a lasting enmity between certain pobladores and this indigenous nation. 
Treaty negotiations tempered this divisive attitude toward the Lipanes. All the same, with 
the establishment of the imperial forces of the United States in Mexico, the elite interests 
of the upper echelons of each settler state combined to destroy certain aspects of Ndé 
society, culture, and even physical life. Sovereignty, with its emphasis on 
intergovernmental agreements between nation-states, eluded the aspirations of this 
indigenous nation. The Mexican policy of citizenship for all indigenous peoples within its 
geopolitical boundaries had the contrary effect of resulting in the withdrawal of the 
Lipanes from direct social and political interaction in the northeast. Federalist against 
centralist interests contributed to the further marginalization of the Ndé from Mexican 
political interaction. Lipan Apache sovereignty in the northeast of the settler state 




















Chapter 5. This Horrible Butchery: Lipan Apache Autonomy, Treaties, and the 
Perfidy of Santiago Vidaurri, 1848-1856 
In a dusty corner of the Mexican province of Coahuila lie the shallow graves of 
Lipan Apache women and children massacred at the location of Gracias a Dios in 1856. 
Translated as “Thanks Be to God,” Gracias a Dios consists of a geographical site of 
resistance and despair. The Ndé suffered enormous casualties as the result of an 
internecine war between Mexico, the United States, Texas, and the indigenous peoples of 
the so-called borderlands. The border divided Ndé homelands in two. Indeed, the Ndé 
maintain to this day that the border comprises a fiction. This indigenous nation asserts 
that its homelands constitute a unity regardless of U.S. assertions to the contrary. As a 
“transnational” people, the Lipanes evinced strategies and tactical maneuvers in order to 
maintain subsistence economies and political integrity. They shared their lands with other 
indigenous nations, refugees such as the Seminoles, Mascogos, and Kickapoos. While 
differences flared, the confluence of nations combined to fight Anglo-Texans who sought 
to control the so-called border between Mexico and the United States. 
The impositions of the United States on indigenous peoples remain a stated fact. 
The history of Mexican Indian policies in its northeast, however, involves an entirely 
different historical approach. Indeed, sovereign relations between the Ndé and Mexico 
eroded with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. From this time until 1856, the Ndé 
maintained political integrity and autonomy in large part because the Mexican 
government had few resources to implement its assimilation and annihilation strategies. 
Acrimony developed between northeastern elites and the Lipanes resulting in massacres 
against either the Ndé or Mexicans with inordinate frequency. Relations between the 
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Lipanes and Mexico controverted traditional Euro-American concepts of sovereignty. 
Still, Mexico allowed for the Ndé people to develop their own political autonomy at least 
in part.  Indeed, Ndé resistance to Mexican social control during this time period 
remained strong, even if Mexico, particularly the governments and elites of the northeast, 
sought to destroy the Lipanes. 
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Its Aftermath 
The negotiations, ratification, and enactment of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
ended the Mexican War, or la intervención noteramericana, in early 1848. In February 
U.S. diplomat Nicholas Trist signed the treaty along with three plenipotentiaries 
representing the government of Mexico.217 Prior to the signing of the treaty between the 
United States and Mexico, the Mexican Commissioners Luis Cuevas, Bernardo Couto, 
and Miguel Atristain insured the insertion of language into the treaty regarding 
indigenous nations on the new border between the United States and Mexico. This 
language grew into an entire article within the Treaty, Article XI.218 Trist wrote U.S. 
Secretary of State James Buchanan that Mexico’s northern states required the inclusion of 
language against Native American incursions into Mexico.219 The Mexican government, 
in an effort at propaganda to promote widespread acceptance of the treaty, proclaimed 
Article XI as the primary advantage to compensate the fledgling nation for sacrifices 
made during the war.220 The treaty would not have been approved without language 
recognizing culpability on the part of the United States in border incursions perpetrated 
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against the Mexican countryside. In March the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty including 
Article XI. In May Mexico also ratified the tratado.  On July 4, 1848, the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo took effect.221 Article XI affected the Ndé along with a significant 
number of other indigenous peoples. 
Ironically, U.S. incursions against the Lipanes in Mexico occurred only after the 
abrogation of Article XI in 1853. Instead, Mexican pobladores and military elites 
remained the prime instigators in the destruction of Ndé structural and political integrity. 
Contrary to expectations, in 1854 a successful détente arose between the Mexicans of 
northern Coahuila and the Ndé. Indeed, local and provincial governments in Coahuila 
eventually recognized Ndé sovereignty with successful treaty negotiations and the 
appointment of Indian agents in the style of general U.S. Indian policy. 
The Mexican Republic felt the need to redress the issue of Indian depredations on 
the border with the United States including those of the Lipanes. An analysis of the 
language of the treaty reveals the direction of Apache, Mexican, and U.S. relations until 
the 1880s even if the Tratado de la Mesilla/Gadsden Purchase specifically superseded 
Article XI. Four primary points in the article made the treaty a real presence in the lives 
of the Ndé. First, the United States promised to halt Indians from crossing the 
international border into Mexico or lead punitive expeditions against those Indians who 
committed depredations across the Río Bravo/Grande. According to Article XI, the 
Apache “occupied” their own homelands and came under “the exclusive control of the 
Government of the United States.”222 In this statement, the U.S. government denied 
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indigenous land title and asserted plenary power over the Lipanería, the homelands of the 
Lipanes. The arbitrary division of Ndé territory resulted in treaty language effectively 
destroying the holistic nature of Lipan Apache lands with the stroke of a pen. Second, the 
treaty disallowed U.S. citizens from purchasing Mexican captives or stolen Mexican 
property offered by indigenous nations, including the Ndé. The consequences for Lipan 
subsistence, based in “shadow” economies of raiding and trading, became tantamount to 
the destruction of Ndé livelihoods.223 Third, the United States promised to return 
Mexican captives to Mexico. Fourth, the U.S. government promised to remove each 
indigenous nation along the border from their homelands.224 The treaty assumed this 
action in stating that 
…when providing for the removal of the Indians from any portion of the said  
territories, or for its being settled by citizens of the United States; but on the  
contrary, special care shall then be taken not to place its Indian occupants under  
the necessity of seeking new homes, by committing those invasions which the  
United States have solemnly obliged themselves to restrain….225 
The United States, in this section, promoted a dual and inconsistent policy. The U.S. 
government sought Indian removal while at the same time leaving indigenous nations 
alone in the hopes that Native peoples would not commit depredations against Mexicans. 
The federal government later subjected the Ndé to policies of removal and genocide on 
the basis of the language of Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
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 The general implementation of the article from 1848 to 1853 resulted in a rise in 
depredations and costs across the Apachería and the Comanchería from Tamaulipas to 
Sonora. More than 160,000 Native Americans lived along the newly established border 
between the United States and Mexico. Both the Apache and Comanche often raided 
Mexican villages south of the Río Bravo beginning in the early eighteenth century. 
During the early 1850s, approximately 8,000 U.S. troops mobilized on the border. As a 
result, the cost of reducing Indian incursions was greater than the cost of compensation to 
Mexico for the southwestern United States.226 Moreover, the establishment of the new 
border meant that Mexicans could not cross the Río Bravo for retribution against Native 
Americans.227 The significance of these facts to the Ndé included an increase in negative 
relations with the U.S. military and further deterioration of relations with Mexican 
pobladores. 
Mexican Atrocities and Lipan Losses 
The Ndé, during these years, continued their “shadow” economy of raiding 
Mexican villages and trading with Anglo-Texans across the border, although Mexican 
attacks hindered the indigenous nation. Ndé and Comanche incursions for the years 1849 
to 1852 have considerable documentation. For the states of northeastern Mexico, attack 
and reprisal remained the status quo in relations between the settler state and indigenous 
peoples. While the historical record does not differentiate the Lipan Apaches from the 
Comanches, the defense of the Lipan Apache Nation constituted a powerful response to 
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the military ethos of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León and Coahuila.228 The Ndé, however, also 
suffered a great deal from Mexican retaliation for perceived wrongs. 
Three specific events from the years intervening between the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase between the United States and Mexico in 1853 reveal 
specific Mexican atrocities and the concomitant losses sustained by the Lipan Apache 
Nation. On Christmas Day in 1849, sixty soldiers from San Vicente and Monclova Viejo 
along with seventy-five settlers from Santa Rosa in Coahuila found a local group of 
approximately one hundred Lipanes and Mescaleros camped in a forest near the watering 
hole of Rosita. The Mexicans attacked, and most of the Apaches fled into the forest. After 
the attack, the settlers and military corps found ten indigenous bodies. The Mexicans 
proceeded to scalp eight of the Apache corpses.229 
In September 1850 the military elites in the northeast promulgated a new Indian 
policy. They demanded that the Mexican people make no peace with any indigenous 
peoples of the area. Military elites, instead, sought to wage total war against the 
Comanche and the Ndé. Mexican authorities declared that Lipanes lacked sedentary 
villages and horticulture. Instead, the elites asserted that the Ndé devoted themselves only 
to hunting and warfare.230 In truth, the Lipanes engaged in hunting and warfare but not to 
the exclusion of other cultural concerns including the harvesting of the sotol plant and the 
Apache girl’s coming of age ceremony.231 Furthermore, Mexican elites completely 
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ignored women’s roles and work in Ndé society. In particular, Lipan women engaged in 
horticulture prior to European contact. Mexican authorities appeared woefully naïve in 
their assertions. 
In February 1852 at Los Salitres de Cabezas near San Buenaventura in Coahuila, 
Mexicans attacked a Lipan camp in order to recover silver, money, cotton, and silk.232 
This “recovery” found in the historical sources belies the notion that Mexican settlers 
often stole from the Ndé just as much as the Ndé appropriated Mexican property within 
the confines of their homeland. Relations between Mexican settlers and the Lipanes 
remained problematic at this time. The interference of Mexican elites added to the war of 
attrition between the two peoples. 
The Settlement of Mexican Colonies, Refugee Indians, and Mascogos in Coahuila 
 In a flurry of legislation during and after la intervención norteamericana, the 
Mexican government sought to “protect” the northern frontier from American Indian 
incursions and Anglo-American banditry. The Ndé were primary targets in the republic’s 
effort to quell “hostile” Indians. Beginning at the outset of the war, the government of 
Mexico sought to establish a policy of so-called pacification of the north. In December 
1846 the Mexican legislature passed a law for the establishment of a Department of 
Colonization and introduction of military colonies comprised of Mexican nationals or 
foreigners in the north to halt Indian incursions.233 Two years later, Mexican President 
José Joaquín de Herrera released guidelines for Mexican colonization along the newly 
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established border with the United States. This new law established military colonies in 
the north for defense from incursions by indios bárbaros including the Ndé.234 At the end 
of the war, President Herrera also stated in a decree the Mexican policy of repatriating 
and resettling Mexicans desiring to return to the Republic and remain citizens of Mexico. 
These resettlements occurred, again, primarily in the north and remained connected to the 
founding of new “frontier” towns such as Nuevo Laredo in Tamaulipas and Piedras 
Negras in Coahuila.235 Through these initiatives, the federal government sought to control 
the Ndé and destroy their autonomy as a nation separate from the United States or 
Mexico. 
In a strange twist of events, the government of Mexico also invited refugee 
peoples from the United States to settle in northern Coahuila in order to defeat Ndé 
initiatives in protecting their indigenous homeland. In 1849, Wild Cat (Cowokocî or 
Coacoochee) led a group of Seminoles, Black Seminoles and Kickapoos into Coahuila 
seeking asylum from the U.S. settler state.236 Mexicans referred to African-Seminole 
people as los mascogos after the word for “the people” in Seminole. In 1850, Cowokocî 
signed an agreement with the inspector general of the eastern military colonies in San 
Fernando de Rosas (now Zaragoza). The indigenous leader’s followers received lands in 
northern Coahuila. The agreement accorded Mexican citizenship to the Kickapoo, 
Seminole, and refugee mascogos led by John Horse (John Cowíka). Mexican elites 
required the displaced peoples to defeat the Comanche, Mescalero, and Lipan and 
                                                
   234 Hernández, Mexican American Colonization, 84; Mulroy, Freedom on the Border, 53. 
   235 Hernández, Mexican American Colonization, 6, 139. 
   236 Felipe A. Latorre and Dolores L. Latorre, The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1976), 12. For further reading on the Seminole and los mascogos, see Susan A. Miller, Coacoochee’s 
Bones: A Seminole Saga (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003) and John L. Elder, Everlasting 
Fire: Cowokocî’s Legacy in the Seminole Struggle Against Western Expansion (Edmond, OK: Medicine 
Wheel Press, 2004). 
 120 
maintain good relations with U.S. citizens. Mexico did not require the peoples to “change 
their habits and customs.”237 
In late 1851 the Mexican government established permanent settlements for the 
Seminoles and mascogos at the Hacienda de Nacimiento near the headwaters of the Río 
San Juan Sabinas. Their settlements became the villages of Nacimiento and Nacimiento 
de los Negros.238 Most Kickapoos returned to Indian Territory, or what is now Oklahoma, 
after attacks on Lipanes, Comanches, and Mescaleros in 1851. One Kickapoo local group 
under Chief Papicua remained in a settlement near Morelos, Coahuila.239 In a clever yet 
malevolent move, the Mexican government exploited oppressed groups against each 
other. The Ndé became subject to attacks not only from the Comanche but also from 
displaced peoples fighting for their right to survive unencumbered. Ultimately, after 
1852, the mascogos demonstrated less interest in military maneuvers against “barbarian” 
Indians and concerned themselves with their own economic ventures and cultural 
development. Indeed, Black Seminoles quickly developed an interest distinct from the 
goals of Cowokocî’s local group.240 The Black Seminoles simply wished to remain apart 
from other ethnic groups and celebrate their freedom from slavery. Their presence, 
however, offended the so-called sensibilities of Anglo-Texan slavers, and, ultimately, led 
to U.S. attacks on both the Ndé and the mascogos. 
An Uneasy Peace 
Ndé autonomy received an added boost with the establishment of a peace 
settlement near the town of San Fernando de Rosas (now Zaragoza) in Coahuila. Local 
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Mexicans named the village after the old church at the site. The Spanish had used this 
place of worship as a mission to the Ndé in the eighteenth century. In June 1853 the local 
government chose to recognize the Lipanes as a separate people apart from the general 
Mexican population. Ndé leader Coyote entered into a treaty of peace and friendship with 
the town. This leader was a minor capitán of the Lipanes. His local group comprised 
three men and seventeen women, suggesting that the women of the group placed strong 
emphasis on diplomacy and negotiation. The leader set no conditions on his surrender in 
establishing a truce with the village.241 The impetus for the villagers was the hope that the 
settled Lipanes could act as a deterrent to Comanche raiding. Also, horses and cattle 
stolen by the Ndé across the Río Bravo in Texas could then be resold from San Fernando 
to the Coahuilan capital of Saltillo. The village “adopted” the Ndé and settled them at the 
Hacienda Patiño in order to “teach” them agriculture, not knowing that the Lipanes 
practiced agriculture since before European contact. Lipanes also settled at El Remolino 
northwest of San Fernando de Rosas at this time.242 Although the stated reason for the 
treaty proclaimed amity between the two sovereign entities, both the Ndé and the 
Mexican villagers needed a détente in hostile relations between each other. An 
unintended result, however, was to recognize the sovereign independence of the Lipan 
nation. 
 In further recognition of the Ndé as a separate people, Governor Gerónimo 
Cardona of Coahuila initiated policies recognizing the Lipanes and their needs to recover 
from depredations on the part of Anglo-Americans on the north side of the Río Bravo. In 
January 1854 a number of Lipanes crossed the international border near Laredo and 
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settled in Coahuila at the invitation of Mexican authorities. These officials offered land 
and security.243 Governor Cardona of Coahuila appointed an Indian agent to watch over 
the Ndé. In April 1854 Juan Castro and his local group of Ndé people crossed the Río 
Bravo/Grande and met with other Lipanes at San Fernando de Rosas.244 As further proof 
of his goodwill towards the Lipan Apache people, Governor Cardona defended the Ndé 
in August 1854 when the indigenous nation stood accused of attacking a small settlement 
in Nuevo León. Indeed, during the summer of 1854, the Lipanes proved their value to the 
Mexicans in defeating Comanche raiders in the province to the east of Coahuila, Nuevo 
León.245 Peace appeared finally to have settled on the northeastern frontier of the 
Mexican Republic. From an Ndé perspective, the Lipanes saw the need to negotiate with 
the invaders in order to remain in their original homeland. 
With the Gadsden Purchase, finalized in 1854, the United States rescinded Article 
XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This agreement purportedly released the Ndé 
from fear of reprisal for continuing their shadow economy. This fear, however, remained 
significant until 1861 with the coming of the U.S. Civil War. Indeed, the military of the 
country to the north increased incursions against Native peoples across the Río 
Bravo/Grande in Coahuila. In Article II of the Gadsden Purchase, or the Tratado de la 
Mesilla, the U.S. government abandoned responsibility for “protecting” Mexican citizens 
from Native American attacks south of the boundary between the two countries.246 The 
United States assumed that its payment of ten million dollars included rectification for 
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Mexican losses to the Ndé among other indigenous nations.247 The Lipanes, even with the 
détente in relations with Mexican pobladores in Coahuila, remained subject to attack 
from the Mexican and U.S. armies. Particularly with the drastic change in leadership, 
both in Mexico City and in the northeast, the Ndé suffered unparalleled losses. 
Death and Destruction in Coahuila 
With the change in the government of the northeast to Liberal leadership, the 
Mexican state imposed physical and structural violence against the Ndé to the point of 
cultural destruction and the shattering of Lipan Apache autonomous political structures. 
With the deposition of Santa Anna from the presidency in Mexico City in August 1855, 
many changes erupted on the political scene throughout the nation. New leaders under the 
banner of Liberalism emerged throughout Mexico.248 In the northeast, the political 
opportunist Santiago Vidaurri assumed power beginning in Nuevo León. His dominion 
quickly spread to Coahuila.249 His policy towards the Ndé contained no compromise. He 
refused to recognize recent developments in Mexican recognition of indigenous 
sovereignty. All treaty-making came to a standstill. Indeed, Vidaurri took clear and 
malevolent advantage of the positive interactions between Coahuila and the Ndé in 1853 
and 1854. As a result of Vidaurri’s scorched earth policies, he initiated an overwhelming 
massacre of Ndé people at Gracias a Dios.250 Prior to this unprecedented attack, Anglo-
Americans in Texas singled out the Ndé as purveyors of destruction in their exercise of 
the “shadow economy.” As a result, the Callahan expedition of 1855 led to a skirmish 
between the Anglo-Americans and a combined force of Ndé and Mexicans south of the 
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Río Bravo/Grande.251 This alliance however quickly melted away in the face of the 
Liberal uprising initiated by Santiago Vidaurri. There would be no more treaties between 
the Lipanes and Mexican governments, local, provincial, or otherwise. Instead, a period 
of extreme violence perpetrated against the Ndé resulted in tragic and dire consequences 
for the indigenous nation. 
 Santiago Vidaurri was born in the Nuevo León village of Lampazos, the heart of 
the Ndé homelands in northeastern Mexico. Vidaurri began his long political career in the 
service of the conservative party in Nuevo León. From 1832 to 1837, he served as chief 
clerk to the governor, Joaquín García.252 More significantly, Nuevo León appointed 
Vidaurri as Commander of the Compañía defensora de la frontera. In this capacity, he 
joined forces with the Mexican militia to attack Ndé people in their own territories.253 
Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, Vidaurri served in the conservative administrations of 
Nuevo León.254 Ever the political opportunist, when the Liberals toppled the conservative 
government of Santa Anna, he quickly switched parties to become a champion of 
Mexican Liberalism. 
 Liberalism, as defined in Mexican politics of the nineteenth century, promoted 
economic development and the rights of individuals over groups, including Native 
American tribes.255 In March 1854 Mexican rebels published the Plan of Ayutla and 
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made known their purpose to oust Santa Anna from the presidency.256 The Ayutla 
revolution had enveloped the entire nation of Mexico by the Spring of 1855. Jumping at 
the chance to assert political power at the provincial level, Vidaurri, along with Juan 
Zuazua, successfully overthrew the conservative government of Nuevo León headed by 
Gerónimo Cardona. In May, Vidaurri declared himself governor of Nuevo León and 
named Zuazua as his military strategist and colonel. At this time, Vidaurri issued his own 
plan, titled the Plan del restaurador de la libertad, to overthrow the Mexican 
government. In his assertions as an autocrat and tyrant, he declared the province of 
Nuevo León to be independent from Mexico until the nation established a Liberal 
government in Mexico City.257 In a pointed reference to his hatred of the Ndé, Vidaurri 
invited Coahuila and Tamaulipas to join his government in order to deal with the so-
called Indian threat.258 On August 9, 1855, the conservative Santa Anna resigned the 
Mexican presidency and went into exile in Cuba.259 The indigenous homelands of the 
Ndé became subject to the tyranny of Governor Vidaurri and his vehement attacks on the 
rights of the Indian nation. 
The Callahan Fiasco: U.S. Intervention in Mexico 
The Ndé had to withstand the incursions of Anglo-Texans from across the border 
into Mexico in addition to suffering the tyranny of Governor Viduarri. The Anglos 
crossed the Río Bravo/Grande with the specific purpose of attacking the Ndé in their 
peace settlements. In the summer of 1855 the United States military recalled most of its 
cavalry from the Texas border forts to “Bleeding Kansas.” Without the oppression and 
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threats on the part of the United States, the Ndé renewed their shadow economy of 
raiding in Texas for trade in Mexico. At this point, the state of Texas decided in favor of 
vigilantism in order to halt Ndé economic initiatives. In early July Texas Governor Elisha 
M. Pease ordered Captain James Callahan to form a company of Rangers to attack Lipan 
Apache raiders in Mexico.260 This action comprised a clear violation of both the rights of 
the indigenous nation and the government of Mexico after the abrogation of Article XI of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1853. In late July 1855 Callahan collected eighty-
eight mounted gunmen for an invasion of Ndé and Mexican territories.261 By late 
September, the so-called Callahan expedition reached the Río Bravo/Grande across from 
Piedras Negras, Coahuila.262 In contemplation of an invasion of Mexican and Ndé lands, 
Callahan gave no thought to the import of his actions. His force comprised only a small 
number of vigilantes with tacit approval of the governor of Texas and no recognition 
from the U.S. government. 
The Ndé and the Mexicans, in a rare show of solidarity, combined to defeat the 
Anglo invaders. In early October Callahan crossed the Bravo into Mexico. He moved his 
force to the Lipan Apache camp near San Fernando de Rosas. At that point, he engaged a 
party of Mexicans and Lipanes who defeated his vigilante army.263 The following day, 
Callahan retreated to the village of Piedras Negras.264 In direct violation of the rights of a 
citizenry not their own, Callahan’s troops set fire to the town and then retreated further 
across the Rio Grande into Texas.265 The political fall-out of this fiasco comprised a deep 
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sense of violation felt by both the Ndé and Mexico. The United States disrespected both 
Mexican and Ndé aspirations to sovereignty. As a result, indigenous peoples and 
Mexicans found common cause in the face of Anglo-Texan oppressors. This newfound 
solidarity lasted only a short time before Governor Vidaurri altered his opinions about 
both the Ndé and the Texans. 
 At first, Vidaurri expressed sentiment that demonstrated some sympathy for the 
difficult situation of the Ndé. Before his drastic and unmitigated change of heart, the 
governor wrote to the Mexican leader of the Liberal rebels, Juan Alvarez. Vidaurri stated 
that “the object [of the Callahan Expedition was] the recovery of fugitive negroes from 
the State of Texas or a desire to chastise the Lipan Indians, who being at peace among us, 
are said to have committed murders in Texas….”266 At this time, during the heated 
debates on the evils of slavery in the halls of the U.S. Congress, many Anglo-Texans 
sought to subjugate and punish Mexico because of that nation’s policy of according 
freedom and rights to African-Americans. The Callahan fiasco, a prime example of 
southern white arrogance and hatred, resulted in chastisement of those Anglo-Texans 
who threatened the rights and freedoms both of the Ndé and freed Africans in Mexico. 
Massacre at Gracias a Dios 
 Governor Vidaurri ultimately gave the order to annihilate the Ndé. Although he 
failed in his endeavor, the shock wave of the events that occurred throughout Coahuila in 
1856 signified an unmitigated chill in Lipan Apache-Mexican relations. Governor 
Vidaurri’s fears over the power of the Ndé resulted directly from the Callahan fiasco. In 
December 1855 Governor Vidaurri, in response to fears of reprisal over the Callahan 
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incident, wrote to the Mexican Minister of War that “there is nothing to fear from the 
[Ndé nation], which is located at a place [Hacienda Patiño] which it cannot leave without 
being observed, but as it is really composed of savages [sic], it needs a director who shall 
care for its education, and lands for cultivation.”267 At this stage, Vidaurri remained 
noncommittal in relation to the situation of the Ndé. He sought to impose an agent in the 
style of U.S. federal Indian policy in order to quell Lipan Apache responses to the 
outright attacks of the Anglo-Texas. 
In a related strategic move, on February 19, 1856, Vidaurri unilaterally annexed 
Coahuila to Nuevo León as one of the first acts of his new government.268 His new 
interest in Coahuila became the source of his desire to control and, finally, attempt to 
annihilate the Lipanes. By February 1856, Vidaurri sought to conduct an investigation of 
the Ndé. At this point, rethinking his stance on the Lipan Apache “shadow” economy and 
raids into Texas, the governor altered his approach toward the Ndé. Indeed, he gave 
orders “to notify them for the last time, that the least complaint for damages caused on 
either side of the Rio Grande would be the signal for their extermination without 
discrimination of any kind.”269 Slowly, Vidaurri, in his tyrannical disposition as a 
Coahuilan caudillo, began to implement a cruel and untoward policy in relation to the 
Lipan that would have lasting effects. 
 The governor made his move in March. In an effort to develop positive relations 
with Anglo-Texans and the U.S. military, Vidaurri gave the orders for the purported final 
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destruction of the Ndé. On March 16, 1856, he wrote to the Anglo-American military 
commander stationed across the Río Bravo/Grande at Fort McIntosh that “I have the 
satisfaction to enclose copies of communications sent to the military commanders on the 
frontier. In them you will see that before you informed me of the murders and robberies 
committed by the Lipans, I ordered the arrest of the malefactors, and in case of resistance, 
to wage a war of extermination against them.”270 With this notification, Vidaurri’s 
machinery of war and genocide began to develop in its final manifestation. 
 The governor’s private army stepped in to fulfill his nightmare visions of war. 
Colonel Pablo Espinosa moved his troops to the Chupadero River near Villa Gigedo in 
Coahuila to attack an Ndé ranchería. Further, Colonel Juan Zuazua, Governor Vidaurri’s 
military strategist, located his troops at the Río Salado to attack another Ndé settlement. 
On March 19, 1856, Captain Miguel Patiño with Espinosa’s army captured and made 
prisoners of the Ndé at the Río Chupadero with the intent of moving the indigenous 
nation’s captive men, women, and children to Colonel Zuazua’s force on the Río 
Salado.271 On March 20, the Mexican soldiers and captive Ndé rested at Gracias a Dios. It 
was only a matter of time before the Lipanes decided to end their captivity as best they 
could. The Mexican soldiers held them in their grip, and the Lipan could see no route of 
escape. Ndé women, without warning, killed their own children by cutting their 
throats.272 Because the Lipanes valued freedom from the hated Mexican soldiers more 
than anything else, Ndé women, as the matrilineal centers of power in Lipan society, 
made the ultimate and coerced decision to end their own lives and those of their children. 
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This result was better than forced subjugation at the hand of the Mexicans and 
incorporation as servants at the bottom rung of Coahuilan society. Choosing death over 
the loss of freedom, Ndé women knew there could be no alternative to forced domination 
and what amounted to slavery at the hands of the Mexicans. In an inexplicable move, 
Captain Patiño then gave orders to kill all of the Ndé men, many of the women, and at 
least one girl.273 On March 21, 1856, Espinosa wrote to Governor Vidaurri of the incident 
in cold, dispassionate tones and in language relishing the deaths of the Ndé women and 
children.274 
 After notification, Vidaurri penned a letter to the Mexican War Department. He 
could not understand the motivations of Ndé women. On March 26, 1856, the governor 
wrote that “the savages [sic] undertook to escape [on March 20], while their women 
commenced killing their infants, rather than see them deprived of liberty. This unnatural 
action enraged the troops, and after Captain Miguel Patiño had in vain attempted to 
prevent the flight and this horrible butchery, he was forced to appeal to the last remedy, 
by putting to death forty-one persons of both sexes.”275 Vidaurri’s explanation for the 
massacre at Gracias a Dios lacks conviction or credibility. Since February, he intended to 
annihilate every single Lipan he could locate. To add insult to injury, the governor found 
the actions on the part of the Ndé objectionable even if their fear and anger compelled 
them to drastic measures. He disdained to understand the rationale behind their 
desperation. 
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Further, Ndé men found themselves attacked in another part of Coahuila. On 
March 22, 1856, Colonel Zuazua attacked an Ndé settlement at the Río Salado. He took 
many captives and killed others. Ndé warriors, weeping because they thought that “God 
was angry” with them, sought to commit suicide.276 Again, the Mexicans could not 
comprehend the actions of the Lipanes. They refused to understand suicide as an option. 
Mexican reactions to the Ndé resulted in an assertion of their supposed cultural 
superiority. In fact, Ndé men sought death over captivity because they knew the 
consequences of coercion and assimilation into Mexican society. Ndé men sought to end 
their lives rather than become the slaves and domestic servants of upper class Mexican 
hacendados. Captivity and the denial of freedom were anathema to the cultural, social, 
political, and physical vitality of the Lipanes. 
 After these events, the Mexican government falsely asserted that the history of the 
Ndé as a people came to an end. In an effort at wishful thinking, the government believed 
that the tribe disappeared as a result of these massacres in March 1856.277 The Euro-
American colonial apparatus, however, failed in its endeavor. The Lipanes remained in 
Coahuila to the early twenty-first century. In 1868 the U.S. military on a reconnaissance 
mission found the Ndé in the exact same location as in 1856 prior to the massacre.278 
Indeed, the Lipanes refused to halt the implementation of their shadow economic policies 
in raiding Texans for livestock to trade in northern Coahuila. The Ndé remain to this day 
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at their settlement in Zaragoza, the town formerly named San Fernando de Rosas where 
the Lipan Apache settled as a result of the treaty of 1853.279 
Conclusion 
 In the period from 1848 to 1856, the Ndé engaged in direct relations with the 
Mexicans of Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. Lipan Apache sovereignty in 
relation to the Mexican government remained attenuated and problematized during this 
period. Indeed, the Ndé formed only one intergovernmental agreement between their 
nation and the government of Coahuila. In the face of Mexican assimilation policy, the 
fact that the Lipanes formed even one treaty with a local government testifies to the 
diplomatic abilities of Ndé leaders. One problem, however, with these Mexican sources is 
the fact that they, for the most part, ignore the role of women in Apache culture. This fact 
is not surprising given the patriarchal structure of Mexican society in the northeast. 
Moreover, the Mexican sources reveal little about internal Lipan Apache interactions and 
cultural beliefs. In accordance with their assimilation and annihilation policies in the 
north, the Mexican government simply refused to care about the construction of Ndé 
society and culture. All the same, Lipan Apache autonomy accorded the indigenous 
nation different status from the Mexican pobladores. Mexican settlers could not deny this 
difference in political structure between the Ndé and the governments of Mexico. As a 
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Chapter 6. Anxious to Be at Peace: The Treaty Era and Linkages between the Lipan 
Apaches and the United States, 1845-1853 
 Throughout treaty negotiations between the Lipan Apache Nation and the United 
States, the phrase “anxious to be at peace” appeared several times.280 The treaty 
commissioners assumed this anxiety on the part of the Ndé. Given the difficult conditions 
of the settler state of Texas and its burgeoning Anglo-American population, perhaps the 
Lipan Apaches felt some anxiety to negotiate peace with the U.S. settler state. 
Recognizing the sovereignty of the indigenous nations of Texas, however, U.S. treaty 
commissioners became truly anxious. In linking with the United States, the Ndé parted 
with certain sovereign principles, particularly in the realm of diplomacy. The internal 
structural integrity of the Lipan Apache Nation remained consistent regardless. 
 With the imperial power of the United States established by the mid-nineteenth 
century, this settler state really had no use for intergovernmental agreements with the 
indigenous peoples of Texas. The Harney massacre of 1853 evinced the problematic 
relation the United States imposed on the Lipan. The fact, however, that the U.S. 
government saw fit to engage in treaties with the Ndé among other Native peoples 
suggests that presidential administrations at this time felt a moral obligation to recognize 
the sovereignty of American Indian tribes. In this sense, the United States linked with the 
Ndé in a powerful relation not to be taken lightly. In a series of three treaties from 1846 
to 1851, the United States promoted the validity of indigenous claims to their homelands. 
The fact that the Ndé never ceded land to the United States or any other sovereign power 
attests to the resilience of Lipan Apache leaders in rejecting colonial politics and social 
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control. Even though Texas refused to recognize indigenous land title, the U.S. federal 
government sought to engage in nation-to-nation relations with the Ndé in an effort to 
validate Native American sovereignty in keeping with precedent. 
The False Link 
 Failing to recognize the polity of the Ndé, the 1846 Treaty of Council Springs 
resulted in a false link. The linkage of the United States with the Ndé failed at this time 
because the Lipan refused to sign the treaty. Under the administration of Indian Affairs 
promulgated by the United States, settler colonialism demanded recognition of the 
sovereignty of indigenous “domestic, dependent nations” per the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in the Cherokee cases of the early 1830s.281 Needless to say, the linking of 
indigenous nations to the imperial structure of the United States resulted in the 
subjugation and domination of each Native people to the overarching political control of 
the settler state. In arguing for dependent nation status the United States recognized the 
significance of each Native people as an autonomous entity, however, separate from the 
construction of the U.S. empire. 
 Because the administration of Indian-white relations took place under the aegis of 
the Department of War until 1849, the Office of Indian Affairs looked to the Secretary of 
War, in this case William Marcy, for policy directives and permissions to engage 
indigenous nations in the field. In September 1845, four months prior to the admission of 
the State of Texas into the Union, the machinery of U.S. diplomacy with the indigenous 
nations began its assumption of power. Previously, the Republic of Texas claimed 
exclusive right to treat with Native peoples within the boundaries of this settler state. On 
instructions from the U.S. Department of War, Pierce M. Butler and Colonel L. G. Lewis 
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set out to make a treaty with the indigenous tribes in the Indian country of North, Central, 
and West Texas.282 The prime target nation for diplomacy constituted the Comanche 
people as a result of their pronounced independence and geopolitical dominance within 
the realm of Texas-Indian relations. The U.S. Department of War also, however, targeted 
Lipan Apaches as instrumental to developing positive relations between Native peoples 
and the United States and as prime subjects for its so-called civilizing enterprise. 
 In the following month, President Polk appointed a new Indian Commissioner, 
William Medill, under the control of the Secretary of War. Medill was a political 
appointee and a beneficiary of the spoils system. He had no prior knowledge of Indian 
affairs.283 With his proposed policy of cultural assimilation, termed “civilizing,” the new 
Commissioner intended to destroy the internal structural integrity of indigenous peoples. 
He desired to replace indigenous ways of knowledge with “civilization.” 
 In order to carry out this process by means of treaty negotiations, Butler and 
Lewis traveled across diverse sections of Indian country in order to reach the indigenous 
nations of what is now the state of Texas. By November of 1845, the treaty party reached 
the Cherokee Nation in Indian Territory north of Texas.284 In the ensuing month, the 
Principal Chief of the Cherokee appointed Elijah Hicks, a Cherokee citizen, to 
accompany Butler and Lewis on their excursion. The day after Christmas, the party 
departed the Cherokee Nation arriving in the Creek Nation two days later. On New 
Year’s Day of 1846, Wild Cat (Coacoochee or Cowokocî), the Seminole leader discussed 
in the previous chapter, joined the treaty negotiators, and the party crossed the Canadian 
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River into the Chickasaw Nation.285 By late-January, the treaty commissioners crossed 
the Red River into lands claimed by the ex-Republic of Texas and settled at Comanche 
Peak.286 The record of their travel, recorded by Hicks in his personal diary, gives a 
pleasing description of the carefully tended environment in Indian Territory and what is 
now North Texas. 
The Ndé made their presence known at the camps of this colonizing treaty party. 
While camping on the Brazos River near Torrey’s Trading House in late February, the 
first Ndé representatives made their appearance. Among these leaders was an indigenous 
woman Hicks styled “a Lipan lady with a fancy dress.” His observation coincided with 
remarks made by many observers of the beauty and high social status of Ndé women.287 
Some days later, Cowokocî informed Native leaders including Lipan Apaches that Butler 
and Lewis wanted to negotiate a treaty in order “to have a good talk with them, to settle 
all questions of value to all parties, to prevent crimes, horse stealing and war.” One Lipan 
Apache leader responded in intelligent recognition of the dangers inherent in revealing 
tribal secrets. He stated that his nation denied engaging in the phenomenon of horse 
stealing.288 This assertion comprised a preemptive move to deflect untoward attention to 
the Ndé “shadow economy.” 
In mid-March, the Lipan Apaches held a wedding. Hicks rendered a fascinating 
depiction of the marriage. He observed that “a Lipan belle, dressed in fringed buckskin 
jacket, and also fringed bootees ornamented with sleigh bells” proceeded to marry her 
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husband during this celebrated gathering of nations.289 Again, Hicks noted the poise and 
grace of Ndé women. Without clarifying the matter, the Cherokee attendee declined to 
acknowledge that the man would join his wife’s family to live and his property would 
become hers. Matrilineality and matrilocality played a significant role in gender relations 
in the Lipan Apache Nation. These factors accorded women higher status than patriarchal 
relations found in the United States. 
 In March 1846, further Ndé actions reflected their need for acknowledgment of 
their situation. In a treaty council held in the middle of the month, at least three Lipan 
captains attended what Hicks referred to as “Mexico.”290 Given the existence of disputed 
territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, these Ndé leaders could easily 
have arrived from north of the Rio Grande in lands claimed by the settler state of Mexico. 
In this council, Hicks asserted that the independence of Texas had ended upon annexation 
to the United States. He explained that the Anglos had formed into one people. He 
asserted, without knowing the state’s intrusion, that Texas no longer managed Indian 
Affairs.291 Having dealt with colonial authorities for two centuries, the Ndé leaders 
promoted a style of interaction designed to appeal to the typical colonialist stance. Hicks 
recorded that “they replied that they were from Mexico and the Rio Grande. They had 
also been oppressed and could not live there and had entered the great prairie.”292 In their 
assurance of friendship, these Ndé leaders promoted this stance recognizing colonial 
imperatives while retaining their integrity in the face of the imperialist hegemon. 
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 At the end of April, events took an untoward turn for the Ndé. Robert S. 
Neighbors, whom the United States appointed Special Indian Agent to the Lipan Apaches 
after his “success” in establishing rapport with the indigenous nation, brought heavy 
news from Central Texas. Hicks reported that the Special Agent returned from Austin 
bringing information that Anglo-Texans killed several Lipan Apaches on the Colorado 
River. These inauspicious tidings “caused the most heartrending national mourning by 
the Lipan women encamped here, loud with their shrieks which lost their sound in the 
distant heaven.”293 At this point, the Anglo-Texans, having forgotten their previous 
dependence on Ndé goodwill, proved their unworthiness in their dealings with this 
indigenous nation. Texans viewed their former allies no longer as friends but as enemies 
to be murdered without quarter. Treaty relations resumed after several weeks of 
mourning. 
 In mid-May, the Ndé, along with a number of other indigenous nations including 
the Comanche, concluded a treaty with the United States at Council Springs.294 
Apparently, representatives of the United States passed over Ndé leaders in requesting 
signatories to the treaty. As a result, no Ndé leaders affixed their marks to the document. 
From this fact, one could make the argument that the stipulations of this accord did not 
apply to the Ndé nation. All the same, the presence of Lipan Apache leaders at the 
council implied, at the very least, their recognition of the terms of the treaty. The 
application of the treaty’s focus awaited a separate agreement negotiated in 1851. 
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 Article I of the Treaty of Council Springs provided that the signatory nations to 
the treaty acknowledged the protection of the United States and no other sovereign party. 
Indeed, in refusing to sign the treaty, the Ndé made no recognition of the superiority of 
the sovereign of the United States. Because of this loophole, the Lipan could maintain 
sovereign linkages with governments in Mexico at this time.295 Article IV of the treaty 
stipulated the return of white and African American captives on the part of indigenous 
signatories to the superintendent of Indian Affairs. The United States declared that it 
would use force against those nations refusing to give up captives, thereby providing 
basis for wars of attrition between indigenous nations and the U.S. military in Texas.296 
 Article VI demanded that indigenous signatories act as informants against those 
Native people and nations whom they suspected as perpetrating disturbance of the peace 
or the destruction of the interests of the United States. As a result, the colonizing settler 
state demanded divisive interests both within and between the indigenous nations of 
Texas. This article clearly endorsed a divide-and-conquer strategy with the purpose of co-
opting those indigenous leaders privy to the resistance of other Native American nations. 
With all of its attendant incipient colonization of the mind, hegemony asserted itself in 
this article. Henceforth, the United States promoted divisions in the interests of protecting 
the peace and capitalist state formation.297 
 In a clear withdrawal of elements of sovereignty recognized during the era of the 
Republic of Texas, the United States imposed strenuous restriction on the ability of the 
tribes to prosecute criminals committing crimes within their respective homelands. 
Indeed, Article VII compelled all indigenous persons suspected of committing murder or 
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robbery of U.S. citizens to accept trial according to the laws of the state of Texas. State 
law subsumed federal laws against criminals in this instance. Furthermore, all non-
indigenous persons committing murder or robbery against citizens of indigenous nations 
became subject only to the laws of the state of Texas. As a result, prosecution of non-
Indian crimes against indigenous peoples was dependent upon the benevolence of the 
settler state of Texas to arrest, try, and punish these criminals. For the purposes of 
prosecution, indigenous signatories to this treaty abandoned their rights to prosecute non-
Indian and Native American criminals according to their own laws.298 
 In Article IX of the Treaty of Council Springs, indigenous signatories to the 
document allowed the United States to establish military posts, Indian agencies, and 
trading houses on their homelands. The language of the treaty was such that the United 
States made this request for the “protection” of indigenous people. The need for military 
posts, however, begs the question of which group of persons required “protection.”299 
Indeed, white citizens comprised the beneficiaries of this treaty stipulation because 
military posts in indigenous territories protected Anglo settlers instead of indigenous 
people. Such use of language perpetuated euphemistic fictions about the benevolence of 
the United States with relation to Native peoples. In another arrogation of the sovereign 
rights of indigenous nations, Article XII provided for the prosecution of those non-
Indians introducing liquor to Native people under state law instead of according to 
indigenous laws regarding the prohibition against alcohol in Indian communities.300 
 Article XIII provided for assimilation strategies on the part of the United States. 
These tactics comprised another example of the delinking of indigenous nations from 
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their sovereign rights as distinct polities and cultural centers separate from the settler 
state.301 Indeed, with the introduction of teachers and “preachers of the gospel,” one sees 
the beginning of cultural assimilation practices administered through the colonial power 
in an effort to inculcate Native people into the dominant society. This article entailed the 
rejection of indigenous social communities. In Article XIV, the tribal signatories 
provided their acknowledgement that they were “anxious to be at peace” with the United 
States and other indigenous nations.302 The sovereignty of the U.S. President clearly 
exerted itself over the signatories to this treaty. While the Ndé were present at the signing 
of this treaty, they refused to affix their marks to the document. So, while the United 
States acted as if this nation accepted the terms of the agreement, the settler state could 
not bind the Ndé to recognition of the treaty stipulations in fact. Furthermore, the 
indigenous signatories to this accord made no land cessions at this time.303 
A Strange Interlude 
 After the council held on the Brazos River to promulgate the Treaty of 1846, 
several indigenous leaders, including Ndé chiefs, traveled to Washington to meet with 
President James K. Polk.304 Butler and Lewis wrote in their report to Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Medill that, in transporting the tribal leaders to Washington, they sought 
two main objectives. The treaty commissioners desired to keep the chiefs away from 
Texas during the U.S.-Mexican war “as hostages for the good behavior of those left 
behind.” Further, Butler and Lewis wished to bedazzle the Indians with the glory of the 
imperial capital. The commissioners supposed that the tribal leaders would “go back 
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impressed with our strength, and their own weakness.”305 As a result of these 
negotiations, Ndé hereditary chiefs, along with Comanche and other tribal leaders, 
attended festivities in Washington. 
 President Polk received the tribal leaders in the late afternoon of July 1, 1846. He 
made several observations in his diary on the reception of the “wild Indians of the 
prairies.” Lewis presented the indigenous leaders to Polk in a reception in the Ladies’ 
Parlor of the White House. The U.S. President spoke through an interpreter, “assuring 
them that they might rely upon the friendship and protection of the U.S. as long as they 
would remain peaceable and friendly.”306 Upon termination of the parley, a young white 
woman performed for the chiefs and their wives on the piano. The Ndé, along with other 
indigenous leaders, found themselves entranced by the mirrors of the East Room. Polk 
asserted “when they saw themselves at full length, they seemed to be greatly 
delighted.”307 
Tribal leaders also made an appearance at the South Grounds of the White House, 
attending a concert “in the presence of many hundred ladies and gentleman. The Indians 
attracted much more attention than the music.”308 The President of the United States 
sought to impress upon the indigenous leaders of Texas, including the Ndé, the power, 
might, and large population of the capital city of the imperialist power as means to 
preserve the peace.309 His stated goal failed primarily as the result of Anglo-Texan 
settlers, politicians, and the ineptitude of the U.S. military and the Indian Office. 
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In November 1846, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Medill addressed several 
issues in relation to the indigenous peoples of Texas in his annual report. In discussing 
the Treaty of Council Springs, Medill argued that this intergovernmental agreement 
proved useful in promoting positive relations between the “wild Indians of the prairies” 
and the citizens and government of the United States.310 While he followed this positive 
assessment with inappropriate descriptions of the Indians of Texas as “mischievous” and 
“predatory,” Medill also found that the State of Texas was at fault as well. Texas, upon 
entering the union, retained title to all supposedly vacant lands. In an effort to establish 
title to these “virgin lands,” Medill argued that the tribes held only a right of occupancy 
to their homelands. Still, the commissioner accepted the authority and control of the state, 
finding that the federal trade and intercourse acts along with other federal Indian laws and 
regulations interfered with the right of Texas in the assertions of the state’s local 
jurisdiction. There remained some dispute over whether federal Indian law applied within 
the boundaries of Texas. The Indian commissioner’s statements served to cloak the issues 
in mystery without clarifying the roles of the various governments founded in settler 
colonialism.311 
Indeed, Texas claimed that its rights to the lands held by the indigenous peoples 
superseded the Native “right of occupancy.” Moreover, Texas Governor James Pinckney 
Henderson asserted that Indian Agent Neighbors must not assure the tribal leaders in any 
way. The governor assumed that the federal government would not allow the Indians to 
remain on a permanent basis on lands claimed by Texas. In a clear usurpation of the 
authority of the U.S. government, Henderson instructed Neighbors to withhold any 
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information or direction that suggested to the tribes privileges in land title. Further, the 
governor asserted the position of Texas as sovereign equal to the sovereignty of the 
United States. Henderson argued that “the consent of the State Government too must be 
had before [Indians] can acquire any right to remain where they are.”312 Henderson 
overstepped the boundaries of state jurisdiction in the handling of indigenous peoples in 
direct violation of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the Indian Commerce Clause. 
 In a June 1847 letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Special Agent to the 
Texas Indians Robert S. Neighbors recognized that “the present laws of Texas do not 
acknowledge that the Indians have any right of soil; and those [white] persons holding 
land claims contend that they have the privilege of locating wherever they choose.”313 As 
a result, Neighbors argued that the federal government could accomplish little in 
preventing Anglo-Americans from entering and laying claims to indigenous-held 
territories. Neighbors also noted that Lipan Apaches relied primarily on hunting to 
provide sustenance in a subsistence economy.314 
 In August 1847, Neighbors relayed significant information about negative Ndé-
white relations to the Indian Commissioner. While unable to vouch for the veracity of the 
accusation, Neighbors found that a party of Lipan Apaches attacked a party of Texas 
Rangers on the road to Laredo from San Antonio. The skirmish resulted in the deaths of 
three Ndé. Colonel Jack Hays, originally a friend to the Lipan Apaches, aspired to resolve 
peacefully the issue between representatives of the United States and the Lipan. Hays’s 
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men, however, fired upon the Ndé, wounding two of them, who then fled. Neighbors 
reported that the Lipan resided below the Nueces River in occupied Mexican territory 
during the U.S.-Mexican War and “beyond [his] control.”315 
 In September of the same year, Neighbors asserted that he was unable to locate 
any Ndé people as a result of the Ranger attack.316 The Texas Indian Agent, in 
communications with the Comanche, gained information that the Ndé joined a number of 
“Apaches” on the Pecos River or, as Neighbors termed it, the “Rio Puerco.” The reason 
for their removal beyond the reach of the long arm of the state resulted from an attack 
along the upper Colorado River. Neighbors would not learn of the reasons for their 
escape until April of the following year. Indeed, the reasons for their flight included 
Texas Ranger Bezaleel W. Armstrong’s ambush and massacre of several members of 
hereditary chief Chiquito’s local group of Ndé in August 1847.317 
 The Armstrong incident was only one of a series of massacres perpetrated against 
the Ndé in the coming years. The Texas Rangers appear to be the primary culprits in 
these incursions against Lipan Apache lives, liberty, and property. In January of the 
following year, Captain James Gillett executed seven Ndé people for the perception that 
the Lipan had absconded with a small number of horses. In fact, a Comanche raiding 
party was responsible for the theft of these horses. Captain Gillett, unaware of such fine 
distinctions, formed a cover for his gun holster out of an Apache scalp.318 Before October 
1848, Texas Ranger William Crump massacred several Ndé in an incident of horse theft. 
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Again, a Comanche raiding party made off with Crump’s horses. The Lipan Apaches fled 
to the headwaters of the Colorado River, declaring their anger at the loss of indigenous 
lives. Ndé people refused to engage in peaceful negotiations “until they had full 
satisfaction.” Neighbors, at this time, made an especially perspicacious comment. He 
argued that “under the present system the treaty is forgotten, and, if a horse is stolen by 
an Indian, there is no demand made, through the agent, for his recovery, but the first party 
of Indians that is fallen in with is attacked and massacred.”319 These Anglo atrocities 
succeeded only in further alienating Lipan Apaches from positive diplomatic 
negotiations. 
 Significantly, while the Rangers remained the primary culprits, at least one 
instance of violent and deadly perpetrations against Lipan Apaches included the U.S. 
military. Under Lieutenant H.M.C. Brown’s orders, the U.S. Army attacked the Ndé in 
1848. As a result, many Ndé leaders declared against all Anglo-Americans in the face of 
repeated attacks on their lives and property within their indigenous homeland. In 
response, Neighbors reported that he had “heard threats made by some [whites] to shoot 
the first Indian they meet with.” The Indian Agent also argued that “a few more attacks 
similar to the one made on the Lipans, must involve us in difficulties with the wild 
Indians that it would be impossible to adjust without much blood.”320 Clearly, the U.S. 
military was just as culpable as Texas in the subjugation of the Lipan Apache. 
 Anglo-Americans refused to simply target Ndé warriors in their efforts to 
eradicate this indigenous people from disputed territories along the frontier. Indeed, in 
                                                
	  	  	  319 Robert S. Neighbors to Commissioner William Medill, United States Special Agency, Texas, October 
23, 1848, in Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1848-1849, Senate Executive Document 
1, 30th Congress, first session, Serial Set 550 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1849), 598. 
   320 Neighbors to Medill, San Antonio, Texas, November 7, 1848, Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1848-
1849, 600. 
 147 
1849, the Texas Rangers attacked Lipan Apaches indiscriminately including the act of 
murdering defenseless women and children. According to Abbé Emmanuel Domenech, 
the Anglo vigilante force “massacred a whole division of the Lipan tribe, who were 
quietly camped near Castroville: they slew all, neither woman nor child was spared.”321 
Neighbors, in his letter of March 7, 1849, recognized the import of the massacres 
perpetrated against the Ndé population. He stated that misunderstanding continued to 
develop from attacks on Lipan Apaches. He argued that “all intercourse with them has 
ceased for some months passed; and it will be impossible to adjust those differences 
satisfactorily without money or presents to give them as an indemnity; they claiming to 
be the aggrieved party.”322 Further, the federal government in the form of Neighbors’ 
petition finally found in favor of the tribes in terms of the necessity to extinguish Indian 
title to their own homelands.323 In a letter written in May 1849 to H.G. Catlett, later 
published in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Texas Ranger 
Middleton T. Johnson outlined the original homelands of the Lipan as “ranging from 
Austin to Corpus Christi.” Johnson continued his discourse in stating that the Ndé either 
should have been removed beyond the line of Anglo settlement or allowed to stay in the 
midst of Anglo settlements without intercourse with “the wild tribes beyond.” He 
declared that, because of attacks against Ndé lives and property, Lipan Apaches 
established themselves on the Brazos River and “declared open hostilities.”324 
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 By June 1849, the Ndé split into at least two political positions in relation to the 
whites. One group, in response to the massacres, declared open war against all Anglo-
Americans. Indeed, Lipan Apaches absconded with the Mexican wife of an Anglo-
American living in the vicinity of Matamoros north of the Rio Grande.325 Some Ndé 
joined with the Comanche in fighting Anglo-Americans on the El Paso road. These 
whites sought to emigrate from the eastern United States to California in search of gold 
and a better life. They attacked the Ndé and Comanche in their tribal indigenous 
homelands on both sides of the Rio Grande. One Comanche leader regarding this incident 
declared that the white settlers charged the indigenous force four times. The Indians then 
fired their guns and successfully killed a large number of the gold-seeking party. Tribal 
leaders demonstrated no real desire to fight. They defeated the Americans on the basis of 
self-defense. Another group of Ndé, seeking peace with the Anglo-Americans, joined the 
Caddo at Torrey’s Trading Post in North Central Texas to engage in diplomatic 
negotiations with Indian Agent Neighbors. These partisan bands, Neighbors stated, 
“evince a decided disposition in favor of peace.”326 
In March 1849, the United States created the Department of the Interior and 
moved the Indian Office from the Department of War to the newly created administrative 
unit.327 Secretary of the Interior Thomas Ewing took an active interest in Indian Affairs 
and superseded the authority of Orlando Brown who replaced William Medill as Indian 
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Commissioner on June 30, 1849. Brown resigned by the middle of 1850.328 When he 
assumed the office of commissioner on June 30, 1849, many changes occurred in 
appointments of Indian Agents, including the replacement of Texas Agent Neighbors by 
August 1849. Commissioner Brown, writing in November, found that “Texas, on coming 
into the Union, retained control and jurisdiction over all her public domain, so that none 
of the laws or regulations of our Indian system are in force in her limits.”329 Brown 
adopted whole-heartedly the assertions of Texas. Inexperienced in his understanding of 
Indian policy, Brown gave assent to a law promoted by Anglo-Texans that remained 
questionable in terms of legal force. Texas land policy interfered with the treatment of 
indigenous peoples as “domestic, dependent nations.” Commissioner Brown, in the 
interest of the Whig administration of President Zachary Taylor, appointed John H. 
Rollins to replace Neighbors, a Democrat, in the summer of 1849. Indian Agent Rollins, 
however, arrived in Texas to assume the mantle only in November.330 In February 1850, 
the Texas state legislature, in violation of the Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, rejected a bill extending federal Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts to 
indigenous peoples within its jurisdiction.331 
 Agent Rollins, in an expedition to discover the mode of living among the 
indigenous inhabitants of Texas, visited Lipan Apaches on the Llano River in the spring 
of 1850. He discovered that “since the attack made upon them by a portion of Captain 
Crump’s company, as reported by the late Agent, the position of the Lipans has been 
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always doubtful and frequently hostile. They now, however, express a strong desire to 
remain friendly with the whites forever.”332 Rollins suggested a peace treaty, and the 
leader of this Ndé local group, Chipota, agreed. In the intervening months before 
conclusion of this peace treaty, President Taylor appointed Luke Lea to the position of 
Commissioner of the Indian Office in July and then died eight days later. 
Lipan Apache Links to the Settler State 
 As a prelude to discussion of the Spring Creek Treaty, this chapter will discuss 
the impact of the laws of the State of Texas on Indian Affairs within the confines of the 
claimed boundaries. The U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, prior to the completion of this 
second treaty, wavered in its resolve to impose federal law over the indigenous peoples of 
the state. Because Texas falsely asserted that it had complete control over indigenous 
peoples, the United States acquiesced for several years after annexation to the demands of 
the state. In an instruction to the Texas Indian Agent, Commissioner Lea found that 
“none of the laws and regulations pertaining to our Indian system have been extended 
over them; and it has hitherto been held by this department, that to authorize such 
extension the consent of Texas must first be obtained.”333 The Commissioner made this 
assertion more in response to the events of 1850 than the assumption of the federal role in 
Indian Affairs since 1845. 
 Because of the continuous turn-over in Commissioner of Indian Affairs, each new 
official had to begin again and often held conflicting perspectives on the administration 
in Texas. Commissioner Lea found it expedient to adopt a position that circumvented the 
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interests of previous commissioners in protecting the indigenous peoples of Texas. He 
declared in November 1850 that “the constitution, it is true, gives Congress the power to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but that it can be rightfully exercised in such 
manner as to punish the citizens of that State for trespassing on lands occupied by the 
Indians, or trading with them, unless licensed by the government, is a proposition that 
may well be controverted.”334 This delicate and rarefied language served only to 
obfuscate the fear, on the part of the Indian Office, to assert jurisdiction over and above 
that of the State of Texas in Indian Affairs. The assertion of federal authority in Texas 
changed with the adoption of the Treaty of Spring Creek in December 1850. 
 One of the reasons for delineating an analysis of the Treaty of Council Springs, 
outlined earlier in this chapter, is that the substance of the treaties that followed in which 
Lipan Apache leaders acted as signatories constituted vast similarities to the false treaty, 
false in the sense that it could not apply to the Ndé nation because the Ndé had not signed 
it. On December 10, 1850, representatives of the United States signed the Treaty of 
Spring Creek with the imprimatur of Lipan Apache leaders including Chiquito and 
Chipota.335 A full-scale analysis of the treaty is not necessary given its use of the same 
language as the previous treaty. Still, a broad outline of the treaty proves useful in 
clarifying the position of the Ndé vis-à-vis the United States. 
 The first articles of the treaty focused on significant preliminaries. In Article I, as 
in the previous accord, the Spring Creek Treaty espoused the position that the indigenous 
signatories, including the Ndé, acknowledged themselves to be under U.S. jurisdiction 
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alone. Most germane to the situation at hand was the assertion that no state could acquire 
authority over the Lipan Apache Nation. This stipulation included the State of Texas, a 
sovereign entity that, at this point in time, sought to remove all indigenous peoples from 
its borders or, at the very least, impose its own laws, subverting federal Indian law.336 
Article II provided for licensed traders validated by the United States alone to practice 
sales of goods to the indigenous nations that signed the treaty.337 Article III demanded 
that the “Indians,” a blanket term, agree that they “forever…remain at peace with the 
United States.”338 The notion of perpetual peace included no reference to the United 
States itself maintaining peaceful relations with the tribes, a loophole the U.S. military 
used later to justify repeated massacres. 
 Because of the recent hostilities between the United States and Mexico resulting 
in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the language of the Treaty of Spring Creek 
differed markedly from the previous treaty in some of its articles. In Article IV, the treaty 
found that the indigenous peoples, now referred to as “nations,” were “anxious to be at 
peace” with all other nations of people.339 The onus of the preservation of the peace 
between these indigenous nations and other nations, including Mexico, shifted to the 
President of the United States. Clearly, then, the purpose of the treaty included the 
imposition of federalism on the signatory tribal leaders as opposed to the intervention of 
the State of Texas and the Republic of Mexico. In substance, the use of informants 
against other indigenous nations, state criminal jurisdiction, alcohol prohibitions, and the 
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establishment of military posts continued the actions of the previous treaty.340 The caveat 
here was that the Ndé explicitly came under the auspices of this document. 
 Articles XIII, XIV, and XV of the Treaty of Spring Creek differed markedly from 
the previous 1846 treaty. Article XIII specified that no Indian should murder or take 
captive “any white person.”341 Article XIV asserted that “Young Men” of diverse 
indigenous nations accused of thievery or murder ought to be delivered to the military 
installation Fort Martin Scott for punishment. The distinction here is the allowance of 
recognition of the fluid nature of indigenous leadership particular to the circumstances at 
hand. Indian Agent John Rollins, representing the United States, recognized here that the 
authority of tribal leaders comprised no absolute social or political control of the main 
body of members of a given indigenous nation. In other words, Rollins recognized that 
“young men” of a given nation were not subject to the absolute sovereign will of their 
leaders. Instead, in accordance with the dictates of popular sovereignty, any indigenous 
person could refuse an order from his or her leader except in extreme circumstances.342 
Personal freedom was more important than the consolidation of power. 
Although these indigenous nations made no land cessions in this treaty, Article 
XV provided for the establishment of a boundary line consummate with the line of 
military posts in central Texas.343 The United States simply assumed that the lands east of 
the line had already been ceded. Indeed, the Ndé never made any land cessions to the 
United States or any other power. It was not the prerogative of the United States to assert 
the extension of a line of settlement without proper disposal of Indian title to the lands in 
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question. This extralegal action on the part of Rollins as representative of the settler state 
resulted in a question of clouded land title that remains problematic to this day. In this 
sense, the United States cannot accord federal recognition to the Ndé because to do so 
would imply acknowledgment of this problematic issue of the ownership of the lands of 
South and Central Texas. 
 By late March of the following year, Agent Rollins concluded the necessity of 
land cessions from the indigenous peoples of Texas in the interest of settling the tribes on 
reserved lands and avoiding further hostilities between the indigenous nations and the 
settler state. He asserted “that no action, except that which was radical, could be 
effective; and that nothing short of a country for the Indians, over which the laws of the 
United States regulating our Indian intercourse and relations were extended, together with 
a temporary support for the Indians, could be safely adopted as a permanent policy.”344 
John Rollins died later in 1851 prior to the conclusion of the San Saba Treaty in late 
October.345 
 In the negotiations prior to the Treaty of San Saba, several Lipan Apache leaders 
spoke in favor of the agreement. Chiquito asserted that he and his people had the “desire 
to do as [the United States] advised us to cultivate the lands and raise corn and other 
things necessary for the support of ourselves and our children.”346 Quaco declared, “I 
have been and will continue to be the friend of the white man and people of the United 
States. They have been good to me.”347 Lamos stated that “the reasons of his great 
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satisfaction is he now has a hope of being settled where he can have his children about 
him.”348 Was this an instance of hegemony? No. Instead, Ndé leaders simply recognized 
that without these negotiations the U.S. military and the Texas Rangers would continue 
total war against the men, women, and children of the Lipan Apache Nation. 
 On October 28, 1851, Lipan Apache leaders signed the Treaty of San Saba with 
John A. Rogers, Special Agent for the Indians residing in Texas.349 The substance of this 
treaty extended and confirmed the exactions of two previous treaties, the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the 1846 Treaty of Council Springs. The false link of the original 
treaty made by Butler and Lewis now extended itself in direct manner over the 
indigenous polity of the Ndé. Article II provided the impetus for this inclusion.350 The 
Ndé established a final link to the United States with this treaty. Afterwards, only 
hardship and pain resulted from further interaction between the two sovereigns. 
 Article III extended terms of Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, made 
in 1848, over the Ndé indigenous nation.351 Herein the tribes acceded to the power of the 
United States to determine affairs in relation between Mexico and the U.S. settler state. 
Only in 1851 would Mexico have legal recourse to indemnities suffered on its part in 
relations to Lipan depredations. This legally-binding intergovernmental resolution would 
last only to January 1854 when the Gadsden Purchase superseded Article XI. The 
situation in Mexico changed dramatically before then in relation to the Ndé. Indeed, the 
Ndé, under the guidance of Lipan Apache leader Coyote, also a signatory to the San Saba 
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Treaty, engaged in an intergovernmental agreement with the town of Santa Rosa, 
Coahuila. 
The resulting document between the Lipan Apache and the Mexican village 
nullified U.S. assertions to preemptive power over the Ndé as contained in Article I of the 
San Saba Treaty. Texas, however, apparently lost its hold on the Texas Indians. Indeed, 
in Article I of the treaty made on the banks of the San Saba River, the United States 
preempted the powers of the state of Texas explicitly.352 Texas could no longer find that 
they had any kind of control over the homelands of the Ndé. Most significantly, the San 
Saba Treaty provided for no land cessions. In fact, Lipan Apaches never ceded any lands 
to the Republic of Texas, the state, or the United States. Even if Texas asserted that it 
need not extinguish Indian land title by treaty, the established conventions of the United 
States, of which Texas was a part, demanded land cessions from each tribe recognized in 
treaty relations in order to clear the Indian “right of occupancy.” The fact that the United 
States never adhered to its own diplomatic protocols is a stain on the national character. 
 Commissioner of Indian Affairs Lea apparently received no notice of this treaty. 
He concluded that the indigenous peoples of Texas required the rights to their homelands. 
He declared, 
“they are in such a condition as to be compelled to starve or steal. And if Texas will not 
consent to the arrangement suggested, necessary as it is to the security of her frontier, and 
the very existence of the Indians, she can have no just cause to complain of depredations 
committed by famishing aborigines of the country, who certainly have the right to live 
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somewhere; and nowhere, more certainly, than on the lands which they and their fathers 
have occupied for countless generations.”353 
In this statement, Lea recognized that the indigenous peoples of Texas held aboriginal 
title prior to any “doctrine of discovery.” This legal construction is the foundation for 
federal Indian law prior to 1871 when the United States ended treaty negotiations with all 
tribes. 
Shocking to Every Feeling of Humanity 
Whatever the intention of the United States, the federal government deployed 
three primary strategies for solving the Ndé “problem” after the treaty of 1851. These 
strong-arm tactics included economic dependency and subsequent starvation, the murder 
of Ndé warriors and civilians, and, ultimately, enforced exile beyond the boundaries of 
Texas. The federal “solution” to the problem of Ndé defense of territory resulted from 
these strategies. In effect, the United States “pacified” the Ndé to the detriment of 
territorial and structural integrity. From 1852 to 1853, the U.S. military initiated a set of 
maneuvers designed to control and subdue the indigenous nation. 
 As a result of the turnover in leadership, the U.S. government in relation to the 
Indians of Texas was forced to reinvent the wheel once again. By January 1852, Major 
George Thomas Howard assumed the role of Texas Indian Agent.354 Special Indian 
Agent John A. Rogers resigned before March 9, 1852.355 The Office of Indian Affairs 
instituted Horace Capron as Special Indian Agent in May 1852.356 Treaties having been 
concluded, the United States felt that it could deal with the Ndé in any form the settler 
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state so desired. As a result, Congress defunded the programs to encourage the Native 
peoples of Texas in their wellbeing. Reduced from the ability to engage in their shadow 
economy by the presence of the U.S. military, Lipan Apaches were reduced to the 
economics of dependency and starvation. Further, the increasing growth of the Anglo-
Texan population resulted in mass invasions of Lipan Apache territories and physical 
attacks. The settler state, always with the interest of the whites in mind, sought a final 
solution in imposing exile on the Ndé. 
 Beginning in July, Capron visited Lipan Apaches at Fredericksburg in the Hill 
Country of Central Texas. He met with Ndé leaders Chiquito, Chipota, and Castro with 
the purpose of removing Lipan Apaches from the vicinity of Fredericksburg to Fort 
Mason.357 This forced exile comprised one more example of the destruction of Ndé 
territorial integrity. While the Lipan Apache Nation never made any land cessions in any 
treaty, the United States proceeded as if the Ndé ceded rights to all of their traditional 
homelands with the purpose of exiling Lipan Apaches to points more and more remote 
from the Anglo-Texan settlers. Capron asserted 
“after talking with them freely upon the subject of their continued depredations, plans 
were suggested for preventing further difficulties between them and the white settlers. 
The only feasible one appeared to me to be for them to remove their whole tribe further 
into the interior, and out of the way of the settlers.”358 
As a result, Capron arranged to remove the Lipan Apaches to Fort Mason.359 The agent 
perceived this indigenous removal as the only possibility of rescuing the tribe. 
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 These accords resulted in the forcible removal of certain Lipan bands to 
incorporation within the fort system. The problem with dependency on the fort system for 
economic and social subsistence consisted of the increasing ease with which the United 
States or Texas could wipe out the indigenous population. Indeed, the Ndé removed to 
Fort Mason only to experience starvation at the hands of the U.S. military. The 
deterioration in the tribe began slowly. By late August, Capron found it necessary to 
request of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea that “in locating these Lipan 
Indians upon their present grounds, it is important they should be fed to some extent, as 
game is very scarce in all this region, and they are cut off from their usual resources of 
stealing from the settlers to sustain themselves.”360 Starvation, as a distinct possibility, 
came to be a stark reality. 
 U.S. Indian Agents blamed unscrupulous whites dealing in the alcohol trade for 
further Ndé depredations. Howard, as leader of all of the agents to the Texas Indians, 
declared that Capron “also states that the Chiefs and older men of the tribes are anxious 
to remain on terms of peace and amity with the whites. But that they are unable to control 
their young men when the whites let them have liquor.”361 Lipan Apaches remained 
“anxious to be at peace” with the settler state. The terms of the peace, however, required 
a rejection of alcohol as a threat to the vitality of the Ndé. 
 Coupled with extensive neglect by the Commissioner and the U.S. Congress, 
Lipan Apaches starved. Capron acknowledged 
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“the absence of all official advice from the Commissioner of Washington, particularly in 
relation to appropriations for the Indian Service in Texas, cripples materially the 
operations of the Agents. And whilst my presence amongst the Indians might be useful 
with a comparatively small amount to purchase food for them, it is rendered entirely 
useless for want of it.” 
Capron clearly understood the implications of the neglect of the Indian Office in relation 
to the Ndé. Deprived of their ability to engage in the shadow economy and unable to 
subsist any longer on the animals of the Plains, the United States reduced Lipan Apaches 
to starvation in an economy of austerity. Capron explained that “there is no exaggerating 
the starving condition of these Indians, and with every disposition on their part to be 
friendly, they are forced into predatory excursions to sustain life.”362 The Indian Agent 
recognized one of the underlying reasons in the rise of the shadow economy. 
 Carnage and massacre consisted of added elements to Ndé starvation. All 
suggestions left aside of a U.S.-led conspiracy to annihilate the Lipan on the level of 
Mexico’s policies in the 1850s, the end result was the same. Indeed, in December 1852, 
the U.S. military once again committed horrible atrocities against Ndé people. The reason 
these actions remain documented is that Capron, unlike most other Indian agents and 
military officers on the frontier, had a conscience. Prior to his removal from office, 
Capron reported a massacre initiated by U.S. General William S. Harney against the Ndé.  
The carnage was born from a case of mistaken identity. An unnamed Mexican 
accused Lipan Apaches under the direction of Chief Manuel of descending on a ranch on 
the San Antonio River and driving off twenty-five horses, wounding several persons in 
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the melee. Indeed, the Mexican informant asserted that he knew they were Lipan because 
Manuel announced it, an action suspect in its own right. For General Harney, this 
supposed action was sufficient for him to propose the annihilation of the tribe. Upon 
further investigation, Capron discovered that Manuel was with the Delaware interpreter, 
John Connor, two hundred miles away from the scene of the horse-theft. Capron 
petitioned the U.S. Indian Commissioner in January, asserting that “the result of our 
inquiries was reported to General Harney by Major Howard, but the order had gone forth 
for killing all the men and making all the women and children prisoners.” Furthermore, 
General Harney succeeded in imprisoning Ndé women and children. He allowed the men 
to escape. This atrocity, unparalleled in previous U.S. military actions against the Ndé, 
provoked the conscience of Capron. He also recognized that such rash attacks on the 
sovereignty of an indigenous nation could only result in further depredations in Texas. 
Capron stated that “under any circumstances the result I fear will prove disastrous to the 
peace of the frontier settlers, as it is shocking to every feeling of humanity.”363 
Capron, dissatisfied with the inaction of the federal government in disciplining 
General Harney, traveled to Washington to gain an audience with Indian Commissioner 
Lea. Unfortunately there is no record of such a meeting, perhaps because it never 
occurred. Instead, the Texas Indian Agent outlined the scandal in a letter, stating that the 
U.S. military killed some Lipan Apache warriors and 
“a few women and children captured; the tribe scattered, stripped of their horses and 
mules, their clothing…their camp burned, and even their presents lately distributed 
among them by the Indian Agents, and their blankets, have been taken from them as 
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trophies of war, and, by consequence, all that survive turned loose upon the borders at an 
inclement season of the year, destitute and fired with revenge.”364 
One of the soldiers involved in the atrocities succinctly observed that “the property the 
wealthy Lipan Indians had, which was destroyed in obedience to the orders of General 
Harney.”365 This statement is telling in the sense that the soldiers ascribed “wealth” to the 
Lipan Apaches because of the goods recently distributed. His comments beg the question 
of why the Ndé starved while maintaining vast amounts of what he termed “wealth.” 
Surprisingly the Indian Agent sympathized with the losses of the Ndé in the 
destruction of their lives, property, and integrity. He recognized that Lipan Apaches 
would have no choice but to turn to depredations against Anglo settlers as a result of the 
widespread devastation brought on by the order of General Harney. Capron declare that 
“every principle inherent in the Indian character, every feeling that can operate to arouse 
oppressed and starving human beings to resistance, will drive this warlike tribe to 
extremities.” General Harney, famed for his exploits during the Indian “wars,” in essence, 
was nothing more than a brigand. Capron recognized that “this tribe has been subjected to 
the unfortunate attack while guileless of any participation in the crime.”366 Given the 
haste of Harney’s orders, it was not surprising that Lipan Apaches suffered for the 
misdeeds of others, most likely a collection of outlaws on the San Antonio River. 
In marked contrast to Capron’s demands for justice, Howard, his superior, 
attempted to smooth over the horrors that General Harney initiated. His concern lay more 
with appeasing the white settlers than caring for the Ndé. Howard declared in March, 
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three months after the event, “the Indians…must be fed in order to keep them quiet.” 
From this statement, the conclusion is that Howard had no sense of mission to alleviating 
the poverty of Lipan Apaches. Instead, his purpose was to subdue them, keep them in 
starvation mode, and placate the U.S. military and the colonizing settlers. Howard met 
with an unnamed Lipan Apache chief and found that the chief’s “tribe is starving and is 
anxious to have a talk with me about late occurrences.”367 Indeed, Howard’s silvered 
tongue portrayed the Lipan Apaches as quelled from their anger over the atrocities 
sustained. In mid-March, the Agent stated “my last communication anticipated a probable 
outbreak on account of the severe character of General Harney’s order. I have now the 
pleasure to state that all feelings of animosity on the part of our red brethren has been 
removed. My visits and explanations have soothed away all irritation. I have prevented 
depredations of every description.”368 If only in his own perception, Howard figured that 
the sole responsibility for ending the “war” between the United States and the Ndé was 
his alone. The triple-pronged initiative of starvation, carnage, and forced exile, however, 
remained in place as, wittingly or no, the policy of the Indian Administration in alliance 
with the military. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, the linkages between the United States and the Lipan Apache tribe 
resulted in a firm bond between the federal government and the indigenous nation absent 
what happened in the following years. The United States government broke its promises 
                                                
   367 George T. Howard to Commissioner Luke Lea, San Antonio, Texas, March 1, 1853, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Texas Indian Agency, Record Group 75, Microfilm Publication M#234, Roll 
859, National Archives. 
   368 George T. Howard to Commissioner Luke Lea, San Antonio, Texas, March 18, 1853, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Texas Indian Agency, Record Group 75, Microfilm Publication M#234, Roll 
859, National Archives. 
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time and time again. Diplomatic sovereignty, ever elusive to the Ndé in relation to the 
Republic of Texas and the settler state of Mexico, appeared to finally gain a solid 
foothold in relations with the United States. Emphasis, however, must be placed on the 
word “appeared.” This appearance proved a mirage. The United States ultimately failed 
in its mission to accord sovereignty to the indigenous peoples of Texas. The Ndé 
concluded three treaties with the United States during the nation’s treaty era from 1845 to 
1852. In each of these treaties, the Lipan made no land cessions. As a result, indigenous 
land title remained a question unanswered. What, then, was the solution to problem of the 
Ndé as a thorn in the side of the both Texas and the United States? The ultimate answer 
lay in forced exile and destruction of Lipan Apache structural integrity promulgated in 


























Sovereignty is the ability of a nation to exercise internal forms of self-government 
and external diplomatic relations. In the mid-nineteenth century, three sovereign entities 
engaged the indigenous nation of the Lipan Apache, or Ndé. These entities included the 
Republic of Texas, the United States, and Mexico. Each of these governments 
perpetuated colonial and imperial attempts at social control of the Lipan. Each settler 
state, however, also accorded some recognition of Ndé sovereignty in the form of treaties. 
While the official position of the Mexican government was to grant citizenship to all 
indigenous peoples, in practice the settlers of northeastern Mexico chose to both establish 
intergovernmental agreements with the Lipan Apache Nation as well as engage in 
military expeditions against this indigenous nation. The Republic of Texas, particularly 
under the aegis of President Sam Houston, promoted treaty relations along the lines of 
U.S. Indian policy up to the 1830s. The United States, upon completing three treaties 
with the Ndé, proceeded to marginalize, massacre, and force Lipan Apache into exile. 
Indigenous sovereignty, as practiced by the Ndé, reflected notions of true democracy 
internally and honorable negotiations externally. 
Beginning with the turn of the twentieth century, several historians began to study 
Lipan Apaches with regard to the nation’s relations with the Republic of Texas and the 
United States. These studies, however, promoted a scientific notion of objectivity that 
masked certain prejudices these historians held toward indigenous peoples in general. In 
the 1930s, anthropologists recorded the traditions and belief systems of the Ndé. Again, 
while the accomplishments of these writers consisted of the categorization of Lipan 
Apache elements of culture, the anthropologists contained bias in their writings. In the 
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1960s and 1970s, the Lipan Apache case before the Indian Claims Commission resulted 
in three primary studies of the impact of external sovereigns on the territorial integrity of 
the Ndé.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, many historians engaged in syntheses of several 
indigenous national histories contained within the boundaries of what is now the state of 
Texas. While these historians discussed Lipan Apache actions in relation to the settler 
states of Mexico, the Republic of Texas, and the United States, the Ndé remained 
peripheral to the study of the indigenous peoples of Texas. In the past eight years, several 
new tribal histories focused on Lipan Apache have made an appearance. These histories 
may be distinguished from the previous historiography by their focus not only on the 
Anglo-American encounter with the Ndé but also the Spanish and Mexican approaches to 
this indigenous nation. 
Within the historical context of the mid-nineteenth century, the case of the Lipan 
Apaches promoted diversity in colonial recognition on the part of Mexico, the United 
States, and the Republic of Texas through the colonial techniques of treaties and 
massacres. The Ndé, while subject to plebeian racism, also demanded political power and 
intergovernmental accords from the settler states of Mexico, the Republic of Texas, and 
the United States. The thesis promotes an understanding of Lipan Apache indigenous 
sovereignty that accords significance both to traditional forms of government and 
external relations with colonial powers. With regard to the government of Mexico, the 
settler state accorded citizenship to the Ndé in the 1824 Constitution. The practice of 
citizenship in the Mexican northeast, however, excluded the Lipan Apache as barbarian 
Indians, yet municipal governments treated with the Ndé on a government-to-government 
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basis. As for the Republic of Texas, three out of four presidential administrations treated 
with the Lipan Apache as a sovereign entity. By contrast, Mirabeau Lamar’s 
administration sought and failed to integrate the Ndé into Anglo-Texan settler society. 
The United States treated with the Lipan Apache on a nation-to-nation basis. After 
completion of these treaties, however, the U.S. government sought to starve, massacre, 
and exile the Ndé as final solutions to the Indian “problem”. Between 1836 and 1861, 
each of these three settler states attempted to destroy this indigenous nation while also 
entering into sovereign agreements with the Lipan Apache. 
This historical work examines the role of indigenous sovereignty as a form 
separate from the sovereignty of colonialist powers. By analyzing external responses on 
the part of three distinct governmental entities, the thesis asserts that sovereign 
recognition can be coupled with attempts to destroy indigenous peoples, particularly the 
Lipan Apache Nation within the boundaries of what is now the state of Texas and 
northeastern Mexico. In this nineteenth century study, the thesis further proves that the 
historical past cannot simply be studied as a litany of racist policies and belief systems. 
Instead, government officials of the United States, Mexico, and the Republic of Texas 
held vastly differing perspectives with regard to the Lipan Apaches. Some of these 
officials held no compunctions in attempting to annihilate this indigenous people. Other 
persons in official positions sought to alleviate the suffering of Ndé people in recognition 
of their humanity in accordance with a higher, moral law. The thesis answers significant 
questions relating to racism in the nineteenth century as well as the implications of 
sovereign recognition on the part of settler states towards indigenous and subject peoples. 
 168 
 While the main focus of the thesis is on Lipan Apache-white relations, I wish to 
interpose a caveat about the internal structuring of indigenous governance. Within tribal 
societies, a distinction must be made between the “ethnos,” a community of descent and 
affiliation, people, nation, tribe, and the “demos,” a politically defined community of 
public negotiation or the people as a political unit. The concept of “nation” itself implies 
a common culture, language, ethnicity, and history because the etymology of term 
derives from the Latin “natio” meaning “birth.” As a concept, then, indigenous nations 
describe the “ethnos.” Popular sovereignty, as practiced by the Ndé and other tribal 
nations, describes the “demos.” True democracy is the will of the people, unlike 
“representative” democracy such as found in the U.S. government. “Representative” 
democracy is a misnomer. Government by representative is not the same as government 
by the people. Many indigenous nations practiced and, still to this day, practice true 
democracy. The Ndé nation, with its hereditary leadership, comprised true democracy in 
the sense that Ndé people could always choose not to abide by the rule of the hereditary 
chief. 
Settler colonialism, as a set of strategies and tactics, demanded blood in terms of 
the destruction of Lipan Apache lives. It, however, sought more than this. Settler 
colonialism required the destruction of traditional lifeways, culture, language, and 
indigenous forms of government. By 1861, the current settler states of Mexico and the 
United States had not accomplished these aims with regard to Lipan Apache culture, 
language, and government. If anything, the Ndé were poised to take advantage of the 
removal of the U.S. military from the frontier in a revitalization of the Lipan Apache 
“shadow” economy. In one significant respect, however, settler colonists succeeded in a 
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structural shift in Ndé society. Colonization required a reduction in the political status of 
Ndé women. As a result, Lipan Apache women no longer played the diplomatic roles 
they held throughout the long eighteenth century. Instead, mention of Ndé women all but 
disappears from the historical record for the mid-nineteenth century. Today, 
decolonization strategies choose to recognize the valued contributions of women 
throughout Ndé history, and the reincorporation of collaborative women leaders and 
diplomats as worthy political persons within the Ndé polity. 
 Taiaiake Alfred, in Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, 
attacks the very concept of “sovereignty” as inappropriate.369 He states that in making 
claims to sovereignty, indigenous elites accept the state as their design and allow 
indigenous political goals to be focused according to a “statist” pattern. Alfred believes 
that the act of promoting indigenous governance in terms of sovereignty comprises a 
problematic juncture. Sovereignty implies values opposed to those found in those 
indigenous philosophies that take pre-contact modes as their point of origin. Sovereignty 
comprises an exclusive concept rooted in coercive Western notion of powers. Acceptance 
of indigenous rights and claims to territories under the rubric of “state sovereignty” 
represents the extremity of white society’s notion of assimilating indigenous peoples. 
Concepts of indigenous sovereignty that do not challenge the racist core of Western 
thought serve to continue Western modes of representation. State sovereignty, put simply, 
is confounding. 
In contrast, this thesis asserts that sovereignty as a concept may be worthless, 
although it is possible to salvage a different connotation of the term sovereignty, If one 
                                                
   369 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 79-84. 
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makes reference to popular sovereignty – that political action must be based on 
persuasion and consensus-building instead of coercion – one can save the denotative 
concepts of the term as simply the exercise of political intergovernmental interaction and 
national viability and integrity. Does sovereignty as a term have to mean the physically 
and intellectually violent exercise of power by a state? No. This thesis presupposes a 
history of sovereignty and not nationhood because it does not exactly include indigenous 
notions of self-government. That is the purview of the Ndé theorist and historian. Instead, 
this thesis focuses on a history of how statist sovereigns viewed the Ndé nation as 
constituting a sovereign in and of itself. To say that this is wrong misses the point.  
According to Western notions of political self-government in the nineteenth 
century, settler states acknowledged the self-determination of indigenous nations within 
the framework of sovereignty. Sovereignty, as a concept, may be inappropriate as a label 
for indigenous political theory; however, one cannot simply ignore the viewpoints of the 
polities of the settler states in the nineteenth century. The fact that settler states 
recognized indigenous self-government through the lens of sovereignty or any other lens 
conveys significant information about settler states in relation to indigenous peoples. 
Settler states could have and often did simply ignore all indigenous rights to self-
governance. They could have and did ignore indigenous peoples’ rights altogether. As a 
result, sovereign recognition in the nineteenth century formed a basis of leverage for 
indigenous nations to garner recognition not only of their rights as peoples but also to 
interpose their own views on political philosophy. Without intergovernmental recognition 
in agreements and accords, the option for indigenous intellectuals to posit Native political 
formations would have remained a chimera. Recognition is not an end in itself, yet the 
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concept of intergovernmental relations is a necessary element to construction of viable 
indigenous polities. Indigenous nations do not reside in a vacuum. They must deal with 
settler states on several political levels. To posit a theory of indigeneity in political 
consciousness is integral. To disregard the presence of the settler state is folly. 
In her writings, Susan Miller asserts that the tribes have the full right to self-
determination.370 She argues that limited sovereignty is a fictional product of the colonial 
imagination. Like Alfred, Miller has doubts about the concept of sovereignty. In her 
writing, according to doctrines of sovereignty, the state has vast rights to control 
individual behavior. On the other hand, tribes exercised self-governance since time 
immemorial. Today, U.S. officials recognize “limited sovereignty” as inhering in 
indigenous nations. The notion of indigenous sovereignty comprises peoplehood. It 
remains a stated fact today, although the United States persists in violating tribal 
sovereignty. Miller asserts that sovereignty itself is a European concept, not indigenous. 
“Connotations of monarchy and state-type organization” alien to American Indian 
political thought inhere in the very idea of sovereignty.371 European notions of 
sovereignty assert the power of the state to limit individual behavior. Miller contrasts this 
idea of sovereignty with the indigenous principle of respect for the autonomy of all tribal 
members. Kinship is vital to indigenous law. Sovereignty issues focus on land tenure, 
land claims, and dispossession. 
Miller asserts further that decolonization is a “movement to rid the tribes of 
colonized relations with nation-states and the destructive effects of those relations.”372 
                                                
   370 See, for example, her essays in Susan A. Miller and James Riding In, eds., Native Historians Write 
Back: Decolonizing American Indian History (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2011), 9-40. 
   371 Miller and Riding In, Native Historians, 32. 
   372 Miller and Riding In, Native Historians, 34. 
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Decolonizing tribal government consists of changing them to serve indigenous instead of 
colonial interests. Historians must consult Indians for the acceptability of their works; 
however, all scholarship that replaces colonizing histories with indigenous-centered 
studies manifests decolonization. Indigenous methodologies decenter the statist 
assumptions of settler colonialism to focus instead on the needs of the tribes, prescribing 
indigenous histories that resist imperialist hegemony, rejecting the official language of 
the colonizer, and proposing historical narratives that indigenous nations may employ to 
further their own concepts of peoplehood. 
It is my hope that this thesis contributes to the national interests of the Lipan 
Apache Nation, although I understand the limitations that result from using only the 
sources of the colonizer. With the analysis and delineation of treaties with the United 
States, Mexico, and the Republic of Texas, this thesis takes as its purpose recognition of 
the inherent ideologies of self-determination composed within the confines of this 
indigenous nation. While recognizing that my work lacks Ndé voices except insofar as 
they have been recorded in the written historical record, my intentions have always been 
to attribute power, status, and worth to the Ndé. Further studies of the Ndé require the 
input of Lipan Apache scholars in the formation of historical accounts. These studies 
should also provide emphases on the Ndé perspective of these momentous events. The 
oral histories of the Ndé, as recorded by the elders of the nation, must take precedence in 
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